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Abstract 
Policy-based management has often been proposed as a flexible and efficient means for managing 
Quality of Service (QoS) in IP networks since policies can be dynamically changed without 
modifying the underlying implementation. Yet despite research projects, standardisation efforts 
and substantial interest from industry, network providers have been reticent to adopt it in practice. 
One of the most significant adoption barriers is that it is difficult to analyse policies to ensure the 
specification is consistent, free of conflicts. Policy analysis encompasses techniques and 
methodologies that provide the means to detect and resolve conflicts, and remains a poorly 
explored area. 
This thesis comprehensively covers QoS provisioning policies from service management to traffic 
engineering, and classifies inconsistencies that may arise between them. It presents an integrated 
framework for policy analysis which is based on formal methods and supported reasoning 
techniques. The analysis approach has two main aspects: the definition of appropriate rules for 
determining potential conflicts in policy specifications, and the effective deployment of analysis 
processes in the context of the managed environment. Detection rules are used to describe the 
conditions under which a conflict will arise and include information from policies and the 
managed environment itself to cater for the various QoS management conflicts. A comprehensive 
set of detection rules together with system-specific information is used by the analysis processes 
to determine potential inconsistencies. 
Analysis processes are distinguished between static and dynamic, which cater for conflicts that 
can be determined prior to policy enforcement and for conflicts that can only be detected at run- 
time, respectively. The former is an off-line process initiated by an administrator and searches the 
policy space for conflicts whose resolution is manual, whereas the invocation of the latter process 
and the subsequent detection of conflicts are automated. The run-time resolution process is also 
automated and is based on a pre-defined set of policies. The approach has been implemented in an 
integrated tool supporting both static and dynamic conflict analysis, which has been extensively 
tested for scalability over a range of static conflict types using large numbers of policies. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
Chapter I 
I Introduction 
It is evident that modem networks have become increasingly difficult to manage mainly due to the 
diversity in networking technologies, the vast number of resources, and the high demand for 
bandwidth-intensive as well as delay-sensitive applications. These complexities pose significant 
challenges to existing network management models, which can lead to cumbersome 
administration processes especially when network re-configuration is needed to adapt to new 
services, unpredicted demand, changing business objectives and application requirements. 
Policy-Based Management (PBM) is a management paradigm that has been researched over the 
past fifteen years and has been proposed as a potential solution for the problems stated above. 
Under this paradigm, an administrator can manage different aspects of a network or distributed 
system in a flexible and simplified manner by deploying a set of policies that govern its 
behaviour. Policies are technology independent rules aiming to enhance the hard-coded 
functionality of managed devices by introducing interpreted logic that can be dynamically 
changed without modifying the underlying implementation. This allows for a certain degree of 
programmability without the need to interrupt the operation of either the managed system or of 
the management system itself. Furthermore, this approach facilitates scalability since a few 
policies can manage devices in a collective fashion, thus avoiding the need of specifying multiple 
vendor-specific scripts for different device technologies as traditionally done. 
The advantages offered by PBM as a management technology attracted the attention of both the 
research community and industry. This has resulted in the development of a number of policy 
languages and frameworks, commercial products, as well as investigations into their applicability 
in various application domains. One of the most popular application domains is that of Quality of 
Service (QoS) management since network providers can realise their objectives through flexible 
programmability with respect to offered services and treatment of customer traffic. For this reason 
the application area considered in this thesis is QoS management, focusing on IP networks with 
DiffServ support. The QoS provisioning policies proposed apply to service management and 
traffic engineering, and essentially define how traffic should be treated in the network. 
As with any new technology however, PBM comes with some drawbacks or unresolved issues, 
the first being policy refinement. The operational behaviour of a managed system is usually based 
I 
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on business objectives that can be expressed as high-level policies. These need to be 
incrementally decomposed (refined) to lower-level policies that enforce management operatIons 
supported by the system. The second and most important problem is that of policy conflicts. 
These are inconsistencies that can arise between policy rules as a result of specification errors, 
omissions, or contradictory management operations and, in some cases, can have catastrophic 
effects on the operation of the managed system. The work in this thesis tackles the largely 
unresolved issue of policy conflicts in the context of QoS management policies for DiffServ 
networks. 
1.1 Research Motivation 
Although extensive research has been done in developing policy specification languages, 
protocols and architectures to support policy-based management, relatively little attention has 
been devoted to the fundamental issue of policy conflict analysis, which is evidenced by the lack 
of tool support. This is the main reason why policy-based management has not been widely 
adopted, despite its potential benefits of flexibility and constrained programmability. 
Policy conflicts had been initially studied in the context of generic management policy and were 
broadly classified as staticý and dynamic - static conflicts are those that can be detected at policy 
specification time, whereas dynamic ones refer to those that can only be detected at policy 
enforcement time. Subsequent research in specific application domains, such as security 
management and call control in telecommunication networks, mainly focused on static conflicts. 
This involved simple analysis and resolution was mostly based on the specification of policy 
precedence rules that may not suit many policy-driven systems. Furthermore, policy conflicts in 
the domain of QoS management, which was of primary interest to the IETF, have not been 
considered and, consequently, techniques for their effective detection and resolution have not 
been developed. 
In contrast to static inconsistencies that can be deterinined by off-line processes before policy 
deployment, dynamic conflicts can only be detected during system execution since they depend 
on the current state of the managed system. For example, conflicts can occur between policies for 
dynamically allocating resources and those setting quotas for users or classes of service. As such, 
automation should be a key aspect of dynamic analysis mechanisms so that the operational impact 
of a conflict can be kept to a minimum. This issue has not been adequately addressed in the 
literature and concrete methodologies for handling run-time inconsistencies have not been 
developed. 
There is limited value in deploying policy-based management systems that do not provide support 
for conflict detection and resolution. The deficiencies in addressing conflict analysis identified 
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above motivate the work presented in this thesis, the objective of which is to develop a 
methodology and supporting tools so that the consistency of QoS management policies can be 
ensured. In this respect, the various conflicts that might occur in DiffServ environments are 
identified and categorised, and an approach for both static and dynamic policy analysis is 
proposed. This is based on the logic formalism of Event Calculus, which serves as the underlying 
formal representation for both the system and the policies. The logic-based approach allows for 
advanced reasoning capabilities to cope with the requirements of effectively analysing for 
conflicts in complex systems such as QoS management. 
1.2 Thesis Contributions 
In an effort to extend previous work on policy conflicts and to develop new techniques for 
conflict analysis, several research contributions have been achieved. These can be surnmarised as 
follows: 
e QoS management policies: A small number of QoS management policies have 
previously been defined, mostly targeting specific QoS provisioning operations. In this 
thesis a comprehensive set of such policies, from service management to traffic 
engineering, is provided and the effect of their enforcement on the behaviour of managed 
modules and associated DiffServ managed objects is described. The specification of these 
policies using the Ponder format, one of the most widely adopted policy languages, is also 
provided. 
0 QoS management policy conflicts: A wide range of potential conflicts related to QoS 
management policies, not been previously reported in the literature, have been identified 
including the conditions under which they arise. Some of these conditions can apply to 
other resource management frameworks. The conflicts have been classified based on their 
level of abstraction, the QoS provisioning subsystem in which they occur, their specificity 
to the application domain, and the time frame at which they can be detected. 
0 Static conflict analysis: The rules that describe the conditions under which static QoS 
management conflicts will arise have been defined and a methodology for their detection 
has been developed. This is based on the formal representation of policies and the 
managed system components, and the use of abductive reasoning techniques. The use of 
the latter to not only detect static inconsistencies but also to generate explanations as to 
how they occur has been demonstrated. 
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Dynamic conflict analysis: An approach for detecting and resolving dynamic QoS 
management conflicts has been developed which, as in the case of static analysis, is based 
on formal methods. The approach allows for the automatic deployment of conflict 
analysis processes at system execution time by monitoring policy enforcement. Detection 
is based on deductive reasoning over defined conflict rules and resolution is achieved 
without human intervention using generic resolution policies. The latter is a flexible 
solution that overcomes the limitations of traditionally used precedence rules. 
Tool support and performance evaluation: The issue of lack for conflict analysis tool 
support has been addressed by developing the proposed analysis techniques and 
integrating them in a tool. The tool provides a usable interface that hides the complexity 
of the underlying formal methods and allows for both static and dynamic consistency 
checks to be performed. Furthermore, the performance of the static analysis engines has 
been evaluated through extensive experimentation over a range of conflict types - this is 
something that has not been adequately addressed in the literature. 
1.3 Thesis Structure 
This chapter introduced the basic principles of policy-based management, described the 
motivation for investigating policy conflicts and analysis techniques, and presented the research 
contributions. The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows: 
Chapter 2- Background and Related Work: This chapter provides an overview of the 
background topics and the most important related work associated with this thesis. More 
specifically, previous work in the areas of policy-based management, conflict analysis, and formal 
approaches for policy specification and analysis, is presented and discussed. The application 
domain of QoS provisioning in DiffServ networks is also described. 
Chapter 3- Policies for DiffServ QoS Management: This chapter provides a comprehensive 
set of QoS provisioning policies that can be used to manage different aspects of the chosen 
application domain, such as admission control and resource management. The specification of the 
various policies is provided and the influence on the system behaviour as a result of their 
enforcement is described. 
Chapter 4- Static Policy Conflict Analysis: This chapter presents the approach for the 
detection of static conflicts. Various static inconsistencies related to QoS management policies are 
identified and how the conditions under which they arise can be encoded into conflict rules is 
shown. Furthermore, the use of the logic formalism of Event Calculus to represent both policies 
4 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
and the managed system is described, and the use of abductive reasoning to detect the presence of 
inconsistencies is demonstrated. 
Chapter 5- Dynamic Policy Analysis and Conflict Resolution: This chapter presents the 
dynamic conflict analysis approach. Dynamic QoS management conflicts are identified and 
classified, and the formal representation - which is extended to model policy enforcement - used 
in conjunction with deductive reasoning to detect inconsistencies at run-time is described. 
Furthermore, the methodology by which dynamic analysis can be achieved in an automated 
fashion is presented. 
Chapter 6- Tool Support and Experimental Evaluation: This chapter describes the design and 
implementation of the tool developed to support the proposed conflict analysis techniques. 
Evaluation results regarding the performance, scalability and correct operation of the tool are also 
presented. 
Chapter 7- Conclusions and Future Work: The last chapter concludes this thesis by 
summarising the work and discussing the contributions. Future directions of this research are also 
suggested. 
5 
Chapter 2. Background and Related Work 
Chapter 2 
2 Background and Related Work 
This chapter lays the foundations for the work presented in the core part of this thesis. It provides 
the reader with an overview of the background topics and the most important related work in the 
areas of policy-based management, conflict analysis, and Quality of Service in DiffServ networks. 
The chapter begins by introducing the main policy-based frameworks and concepts proposed in 
the literature along with a bnef description of the format and the various components of the 
policies used. This is followed by a section on policy conflicts, which reports the conflict types 
identified in various application domains and describes the reasons for their occurrence. The two 
subsequent sections present prior work relating to techniques for the detection and resolution of 
conflicts, highlighting the pros and cons. Formal approaches for policy specification and analysis 
are also discussed here, focusing on those based on first order logic. The latter part of the chapter 
provides details about the application domain tackled in this thesis, consisting of an overview of 
QoS in IP networks, an example architecture providing such a capability in DiffServ 
environments, and relevant work on QoS policies. Finally, the last section summarises the 
chapter. 
2.1 Policy-Based Management: Frameworks and Languages 
The increasing complexities and heterogeneity of modem networking technology, and the vast 
number of resources to be managed, pose significant challenges to network management models. 
Policy-Based Management (PBM) is a promising solution for these demands, providing the means 
by which the administration process can be simplified and automated to a large extent. A policy, 
the basic building block of the policy-based paradigm, is a set of rules that govern the behaviour 
of a managed system. As these rules constitute interpreted logic, the approach facilitates 
flexibility and adaptability in that policies can be dynamically changed without modifying the 
underlying implementation. 
PBM has been the subject of extensive research over the past years, evidenced by several research 
and development efforts in both academia and industry, working groups leading standardisation 
efforts, technical conferences, and new commercial products. This section presents the three most 
important PBM frameworks and associated specification languages in the literature. Although all 
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frameworks have influenced the evolution of policy research in the management community, the 
work carried out at Imperial College London has paved the way for advances in policy-based 
approaches. 
2.1.1 IETF Policy Management Framework 
The joint effort of the IETF [I] and DMTF [2] resulted in a generic policy architecture, which, as 
illustrated in Figure 2-1, consists of four major functional elements: the Policy Management Tool 
(PM7), Policy Repository, Policy Decision Point (PDP), and Policy Enforcement Point (PEP). 
Policy management 
tool 
Policy 
repository 
Policy decision point 
Policy enforcement point 
Figure 2-1: The IETF/DMTF Policy framework [42] 
The PMT is used by an administrator to define or update the policies to be enforced in the 
managed network. Resulting policies are stored in a repository in a form that must correspond to 
the information model in [3] so as to ensure interoperability across products from different 
vendors. When new policies have been added in the repository, or existing ones have been 
changed, the PMT issues the relevant PDP with notifications, which in turn interprets the policies 
and communicates them to the PEP. The latter is a component that runs on a policy-aware node 
and can execute (enforce) the different policies. The components of the architecture can 
communicate with each other using a variety of protocols. The preferred choice for 
communicating policy decisions between a PDP and network devices (PEPs) is the Common 
Open Policy Service (COPS) [4], or SNMP [5], and LDAP [6] for the PMT/PDP-repository 
communication. 
The simplest approach for policy specification is through a sequence of rules, in which each rule 
is the form of a simple condition-action pair. The IETF policy framework adopts this approach 
and considers policies as rules that specify actions to be performed in response to defined 
conditions: 
If <condition(s)> then <action(s)> 
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The conditional part of the rule can be a simple or compound expression specified in either 
conjunctive or disjunctive normal form. The action part of the rule can be a set of actions that 
must be executed when the conditions are true. The IETF does not define a specific language to 
express network policies but rather a generic object-oriented information model for representing 
policy information (PCIM) [3]. This model is a generic one, specifying the structure of abstract 
policy classes by means of association, thus allowing vendors to implement their own set of 
conditions and actions to be used by the policy rules. 
2.1.2 Ponder Policy Framework 
Initial work in [7] describes the concept of policies in distributed systems management. Here, 
policies are viewed as objects which define the relationships between subjects (managers) and 
targets (managed objects), and are separated from the managers' functionality. This facilitates the 
dynamic change of the behaviour and adaptivity to new requirements without re-implementing the 
management applications. In [8] the authors identify that specifying policies for individual 
managed entities in large-scale systems is not a practical approach. They propose the use of 
domains as the means of grouping objects representing managed entities to which policies apply, 
thus partitioning the management responsibility. 
The concept of domains is a key aspect of the Ponder policy framework which is depicted in 
Figure 2-2 [9]. Here, an administrator can create and modify policies using a policy editor. 
Authorisation policies are disseminated to target agents as specified by the target domains and 
obligation policies to manager agents (PMAs) as specified by the subject domains. Policies can be 
subsequently enabled, disabled or removed from the agents. Obligation policies are interpreted by 
manager agents, which register with the monitoring service to receive events relevant to their 
activation. Upon receiving an event, the agent queries the domain service to determine the target 
objects and performs the policy action(s). 
Query 
subjects 
& targets 
Editor 
Enable Policy Servic 
Qu" 
Domain SeNce 
policy targets 
MW 
0+10- policies 
Manager A-, 'A- policies 
Agent 
Perform actions 
Register 
Monitoring Ser\vAAce Nofify (event) Target Objects Domain 
Figure 2-2: The Ponder Policy Management architecture [91 
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Subsequent work on Ponder [ 10] [II] involved the design of a deployment and enforcement model 
and the development of a toolkit integrating the various components of the framework to support 
the whole policy life-cycle relating to the specification and management of deployed policies. The 
toolkit provides a comprehensive policy-based management platform based on an object-oriented 
Java implementation and has been widely used in the research community. The next part 
describes the various policy types supported by this toolkit. 
The Ponder policy specification language 
Ponder is a declarative, object-oriented language [12] that can be used to specify both security and 
management policies. It supports two main policy types as described below: authorisation and 
obligation policies. 
Authorisation policies define what actions a manager (subject) can perform on target objects. 
These policies are enforced by access controllers running in the target objects' environment 
aiming to protect resources from unauthorised access. A positive authorisation policy is used to 
define the actions that subjects are permitted to perform on target objects, whereas negative 
authorisations define the actions that subjects are prohibited from performing. The policy in 
Listing 2-1 presents the syntax of a positive authorization. In this example, the policy specifies 
that project managers are granted access to confidential documents, only between office hours as 
expressed by the condition of the last line. 
Listing 2-1: Authorisation policy example 
inst auth+ confDOCACCeSS f 
subject /users/projectmanagers; 
target /doCRepository/confidential; 
when time. between(0900,1800); 
I 
Obligation policies are even t- condition -action (ECA) rules that define the operations that must be 
performed by managers of the subject domain on objects of the target domain when certain events 
occur, given some supplementary conditions being true. While authorisations are executed by 
access controllers, obligation polices are enforced by PMAs which facilitate adaptation of the 
managed system according to emerging conditions. The events triggering obligation policies can 
be external events notified by monitoring service components, or internal timer events as in the 
example of Listing 2-2. Here, an archiving process is instructed to create a backup of documents 
in the repository every night at 2: 00 a. m. The "->" operator in the action part of the policy allows 
sequential execution of operations and is used here to create a log once the backup process has 
finished. 
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Listing 2-2: Obligation policy example 
inst oblig+ backup f 
on event(atTime(0200)); 
subject /archiver; 
target /dOCRePOSitory; 
do backupDOCSO -> createLogo; 
2.1.3 Policy Management for Autonomic Computing 
The Policy Management for Autonomic Computing (PMAC) platform [13][141 is part of IBM's 
initiative on autonomic computing, which defines a framework for self-managing IT systems. 
PMAC is a generic middleware platform that can be used to manage aspects of large-scale 
distributed systems including QoS, security and auditing. The architecture of the platform is 
depicted in Figure 2-3 which provides components for policy creation, policy evaluation, and 
enforcement at managed resources. 
Policy management domain 
Def inition 
and persistence PDT, PES PDTz 
Policy evaluation 
and decision AM, AM2 
4A 
E 
MRS 
Computer system 1 Computer system 2 Computer system 3 
Managed system domain 
Figure 2-3: The PMAC architecture [13] 
At the highest level, multiple Policy Definition Tools (PDT) are supported for concurrent policy 
authoring. Policies are stored in a centralised Policy Editor Storage (PES) which can also hold 
metadata such as templates for policy re-use. The main component of PMAC is the Autonomic 
Manager (AM), the role of which is similar to that of the PDP in the IETF framework, but 
supports additional features such as state monitoring, event correlation and notification. AMs 
obtain policies from the PES and register Managed Resources (MR) that are interested in 
receiving policy directives from them. MRs provide two interfaces, Sensors (S) and Effectors (E), 
which represent the attributes that can be read from the resource and the management operations 
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that can be performed on the resource respectively. AMs evaluate policies based on the sensed 
state of resources, which can invoke actions on MRs via the effector interface and consequently 
changing their behaviour. 
Policies in the PMAC framework are specified using the Autonomic Computing Policy Language 
(ACPL), the structure of which is defined using an XML schema. They are ECA rules, where the 
conditional part is specified with a generic constraint language, which is also XML-based. The 
advantage of using such an approach is that the resulting policies can be parsed and type checked 
by XML parsers, thus making it attractive to applications that can consume XML format. 
Furthermore, the language can be extended relatively easy with new operations by modifying the 
schema and adding the extension operators. The problem with an XML representation is that 
policies can become quite verbose and not easily interpreted by human administrators. 
2.2 Policy Conflicts 
As with any programmable system, a policy-driven one can suffer from inconsistencies incurred 
by conflicting rules governing its behaviour. This problem becomes more acute with increasing 
policy-influenced functionality supported by a managed system and thus the number and types of 
policies used. Policy conflicts have been described as being analogous to software bugs, which, 
according to [15], occur when two or more policies are activated simultaneously enforcing 
contradictory management operations on the system. 
Policy conflicts can be broadly classified into domain -independent and application-specific, 
where the former, as the names suggest, are independent of the policy application, and the latter 
are bound by the constraints of the application domain. This section presents the main conflict 
types identified in the literature ranging from simple modality conflicts to more specialised ones 
in the areas of distributed systems management, security and QoS management, and call control 
in telecornmunication networks. 
2.2.1 Domain-Independent Policy Conflicts 
One of the most common types of inconsistency cited in the literature is the conflict of modalities 
[16][17]. This is a generic conflict that can occur in any policy-driven system which supports 
policies of opposite modalities, as for example positive and negative authorisations. 
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PI 
P2 - 
Figure 2-4: Modality conflict overlaps 
According to [18], these conflicts arise when two or more policies with modalities of opposite 
sign refer to the same subjects, actions and targets. This occurs when there is a triple overlap 
between the sets of subjects, targets and actions as shown in Figure 2-4. Based on the 
authorisation and obligation policies supported by Ponder, the authors identify three types of 
modality conflicts as follows: 
0 0+/0- The subjects are both required and required not to perform the same actions on 
the target objects. 
0 A+/A- The subjects are both authorised and forbidden to perform the actions on the 
target objects. 
0 0+/A- The subjects are required but forbidden to perform the actions on the target 
objects. 
Practical examples of this conflict type can be found in [17] and [19]. 
2.2.2 Policy Conflicts in Distributed Systems Management 
One of the first application domains for which policy conflicts have been considered is that of 
distributed systems management. The authors of [18] and [201 identify various conflicts in this 
area and classify them as follows: 
0 Conflict of Resources: This occurs when the number of resources (target objects) 
available is limited. For example, a policy controlling system backup activities may 
require more disk space than the pre-allocated amount. 
Multiple Managers Conflict: Multiple managers (subjects) may manage the same 
objects that are shared between several tasks. This conflict will occur if the outcomes of 
management operations are incongruent with each other. For example, spooling a job to a 
printer and shutting the same printer down. 
Self-Management Conflict: This situation is of a manger managing itself, and will occur 
if a subject is allowed to retract policies that it is supposed to perform. 
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0 Conflict of Interest: This conflict arises when the same subject can perform management 
tasks on two different sets of targets which are competing. For example, a bank provides 
investment advice to a client whilst performing a merger for a competing client. 
Another common inconsistency cited in the literature is the conflict of duties, which is also stated 
as the requirement to ensure separation of duties. This conflict has been studied in [211 and [221 in 
the context of access control systems. Such a conflict will arise if the same subject is permitted to 
perform operations that are not supposed to be carried out by the same entity. For instance, the 
same user should not be authorised for the operations of submitting, evaluating, and approving the 
budget in a company's financial system. A specialised form of separation of duty is the Chinese 
Wall policy [23], which prevents a subject performing any conflicting actions on one target, if that 
subject has already been given permission to perform a conflicting action on a different target. 
2.2.3 Policy Conflicts in Security Management 
There has been considerable work on IP security policy analysis evidenced by a number of 
publications [24][25][26]. The most representative work in this area is the one presented in [27] 
and [28], which deals with inconsistencies among legacy firewall policies. In [27] the authors 
identify the various conflicts that may arise between filtering rules on individual firewalls, which 
are referred to as intra-firewall anomalies. These depend on the relations of filtering rules and 
their relative ordering in a firewall. In this context, a policy anomaly is defined as the existence of 
two or more filtering rules that may match the same packet, or the existence of a rule that can 
never match any packet in the network paths crossing the firewall. Based on these principles the 
following anomalies have been identified: 
0 Shadowing: A rule is shadowed when a previous rule matches all the packets that match 
this rule, such that the shadowed rule will never be activated. 
0 Correlation: Two rules are correlated if they have different filtering actions, and the first 
rule matches some packets that match the second rule and the second rule matches some 
packets that match the first rule. 
0 Generalisation: A rule is a generalization of a preceding rule if they have different 
actions, and if the first rule can match all the packets that match the second rule. 
* Redundancy: A rule is redundant if there is another rule that produces the same matching 
and action such that if the redundant rule is removed, the security policy will not be 
affected. 
Irrelevance: A filtering rule in a firewall is irrelevant if this rule does match any traffic 
that may flow through this firewall. 
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The above anomalies and the reasons as to their occurrence have been cited in other works 
[29][30] and have been used as the subject for analysis. Apart from inconsistencies in the rule-set 
of a single firewall, anomalies may also arise between policies applying to different firewalls 
within an enterprise network. For example, an upstream firewall might block traffic that is 
permitted by a downstream firewall or vice versa. These are termed inter-firewall anomalies, the 
various types of which have been classified into shadowing, spuriousness, correlation, and 
redundancy anomalies [28]. Subsequent work in [31] identified one more inconsistency which 
applies to large scale environments such as the Internet, where there might exist multiple data 
paths to the same protected network: a cross-path anomaly refers to the case where some packets 
denied on one path are accepted through another. 
2.2.4 Policy Conflicts in QoS Management 
Very recent work in [32] targets the same application domain as the one considered in this thesis. 
Here, the authors identify conflicts among policies managing QoS in DiffServ networks, but only 
tackle a small portion of the problem regarding resource management at the router level. The 
policies involved in this process define the treatment of a traffic flow on network nodes by setting 
parameter values for BW allocation, queue size, drop method, and priority for the various Per- 
Hop Behaviours (PHBs). Inconsistencies among these policies are classified according to the 
scope in which they occur: intra-PHB conflicts arise within the flow properties at a specific node 
and inter-PHB conflicts occur between policy definitions across different nodes. 
Intra-PHB conflicts are further subdivided into two types: (a) Single parameter conflicts are 
simple inconsistencies that occur due to malformed parameter conditions such as a negative queue 
length, or a percentile parameter specified with a value greater than a hundred. (b) Multiple 
parameter conflicts occur as a result of dependencies between policy parameters and the 
constraints of the application domain. For example, if the priority level is specified by a flow, then 
the maximum bandwidth should be specified otherwise starvation for other flows will occur. 
PHB policies are set such that a flow meets some quality requirements. This implies that 
equivalent treatment should be exercised at all hops. Inter-PHB conflicts occur when a particular 
flow meets different behaviours at more than one node along its path from source to destination, 
which can result in quality reduction. Examples of this conflict type include different bandwidth 
allocations or different types of forwarding priorities at successive nodes for the same class of 
service. 
In contrast to the above conflicts, the inconsistencies identified in this thesis cover a wider 
spectrum of QoS policies implementing service management and traffic engineering functions, 
both at the network and device levels. 
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2.2.5 Policy Conflicts in Call Control for Telecommunication Networks 
Another application domain for which conflict analysis has been addressed is that of 
telecommunications and more specifically call control. Within this domain, features [33] have 
been widely used to provide users with some control over calls, which, in a similar fashion to 
policies, accommodate additional functionality to enhance the base system. Inherent in feature- 
oriented systems is the problem of feature interactions, where the presence of one feature 
contradicts another thus causing unexpected beahaviour or even failure of calls. Many examples 
of this have been identified in telecommunications systems and documented in [34], [35] and 
[36]. 
With the increasing popularity of policy-based management and the advantages this technology 
provides, researchers investigated the use of policies to facilitate call control [37][38], as features 
tend to be low-level and fairly inflexible units of functionality. This work has been extended to 
investigate conflicts between policies governing the behaviour of call control mechanisms in the 
context of SIP (Session Initiation Protocol) communications [39][40]. Central to this work is the 
role of the policy server, which receives environmental information from call requests and 
responds by executing policy actions that determine how an incoming or outgoing call should be 
handled (e. g. continue as normal, add a party to the call, fork the call). The authors identify two 
distinct situations in which call control policies may conflict. The first is in conflicts between 
policies known to a single policy server, and the second is where conflicts occur between policies 
associated with two or more policy servers (distributed environment). 
Examples of the two conflict types are provided in [40]. To demonstrate a single server conflict, 
the authors use two user-defined call forwarding policies with the following actions: 
(a) fwdLateCa11sVM - forwards all calls after 3 pm to voicemail. 
(b) fwLDCallsHome - forwards long-distance evening calls after 6 pm to home. 
In this example, if the user receives a long distance call after 6 pm, both jWdLateCa11sVM and 
fwLDCallsHome policies apply to the call, which can potentially lead the policy server to an 
unstable state. For the case of a distributed setting, the two following policy actions are used: 
(a) noAddParly Outgoing - applies to the caller's (userA) policy server and prohibits other 
parties from being added to the call. 
(b) addParryHead - applies to the callee's (userB) policy server and requires an additional 
party to be conferenced into the call, when this originates from userA. 
Clearly these two policies conflict with each other. This inconsistency will arise when userA 
places a call to userB, leading the incoming and outgoing policy servers to disagree. 
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2.3 Policy Conflict Analysis 
To effectively use policies and drive the functionality of a managed system in a consistent 
manner, it is necessary to check that newly created policies do not conflict with each other or with 
policies already deployed in the system. To achieve this, detection processes utilise information 
regarding the conditions under which conflicts can arise to search policy spaces and identify 
policies that meet the conflict criteria. Resolution is the latter part of policy analysis, which aims 
at handling detected inconsistencies, preferably in an automated manner, so that consistency 
among policies can be restored. 
A number of detection and resolution approaches have been proposed over the years providing 
solutions for the various conflict types identified in the literature. This section presents the main 
approaches and classifies them based on the analysis technique used. A distinction is also made 
between methodologies that analyse policies statically at compile-time and those that can handle 
conflicts at run-time. 
2.3.1 Approaches for Conflict Detection 
Based on the types of conflicts identified in the literature and the different application domains in 
which they occur, research has concentrated in the development of mechanisms and techniques 
for their effective detection. Although modality conflicts can be detected by syntactic analysis, 
more specialised inconsistencies require a precise definition of the conditions for a conflict, which 
sometimes include domain-specific knowledge, and processes that utilise such information to 
signal the occurrence of a conflict. 
Lupu describes the manner in which modality conflicts can be determined in [41], where a 
detection process enumerates all subject, action, target tuples which have a different set of 
policies applying to them. If there are two or more policies applying to a tuple then there is a 
potential conflict and the policies can be checked to see if they have opposite modalities. 
Following the relevant example diagram given in the previous section, two policies Pl(+) and 
P2(-) will be signalled as being conflicting due to their common subjects, actions, and targets 
indicated by the tuple <sc, ac, tc>. This analysis is purely syntactic and does not require 
understanding of the policies. Below, more advanced methodologies are described catering for 
more complex conflicting situations. 
2.3.1.1 Detection based on meta-policies 
Application- specific conflicts arise from the semantics of the policy, which, according to [18], are 
specified in terms of constraints on attribute values of permitted policies. For example, in the case 
of the separation of duties described in Section 2.2.2, the conflict is particular to the actions of the 
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involved policies. To define the conflicting conditions, the authors in [18] make use of meta- 
policies, i. e. policies about management policies, which capture the various constraints pertaining 
to a conflict. The separation of duties example can be stated as "there should not be two policies 
having overlapping subject domains which give rights to submit and approve a company's 
budget", and can be represented as a logical predicate: 
intersectsubj(pl, P2) A (submit E Pl. actions) A (approve E P2. actions) A 
(Pl. targets = P2. targets = budget) A (Pl. mode = P2. mode = A+) 
=> P1 conflicts-with P2 
A set of meta-policies, encapsulating the descriptions for the various conflict types, are manually 
specified by an administrator and are evaluated during the detection process. The latter iterates 
through policy specifications on a pairwise basis and signals a conflict if it can match two policies 
that satisfy the conditions in a predicate. The fact that conflict definitions are separate from the 
detection process makes the approach scalable, since more meta-policies can be added at any 
stage in case further policy functionality is introduced and more conflicts are identified. This 
approach has been used as a general guideline by a number of researchers in this area, which 
instead propose different representations of conflict conditions and related information. 
2.3.1.2 Detection based on applicability spaces 
The notion of applicability spaces has been proposed in [42] and [43], where the conditional part 
of a policy, represented by a set of independent terms (such as time), can be looked upon as an 
independent axis in a hyper-dimensional space. Each policy rule defines a region in the hyper- 
dimensional space, and separate regions can be associated with a dependent term (such as a QoS 
class) that is identified by the rule. The detection of a conflict is based on overlaps between spaces 
that target incompatible dependent terms. 
Detection based on the intersection of applicability spaces has been extended by the work of IBM, 
which focuses on conflicts involved in the management of distributed systems. Agrawal in [14] 
and [44] describes the policy ratification process which is an integral component of the PMAC 
platform presented in Section 2.1.3. This is defined as the process by which a new policy is 
approved before being committed to the system by taking into account its potential interactions 
with other policies and its deployment environment. Based on the fact that the applicability of a 
policy relies on a set of conditions, this work proposes the use of Boolean expressions for 
constraint representation and evaluation. Therefore, the key ratification operation is to determine 
whether a conjunction of two Boolean expressions is satisfiable (simultaneously true). 
To achieve the above objective, policy constraints are mapped to Boolean expressions and 
subsequently transformed to linear inequalities. The latter are used to build matrix representations 
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which undergo linear transformations until a feasible solution can be found. If such a solution 
does not exist, it is assumed that two spaces do not intersect and subsequently no conflicts can be 
found. Although this approach contributes significantly in the complex task of constraint 
evaluation, taking into account a wide range of logic and arithmetic operators, it does not 
elaborate on the important issue of action incompatibility, which is the very reason behind the 
occurrence of policy conflicts. 
2.3.1.3 Detection based on policy relationships 
Conflicts in the area of security management come about as a result of the relations between 
firewall filtering rules and their relative ordering. The relations concern the network policy fields 
of protocol (TCP/IJDP), source, and destination (including address and port), which can be 
completely disjoint, exactly matching, inclusively matching, partially disjoint, or correlated. 
Instead of specifying separate rules regarding the conditions under which an anomaly would arise, 
most works in this area formalise separate rule relations, which are called from a detection 
process when performing comparisons. More specifically, the most representative work in this 
domain [27][28] developed an algorithm for discovering rule anomalies by implementing the state 
transition diagram in Figure 2-5. The latter illustrates the firewall anomaly discovery states for 
any two rules, R, and Ry, where R, comes before Ry. 
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Figure 2-5: State diagram for detecting firewall anomalies [271 
Initially no relationship is assumed by this algorithm. Each field in Ry is compared to the 
corresponding field in R, starting with the protocol, then source address and port, and finally 
destination address and port. The relationship between the two rules is determined based on the 
result of the aforementioned comparisons. The last step before flagging an anomaly involves 
equality tests between the action parts of the two rules. If, for example, every field in Ry is a 
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subset or equal to the corresponding field in R, and both rules have the same action, Ry is 
redundant to R, while if the actions are different, Ry is shadowed by R,. 
One shortcoming of this approach is the dependence on legacy firewall policies in order to 
perform anomaly analysis. This issue has been addressed in [29] where network security 
requirements can be specified using high-level notations whilst still being capable of a range of 
analysis tasks. 
2.3.1.4 Detection based on information models 
Motivated by the advantages provided by information models in representing managed entities, 
such as platform and protocol independency, the authors in [45] and [46] propose their use in the 
process of conflict detection. More specifically, this work is based on the DEN-ng model [47], 
which, apart from managed entities, is also used for representing both the policies and the 
conditions under which these may conflict. The latter are expressed with the Object Constraint 
Language (OCL) [48] in terms of invariants, pre- and post-conditions associated with attributes 
and operations modelled by policies. 
This work has recently been extended in [49] and [50] to support the overall methodology and 
implementation of the conflict detection approach. Here, the authors describe a two-Phase 
analysis algorithm which, querying an information model, firstly determines the relationships 
between a pair of policies and, secondly, applies conflict patterns to determine if the policies 
should be flagged as conflicting. Policy relationships are expressed in terms of policy subjects, 
targets and actions, while conflict patterns concern constraints defined in the infon-nation model 
describing policy relationships that must hold for a conflict. Determining a conflict involves 
transforming the above information into matrices and performing comparisons. 
ssb ssp secl scor 0 0 0 0 1 0- -1 1 1 1 0- 
tsb tsp req tcor 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
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Figure 2-6: Conflict computation 
The left part of Figure 2-6 depicts the format of such a matrix providing a common representation 
to both policy relationships and conflict patterns. The different entries in the matrix concern the 
relationships between the various fields of policies: rows represent the subjects, targets, events, 
constraints and actions, while columns indicate the relationship type 
(subset, superset, equal, 
correlated, mutually exclusive, conflicting). The right part of Figure 2-6 demonstrates a matrix 
comparison operation to determine a shadowing filtering policy conflict, where relationships are 
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asserted by placing I's in the relevant fields. The first matrix concerns the relationship between 
two filtering policies, while the second one represents the pattern for this particular conflict type. 
The comparison operator combines the values of the two matrices indicating the detection of a 
conflict if the outcome is 1. 
The use of information models is also proposed by Kempter in [5 1 ], where invariants extracted 
from the models are used as indicators for conflicts when they are breached. Although this 
approach benefits from the inherent advantages of information models, XML representation of 
policies and conflicting conditions can become very verbose thus posing a cumbersome task for a 
network administrator if a manual change is required. Furthermore, the use of matrices in [49] 
limits the definition of relationships to the core fields of a policy. As such, conflicts that arise as a 
result of inconsistent action parameters, rather than actions, are difficult to detect and the exact 
reason for their occurrence cannot be provided. 
2.3.2 Approaches to Conflict Resolution 
The process of resolving conflicts may involve retracting, suppressing, prioritising, or amending 
policies, and in some cases, enforcing a new policy altogether so that consistency among policy 
rules can be restored. The methodology in doing so depends heavily on the type of policies 
involved and the domain in which conflicts occur. Although human intervention is unavoidable in 
some situations, several research efforts focussed on techniques to automate the resolution process 
where possible; the main ones are presented and discussed below. 
2.3.2.1 Resolution based on precedence 
The most popular approach for conflict resolution is that where precedence can be established 
between policies. This allows two potentially inconsistent policies to coexist within the system 
and it involves determining which of the two should prevail in the event of a conflict. A number 
of metrics have been studied for determining the relative priorities between policies, which are 
summarised in [18] and presented below. Some of these have been implemented in logical 
precedence mechanisms such as the one supported by the KAoS Policy Administration tool [52]. 
Precedence based on modality 
It is quite common for negative authorisation policies to override positive ones so that a 
forbidden 
action will never be permitted [53], but this may not necessarily be always 
desired. As a general 
rule, this approach resolves all conflicts in a deterministic way, i. e. negative policies take 
precedence over positive ones or vice versa, which is not very flexible. Some flexibility may 
be 
introduced by adopting a default policy, as proposed in [54], such as "everything is implicitly 
forbidden, " or "everything is implicitly authorised, " and defining precedence between explicit 
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authorisation, explicit denial, implicit authorisation or implicit denial, but this does not really 
solve the problem. 
Distance between a policy and the managed objects 
The concept of calculating the distance between a policy rule and the objects to which it refers has 
been introduced in [55] involving authorisation policies in object-oriented databases. Here, 
priority is given to the policy applying to the closer class in the inheritance hierarchy when 
evaluating access to an object referenced in a query, which essentially indicates the relevance of a 
policy to an object. Other types of distances have been considered in [56], such as the importance 
of objects' non-common classes in a generalisation hierarchy and the similarity of unique objects' 
attributes. 
Specificity related to domain nesting 
This concept was proposed in [57] and constitutes a particular case of the distance metric. The 
principle here is that a more specific policy overrides a more general one, where specificity is 
based on the number of objects to which a policy applies, i. e. a sub-domain of objects is more 
specific than the ancestor domain. This approach is particularly useful in policy systems where 
objects are grouped in sub-domains to reflect specialisation or any other relationship considered 
important for management purposes. 
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Figure 2-7: Policy precedence [181 
Although this is a flexible approach, Lupu in [ 18] recognises that it does not apply successfully to 
all situations as precedence cannot be established in cases where subject and target sets are equal, 
subject sets are more specific but target sets are less specific or vice versa. The left part of Figure 
2-7 depicts overlapping policies, Pl and P2, for which a conflict can be resolved by assigning 
precedence to the more specific policy P2. The right part of the figure demonstrates the 
lin-fitations of this approach with examples where precedence cannot be established. 
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Assigning explicit priorities 
An alternative way by which policy precedence can be applied is to assign explicit priority values 
to policies [58]. Meaningful priorities however, are notoriously difficult for users to assign and 
may result in arbitrary priorities which do not really reflect the importance of policies. 
Furthermore, in distributed settings where multiple administrators specify policies and priorities, 
inconsistencies among priorities can also be introduced. 
These issues were addressed in [44] where the authors developed algorithms to automatically 
assign the priority values to new policies and to adjust the values of related policies when given 
only the relative priority of a new policy. The algorithms implement the conflict resolution 
module of the IBM's PMAC platform by maintaining ordered lists under policy insertion and 
deletion operations. 
2.3.2.2 Resolution based on policy ordering 
Instead of specifying integer numbers that represent policy priorities as in the PMAC platform, 
conflicts in firewalls can be avoided by maintaining a correctly ordered list of filtering rules. 
Since the ordering directly impacts the semantics of the firewall security policy, the authors of 
[27] investigated policy editing techniques to avoid the introduction of anomalies during policy 
updates. 
More specifically, the developed algorithms can automatically determine the correct insertion 
position of a newly created rule such that no shadowing or redundancy anomalies are created. 
This is achieved based on the relation of the new rule with existing ones, following the 
principle that the new rule should be inserted before any rule that is a superset match, and after 
any rule that is a subset match of this rule. Although some potential inconsistencies can be 
resolved, this approach does not cater for correlation and generalisation anomalies, for which 
human intervention is required. Rule removal has much less impact on the firewall policy than 
insertion. According to [27], a removed rule may change the overall filtering policy semantics, but 
from a conflict perspective it may only create a redundancy anomaly; this is also handled 
manually. 
2.3.2.3 Resolution based on conflict prevention 
The work in [59] describes an alternative approach for handling inconsistencies and follows the 
validation principle of [60]. The authors propose the use of constraints in a policy to prevent that 
policy from firing, and consequently prevent a conflict from occurring, if a new configuration 
parameter is not consistent with an associated system variable. 
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This approach has been extended in [45] with algorithms to automatically encode appropriate 
constraints into a policy. In this work, the authors use a BW management scenario where policies 
aim to allocate finite link resources. The limitation on these resources is expressed with OCL, a 
specification of which is attached to the allocation operation in the information model. During a 
refinement process this constraint is conveyed to the conditional part of the policy as follows: 
<condition>RoUterLink. currentBW + amount < RouterLink. maxBW</condition> 
The above condition controls the applicability of the policy, which will not execute if the 
aggregate value of the current allocation and the amount to be increased exceeds the maximum 
available capacity. The main disadvantage of this approach is that although it can prevent a 
conflict, it may also prevent the system from making a potentially essential re-configuration. 
Additionally, the constraint will need to be evaluated with each policy triggering event, which 
can, in most cases, induce unnecessary computational overhead. 
2.3.3 Static versus Dynamic Analysis 
Apart from the distinction between inconsistencies identified in different application domains, 
conflicts can also be classified into static and dynamic. Static conflicts can be detected through 
off-line analysis at policy specification time whereas dynamic conflicts can only be detected when 
policies are enforced as they depend on the current state of the managed system. The various 
detection and resolution techniques described in previous parts of this section have been applied 
to static conflicts but, in most cases, cannot meet the requirements posed by run-time 
inconsistencies. The latter, being the more challenging part of policy analysis, have rather been 
neglected with little evidence of research work. 
The time-frame at which conflicts can be detected influences the analysis methodology for 
dealing with them. Dynamic conflicts must be detected by a process that monitors policy 
enforcement and resolution must be achieved automatically in an efficient manner to avoid long 
run-time processing overheads. The main contribution in this field comes from Dunlop in [61 ] and 
[62] which investigate mechanisms and techniques for the analysis of dynamic conflicts in open 
distributed systems. Central to the development of the detection algorithm in [61] are two 
indexed databases; the active events index contains a list of run-time events, and the run-time 
conflict index contains a list of current potential run-time conflicts. These are generated at 
compile-time and hold references to the policies involved and the precise events that will initiate 
conflicts. Such events are monitored at run-time, the occurrence of which triggers the conflict 
detection process. 
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This work was extended in [62] to address the problem of dynamic conflict resolution. Although 
the authors propose the use of precedence between conflicting policies as described in Section 
2.3.2.1, the contribution of this work is not as to how a conflict is to be resolved, but rather as to 
when. Based on the fact that a resolution process can be computationally intensive, the authors 
propose different approaches according to the likelihood of a conflict occurring and the cost of 
resolving that conflict: 
" Pessimistic conflict resolution: This approach assumes that both actual and potential 
inconsistencies will result in conflict at some point in time and must therefore be resolved 
immediately at compile-time. This involves much initial checking to ensure non- 
compliance does not occur, but minimises the run-time cost of detection and resolution. 
" Optimistic conflict resolution: This approach does not involve any preventative 
measures but relies instead on resolving all conflicts dynamically when they materialise. 
As a result, the optimistic approach often requires greater effort and cost at run-time. 
" Balanced conflict resolution: This approach assumes that the likelihood of actual 
conflict occurring is quite high and thus resolves it statically, thereby reducing the cost of 
run-time analysis. Identified potential conflicts are monitored and resolved in the run- 
time envirom-nent only if required. 
Although, from a computational efficiency point of view, the above approaches have a clear 
contribution as to the optimisation of static and dynamic analyses, the validity of pessimistic and 
balanced resolutions can be argued since they violate the principle that dynamic conflicts can only 
be detected at run-time. 
The challenges of dynamic analysis are also addressed in [40] where the authors provide solutions 
for the conflicts identified in Section 2.2.5 regarding call control policies. These conflicts will 
arise at run-time, when a call is placed, if policies enforced at different policy servers, between 
caller and callee, are inconsistent with each other. To facilitate detection and effective resolution 
in such a setting, a distributed communication mechanism is proposed enabling policy servers to 
cooperate since the policies they enforce are intended to apply end-to-end over the call. The 
mechanism resembles the distributed tuple space used by the feature interaction manager in [63], 
which acts as a temporary store (blackboard) for information relevant to policy decisions applying 
to a particular call. 
Resolution is based on pre-specified rules which are treated in the same manner as policies with 
respect to storage and enforcement, and their triggering events are a particular combination of call 
control policy actions. Additional elements in these rules are the conditions 
for a conflict which 
are expressed using comparison operators. The actual resolution strategy 
is encoded in the action 
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part of the rule as in the example XML representation below, which aims at handling the second 
conflict described in Section 2.2.5 regarding the addition of a party into a call. 
<actions> 
<orel se/> 
<action>apply-preference</action> 
<action>reject-call</action> 
</actions> 
The first of the above actions takes advantage of the fact that call control policies also incorporate 
a preference into their specification, e. g. must not or prefer to, and forces the resolution engine to 
prioritise the rule that has the strongest preference level (apply-preference). In case precedence 
cannot be established due to the same preference levels, a generic resolution is applied, which in 
the above example rejects the call. 
To achieve distributed communication and ensure correct enforcement of policies and resolutions, 
the policy store associated with the first policy server assumes the role of the blackboard for the 
duration of a call. Any policies triggered by a call, instead of being enforced, they are written on 
the blackboard and their actions are deferred. A reference to the blackboard is carried by the call 
data ensuring that subsequent policy servers can access and store resolution information relating 
to the current call. On reaching the callee's policy server, local policies are consulted and those 
triggered by the call are identified. The resolution process is initiated at the server by first 
checking for conflicts between local policies and those accumulated on the blackboard. In such a 
case, the relevant resolution action is identified and enforced. Although the notion of resolution 
policies is also used in this thesis, the main drawback of this approach is that the detection of 
conflicts is not supported by a separate process, but the various conditions are encoded within 
resolution policies instead. Resolution specifications can thus become complex, an aspect 
amplified by the verboseness of XML representations, and their evaluation can be quite 
expensive. 
2.4 Formal Approaches to Policy Specification and Analysis 
Apart from high-level languages, research in policy specification has also considered formal logic 
notations. Although these are, in general, not very easy to understand and use, they provide 
notations that have well understood semantics thus avoiding potential ambiguities of high-level 
languages and they support several types of logical reasoning, which can facilitate operations for 
conflict analysis in a simplified manner. Furthermore, formal approaches allow the effect of 
policy enforcement on the behaviour of the managed system to be modelled, which can be used as 
part of the analysis process for the detection of conflicts that are constrained by the state of the 
system. 
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A limited number of approaches have proposed logic-based representations for policy 
specification. Standard Deontic Logic has been considered by some works [64][65], but because 
of the existence of a number of paradoxes it has not been widely accepted. First Order Logic 
(FOL) however, does not have this inherent problem and has been used for the specification of 
both access control and management policies. This section presents the two main approaches that 
are based on FOL and introduces the logic formalism of Event Calculus which is used in this 
thesis. 
2.4.1 Logic Representation and Analysis of Authorisation Policies 
The Authorisation Specification Language (ASL) is based on FOL and is the most representative 
example for the specification and analysis of authorisation policies. As described in [21] and [22], 
the basic constructs of the language are a set of predicates the main ones being cando, dercando, do 
and grant. The first two are used to define explicit and derived positive/negative authorisation 
rules as in the examples below. The first rule states that all subjects of the group CS-Faculty can 
read fi1 el, whereas the second rule derives a negative authorisation for a subject s to read fi1 e2 if 
there exists another subject s' and a group s" such that s and s, both belong to s", and s, is 
authori sed to write fi1e3. 
cando(filel, s, +read) <- in(s, CS-Faculty) 
dercando(file2, s, -write) <-- dercando(file3, s' , +write) 
& in(s, s') & in(s', s") 
Inconsistencies arising among authorisation rules are a speciallsed type of the modality conflict 
described in Section 2.2.1, where subjects are both authorised and forbidden to perform an action. 
ASL allows for two strategies when resolving such conflicts, giving precedence to either denials 
or permissions. These are defined by do predicates which state the authorisations the system must 
consider valid on the basis of existing authorisations, specified or derived. The examples 
below 
both assign precedence to permissions but in different ways. The first rule states that a subject can 
exercise an access on fi1 el if there is a positive authorisation for it, whereas the second states that 
a subject can exercise an access on fi1 e2 only if there is not a negative authorisation 
for it. 
do(filel, s, +a) <- dercando(filel, s, +a) 
do(file2, s, +a) <-- -dercando(file2, s, -a) 
Lastly, resolution predicates are used in the body of access control rules to 
determine the access 
decision upon a request based on specified authorisations. The rule 
below will grant user u access 
to object o, if the user has a positive authorisation for it. 
grant(o, u, +a) <-- doffila, s, +a) 
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The main disadvantage of the formal notation used for the development of ASL is that it has not 
been extended to provide a representation of the manaRed svstem state. As such, there is no means 
to reason about the correctness of policies prior to deployment. 
2.4.2 Logic Representation and Analysis of Obligation Policies 
Apart from access control, FOL has also been proposed for the specification of obligation 
policies. One such example is the Policy Description Language (PDL) [66] which is an event- 
based language formulating obligations as sets of event- condition- ac ti on rules. These rules follow 
the format of the example below, which states that if the event occurs in a situation where the 
condition is true, then the action is executed. 
event causes action if condition 
The event part of the policy rule is an expression of the form ei& ... &e,, where each e, ý 
is an event 
literal, and its occurrence is denoted by the occ predicate. Each policy rule can be translated to 
the implication below, where action a is executed (exec predicate) if the conjunction of a finite set 
of events and a condition c evaluates to true. 
exec(a) <-- occ(el) A ... A occ(e, ) A 
Later work by Chomicki et al. [67][68] extends PDL to include the concept of action constraints, 
which are essentially rules defining the set of actions that can not occur together. Conflicts are 
captured as violations of action constraints. The expression below is used to specify such 
constraints and states that the simultaneous execution of actions ai,..., an is never allowed if 
condition c holds. The constraint can be translated to a conflict rule using the block and exec 
predicates. 
never a, AAa,, ifC 
block(ai) vv block(a, ) <-- exec(ai) AA exec(a,, ) /\ C 
Detection in this framework is based on monitors for inconsistent policy actions or events, and 
resolution is achieved by directly or indirectly cancelling actions to obtain a result consistent with 
the constraints. Taking the latter approach, resolution is specified using the blocking and 
accepting rules below. The first ignores any events that cause actions defined in the conflict rule, 
and the second will only accept a policy action if the event causing it is not blocked. 
ignore(ei) v ... v 
ignore(e, ) <-- occ(ei) A ... A occ(e,, ) ,cA block(a) 
accept(a) <- Occ(ei) A ... A occ(en) AC /\ -ignore(ei) A ... A -ignore(e, ) 
The resolution methodology employed by PDL allows priority ordering among conflicting 
actions. This is done explicitly during the specification of detection rules where the user can 
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define which actions are to be blocked in the event of a conflict. These are encoded in the head of 
a detection rule and are subsequently evaluated in the body of the blocking rule. Taking the 
example of two conflicting actions, action, and acti on2, priority to action, is assigned by blocking 
acti on2 : 
block(action2) <-- exec(actioni) A exec(action2) 
Despite its expressiveness, PDL does not support access control policies, and, as in the case of 
ASL, detection and resolution of policy conflicts can only be achieved at the level of rule 
execution, i. e. at run-time. 
2.4.3 The Event Calculus 
The Event Calculus (EC) was introduced by Kowalski and Sergot [69] as a logic formalism for 
representing and reasoning about events and their effects. The formalism is shown to apply to a 
variety of domains including those featuring continuous change. Although a number of variations 
of this forinalism exist, most works have used a simplified form consisting of a set of time points, 
a set of event types, and a set of properties that can vary over the lifetime of the system known as 
fluents. Additionally, EC defines a set of base predicates that allow the specification of 
propositions: initiallyTrue, happens, initiates, terminates, and holdsAt. 
Because Event Calculus is expressed in FOL, it provides support for a number of reasoning tasks. 
According to [70], these are broadly classified into deductive, abductive and inductive tasks. With 
reference to Figure 2-8, in a deductive task, "what happens when" (initiallyTrue, happens) and 
"what actions do" (initiates, terminates) are given, and "what's true when" (holdsAt) is required. 
In an abductive task "what actions do" and "what's true when" are supplied, and "what happens 
when" is sought. Finally, in an inductive task, "what's true when" and "what happens when" are 
provided, but "what actions do" is required. 
what happens when 
(initiallyTrue, happens) 
Logical Machinery 
what's true when 
(EC axioms) (holdsAt) 
what actions do 
(initiates, terminates) 
Figure 2-8: How the Event Calculus functions 
In the context of this thesis, and as described in chapters 4 and 5, Event Calculus is used to 
represent both the policies and the behaviour of the managed system. This allows for the 
development of analysis processes that cater for static as well as dynamic detection of conflicts. In 
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the first case, abductive reasoning provides the means for deriving the sequence of events required 
to satisfy conflicting conditions, whereas deductive reasoning is used to determine run-time 
conflicts based on the current state of the system. 
Although EC has also been proposed for the purpose of designing and executing protocols [711, 
its use for policy representation in [72] is more relevant to this thesis. In this work, the authors use 
the formalism to specify obligation policies so that adaptation on mobile devices can be achieved. 
More specifically, the defined policy rules consist of system-specific event definitions, a set of 
fluents controlled by events, conditions expressed in terms of fluents, and actions. The latter 
represent calls to specific adaptation methods of an application and are executed when the 
conditional part evaluates to true. Listing 2-3 below demonstrates an example specification of a 
policy from [72], instructing a mobile device to switch to a GSM network connection once 
outdoors. The first part of the policy specifies the events in the managed system, and also defines 
which of those initiate or terminate the outdoors fluent. The action switchNetwork(Gsm) will be 
executed when one of the events initiating the outdoors fluent occurs. 
Listing 2-3: Mobile device adaptation policy using EC 
event LeftHome 
event LeftOffice 
event InHome 
event Inoffice 
fluent outdoors 
initiates(LeftHome) or initiates(Leftoffice) 
terminates(InHome) or initiates(InOffice) 
I 
condition J initiates(outdoors) 
action I switchNetwork(Gsm) 
Thus far in the chapter the main policy-based management frameworks have been described, and 
the various types of inconsistencies that can occur among policies for different application 
domains have been identified. A review of the mechanisms and techniques proposed in the 
literature for conflict detection and resolution has also been provided including logic approaches. 
The last section of this chapter focuses on the application domain targeted by this thesis, which is 
Quality of Service provisioning in IP networks. 
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2.5 Quality of Service in IP Networks 
As the Internet evolves toward the global multi-service network of the future the best-effort 
model, currently employed, is not able to cope with emerging requirements of new services. 
Bandwidth (BW) intensive applications, like peer-to-peer file sharing, pose significant strains on 
the usage of resources, and audio/media services, such as Voice-over-IP (VoIP) and Video-on- 
Demand (VoD), have rather strict delay and packet loss rate requirements. For these reasons, the 
research community was driven to seek new models to support services with guaranteed resources 
and Quality of Service (QoS) characteristics. As a result, the Internet Engineering Task Force 
(IETF) proposed two QoS models, the Integrated [73] and Differentiated Services [74]. 
The Integrated Services (IntServ) model follows a resource reservation approach to a preferred set 
of applications in a similar manner to Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) networks. Bandwidth 
reservation is made with the Resource Reservation Protocol (RSVP) [75], when applications 
signal their requirements to the network. One of the main strengths of IntServ is that, after a 
successful RSVP reservation, connections are assured a certain level of end-to-end performance 
from the network. In addition to the existing best effort class, two more classes of service are 
supported by this model in an IP network. The guaranteed service class provides quantitative 
upper bounds on bandwidth and delay experienced by an application, whereas the controlled load 
class makes a qualitative assurance that the network performance will be equivalent to that of best 
effort under lightly loaded conditions. Despite its strengths, the IntServ model suffers from 
scalability problems - the fact that bandwidth reservation is on a per flow basis, it requires every 
router along a path, from source to destination, to maintain flow state information. The latter 
increases proportionally with the number of flows, thus placing a huge storage and processing 
overhead to the routers. 
DiffServ overcomes the above shortcomings and provides a scalable approach with which service 
differentiation can be achieved. This section provides a short overview of the DiffServ approach 
and also of Multi-Protocol Label Switching as the forwarding technology. It goes on to describe 
in detail a popular architecture for QoS provisioning in IP DiffServ-enabled networks, and also to 
present the various policies that have been proposed for the management of this domain. 
2.5.1 Differentiated Services 
Differentiated services allow the classification of lp traffic into a limited number of service 
classes that receive different treatment at the router level. The information to perform the 
differentiation is encoded within the Type of Service (ToS) byte in IPv4 packet headers or Traffic 
Class in IPv6, which is known as the DiffServ Codepoint (DSCP) [76]. Six out of the eight bits 
are used for this purpose giving 32 possible combinations that can define the various ways a 
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packet can be treated by core routers. Each different treatment is known as a Per-Hop Behaviour 
(PHB), which can be used to describe the forwarding behaviour of a network node applied to a 
collection of packets with the same DSCP. Currently, three types of PHBs are specified for a 
DiffServ network: (a) the Expedited Forwarding (EF) PHB that is of high priority, (b) the Assured 
Forwarding (AF) PHB that has four sub-classes offering different levels of forwarding assurances, 
and, (c) the Default (DE) or Best Effort (BE) PHB available in today's Internet. 
Each of the various PHBs corresponds to a particular DSCP. At the edge of a DiffServ network 
the access routers have the responsibility of classifying and marking incoming packets to relevant 
PHBs supported by that network. The forwarding behaviour, in terms of buffer and scheduling 
management, experienced by a packet in the core of the network corresponds to the PHB assigned 
to it. This approach pushes the complexity to the edge routers at network boundaries, keeping the 
core routers simple, resulting in a very efficient forwarding process. Unlike IntServ, it does not 
require signalling protocols to control the mechanisms used to select different treatment for 
individual packets. As such, the amount of state information required to be maintained at every 
node is proportional to the finite number of service classes rather than application flows. 
A fundamental aspect of QoS provisioning in a DiffServ network is the Service Level Agreement 
(SLA). This is a contract, established statically or dynamically, that captures the business 
relationship between a customer and a service provider. It is used to specify the performance and 
features of a service but also the penalties that apply in case the service is not provided at the 
agreed quality. The technical part of the SLA is referred to as the Service Level Specification 
(SLS). This defines detailed technical parameters for each service level such as the associated 
QoS class, latency, throughput, and bandwidth allocation. 
2.5.2 Multi-Protocol Label Switching and Traffic Engineering 
Rapid changes in the type (and quantity) of traffic handled by the Internet is putting an enormous 
strain on the network infrastructure. Since routing protocols have little visibility into the Layer 2 
characteristics of the network, particularly in regard to QoS and loading, packet forwarding relies 
upon Layer 3 to determine the path to the destination. The hop-by-hop packet processing 
performed by protocols such as OSPF (Open Shortest Path First) can have intensive CPU 
requirements thus reducing throughput in the network. 
Multi-Protocol Label Switching (MPLS) [77] changes the hop-by-hop, paradigm by enabling 
devices to specify paths in the network based upon QoS and bandwidth needs of applications. The 
forwarding decision is based on the exact-match algorithm using a fixed-length, fairly short label 
as an index. This enables a simplified and faster forwarding procedure, relative to longest-match 
forwarding traditionally used at the network layer. 
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According to [781, Traffic Engineering (TE) is the process where data is routed through the 
network according to a management view of the availability of resources and the current and 
expected traffic. The objective of TE is twofold; users expect certain performance from the 
network, which in turn should attempt to satisfy these expectations. Hence, the target is to 
accommodate as many traffic requests as possible by optimally using the available network 
resources. 
While TE can be IP-based, where multiple link weights corresponding to different DSCPs can 
allow routes to be computed per QoS class, an MPLS-based solution allows for sophisticated 
routing capabilities as well as QoS resource management techniques [79]. MPLS TE relies on an 
"explicitly routed" paradigm, where a set of routes is computed offline for the various QoS 
classes. Additionally, appropriate network resources (e. g. BW) may be provisioned along the 
routes according to predicted traffic requirements. This can allow an administrator to explicitly 
define paths between source and destination to ensure QoS or have the traffic follow a specified 
path to reduce traffic loading across certain hops. 
2.5.3 The TEQUILA Framework 
While the DiffServ QoS model specifies control and data plane mechanisms for providing QoS, 
there is a need for network and service management functionality, which is an integral part of 
QoS-based telecommunications networks. The European IST project TEQUILA [80] proposed an 
architecture for managing QoS in IP Differentiated Services Networks with MPLS capability. 
This architecture addresses both service and network management issues and can be seen as a 
detailed decomposition of the concept of a Bandwidth Broker realized as a hierarchical, logically 
and physically distributed system [79]. 
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Figure 2-9: The TEQUILA QoS management architecture [79] 
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As depicted in Figure 2-9, the architecture is decomposed into three major sub-systems: SLS 
Management (SLS-M), Traffic Engineering (TE) and Monitoring. SLS Management is 
responsible for agreeing the customers' QoS requirements in terms of SLSs, while Traffic 
Engineering is responsible for fulfilling the contracted SLSs by deriving the parameters for 
configuring the network devices. The Monitoring sub-system provides the above systems with the 
appropriate network measurements and assures that the contracted SLSs are indeed delivered at 
their specified QoS. 
The DiffServ/1\4PLS QoS management framework developed by the TEQUILA project serves as 
the application domain of the policies defined in the next chapter and of the conflict analysis 
approach proposed in this thesis. The conflict detection and resolution examples presented in 
Chapters 4 and 5 demonstrate the applicability of the approach in this domain. 
2.5.3.1 SLS Management 
SLS Management is decomposed into 3 functional blocks. The SLS Subscription (SLS-S) 
includes processes of customer registration and long-term SLS admission control. The customer 
might either be a peer Autonomous System (AS), a business user or residential user. The 
subscription (or registration) concerns the Service Level Agreement (SLA), which includes prices, 
terms and conditions and the technical parameters of the SLS. Subscribed SLSs are stored in a 
local repository and serve as basic input for the Traffic Forecast (TF). The main function of TF is 
to generate a traffic estimation matrix per QoS class type for the long-term estimated traffic that 
flows between each ingress-egress pair in the network. TF is the "glue" between the customer- 
oriented (SLS-M) and the resource- oriented (TE) frameworks of this functional architecture. SLS 
Invocation (SLS-1) includes the process of dynamically dealing with a flow and is a part of the 
control plane functionality. Its main responsibility is to perform dynamic admission control on the 
traffic injected in the network as a response to customer demand. SLS-I receives operational 
guidelines from SLS-S, its functionality is distributed across the network edges, and has a view on 
the cur-rent spare resources. 
2.5.3.2 Traffic Engineering 
Traffic Engineering is decomposed into 3 functional blocks. Network Dimensioning (ND) is a 
centralised off-line component that has a global view of the network. It performs long-to-medium 
term configuration of the network and is responsible for mapping the expected traffic demand, 
provided by the traffic matrix, onto the physical network resources. Its objective is to 
accommodate the expected demand, and therefore meet the SLS Performance requirements, 
without overloading any part of the network. The output configuration is in terms of MPLS 
Labelled Switched Paths (LSPs) and anticipated loading for each QoS class on all interfaces. This 
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output is fed to Dynamic Route Management (DRtM) and Dynamic Resource Management 
(DRsM), and also to SLS-M (in terms of a resource availability matrix) in order to base the 
admission control decisions for future SLS subscriptions. 
DRtM is distributed, operating at each edge router and is responsible for managing the routing 
processes dynamically according to the guidelines produced by ND on routing traffic according to 
QoS requirements. This includes setting up routing parameters so that incoming traffic is routed to 
LSPs proportionally to the bandwidth determined by ND and modifying the routing of traffic 
according to feedback received from monitoring. DRsM is also distributed, with an instance 
attached to each router interface and aims to ensure that link capacity is appropriately distributed 
among the QoS classes sharing the link. This is achieved by dynamically configuring buffer and 
scheduling parameters according to ND directives, constraints and rules and taking into account 
the actual experienced load as opposed to required (predicted) resources. 
The interactions between SLS-M and TE functions occur only at Resource Provisioning Cycle 
(RPQ epochs, not at the granularity of every single (or a few) service request(s). That is, a traffic 
matrix is produced and the network is appropriately engineered only at the start of a RPC. RPCs 
are relatively long time periods, ranging from hours to days and use traffic forecasts that are 
usually drawn with long-term perspectives. 
2.5.3.3 Monitoring 
The state-dependent dynamic SLS-M and TE functions require constant observation of the 
network in order to apply control actions and drive it to a desired state. Although TEQUILA 
proposes three types of monitoring - at the node, network and service levels - only the first is 
relevant to the work presented in this thesis. Node monitoring is a distributed process across all 
routers, observing resource utilization of each of the QoS classes. Monitoring at core routers can, 
for example, trigger DRsM functions to adjust the allocation of link resources for the various QoS 
classes, and monitoring at ingress routers can trigger SLS-I operations to adjust the inbound rate 
of traffic flows. 
2.5.4 DiffServ QoS Policies 
Since the IETF initiative on policy-based management, a number of DiffServ policies have been 
defined in the literature addressing different aspects of QoS management. The main works are 
described below. 
2.5.4.1 IETF QPIM 
The EETF Policy Framework Working group produced an object-oriented information model for 
representing QoS management policies (QPIM) [81 ]. This is based on the IETF PCIM and defines 
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a model for QoS enforcement for both IntServ and DiffServ using policies. Concentrating on the 
later, the model defines a group of actions to control BW allocation and congestion control 
differentiations, which collectively specify the per-hop behaviour forwarding treatment 
(QoSPo1icvPHBAction class). The example in Listing 2-4 provides a set of rules that specify 
PHBs enforced within a DiffServ domain. Here, the AFI condition matches the entire AFI PHB 
group. 
Listing 2-4: PHB policy rules 
if (EF) then do EF actions 
if (AFl) then do AFI actions 
if (AF11) then dO AFII actions 
if (AF12) then dO AF12 actions 
if (AF13) then do AF13 actions 
if (DE) then do DE actions 
The actions of the corresponding PHBs can be any of the groups of actions mentioned above. The 
example below shows how a Bandwidth action can be used to define the BW allocation for the EF 
PHB: 
QOSPoliCyBandwidthACtion EF: 
qpBandwidthunits: % 
qpminBandwidth: SO% 
2.5.4.2 Ponder DiffServ Policies 
The work in [82] and [83] presents a framework for the management of network services using 
Ponder and focuses on the dynamic adaptation of policies in response to changes within the 
managed environment. The term "Policy Adaptation" is used to describe the ability of the policy- 
based management system to modify network behaviour in one of the following ways: 
* Adaptation by dynamically changing the parameters of a QoS policy to specify new 
attribute values for the run-time configuration of managed objects. 
0 Adaptation by selecting and enabling/disabling a policy from a set of pre-defined QoS 
policies at run-time. The parameters of the selected network QoS policy are set at run- 
time. 
In this context policies have been defined to provide Per Domain Behaviours (PDB) in a DiffServ 
environment, to handle service performance degradation, and to support changes 
in routing or link 
failures. An example of the former is presented in Listing 2-5 where a PDB policy is specified as 
a Ponder obligation rule. 
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Listing 2-5: Policy rule for providing a specific PDB 
inst oblig /PolicieS/PDBPoliCy1 
subject /PMAS/DiffSerVAgent; 
target r= /DiffSerVDomainA/RoUters/CoreRouters; 
on PDBl-configRequest(DS, max-input_rate, min-output-rate); 
do r. applyEFPHB(DS, max-input-rate, min-output_rate); 
/* DS: The Diffserv codepoint for EF: 101110. PDB1 
is implemented with the EF PHB*/ 
when max-input-rate <= min-output-rate; 
/* Property that EF traffic must satisfy 
The actual implementation of the PDB policy, i. e. the implementation of the PHB (or the set of 
PHBs) that will guarantee the QoS characteristics to the corresponding traffic aggregate, is hidden 
from the customer. The customer (human or automated agent) is offered the externally observable 
PDB QoS attributes. The policy rule in this example will configure the core routers within the 
DiffServ domain to implement the EF PHB on the corresponding traffic aggregate. 
2.5.4.3 TEQUILA Policies 
The main drawback of the approaches presented in the two preceding sections is that they fail to 
address network-wide resource management policies as well as policies related to SLS 
management. This was the objective of the work by Flegkas in [84], which defines policies for the 
various components of the TEQUILA architecture. 
Although a small number of policies target SLS admission control, the main focus of this work 
concerns policies for network dimensioning, presented in [85] and [86], which were used as proof 
of concept on the feasibility and benefits of policy-based management. Listing 2-6 shows two 
example policies, the first of which concerns a rule that creates an explicit LSP following specific 
nodes in the network with an associated BW of 2 Mbps. The second rule is a resource allocation 
optimisation policy that prevents parts of the network to get overloaded. This is achieved by 
directly influencing the dimensioning algorithm and increasing a specific parameter (EXponent) 
when the load on any link exceeds a specified value (in this case 80%). It should be noted that the 
policy format closely resembles that of IETF. 
Listing 2-6: TEQUILA ND policies 
(1) If OA==EF and Ingress==4 and Egress==6 then setup LSP 4-9-7-6 2mbps 
(2) If maXLinkLoad > 80% then increaSe EXponent by. 1 
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The effect of enforcing the two policies above is depicted on the left part of Figure 2-10, which 
shows the newly created LSP and the even spreading of load across the network (before the 
enforcement the link between nodes 5 and 6 was heavily loaded - indicated with red colour). 
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Figure 2-10: TE-GUI snapshots before (above) and after (below) the enforcement 
of load balancing policies [84] 
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The next chapter extends this work to cover a wider spectrum of TE and SLS management 
policies thus providing a richer set of programmable functions. These form the subject of conflict 
analysis. 
2.6 Summary 
This chapter presented the necessary background information and prior work on the topics related 
to this thesis. More specifically, an overview of policy-based management was initially provided, 
focusing on the main frameworks proposed in the literature. The core part of the chapter described 
the various conflicts that may arise between policies used in various application domains, and 
presented the techniques employed by other works for effective detection and resolution. The 
shortcomings of these approaches were identified serving as a useful basis for comparison when 
demonstrating the advantages of the proposed approach in subsequent chapters. 
The last part of the chapter presented information about QoS in IP networks, which is the 
application domain of the policies defined in this thesis. In addition to the various technologies 
discussed, the details of the TEQUILA QoS management framework were presented, and a 
flavour of QoS policies was given with specific examples. 
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Chapter 3 
Policies for DiffServ QoS Management 
In order to provide a holistic approach for Quality of Service management in DiffServ networks, a 
range of management operations need to be deployed from traffic engineering and admission 
control, to dynamic management of resources. Several frameworks have been proposed for this 
purpose that mainly stemmed from European collaborative research projects including TEQUILA 
[871, MESCAL [881, and ENTHRONE [89]. All frameworks propose the use of a general model 
depicted in Figure 3-1, where the QoS management goals are realized by three distinct 
management blocks: Service Management, Traffic Engineering, and Policy Management. The 
first is responsible for agreeing the customers' or peer domain's QoS requirements in terms of 
Service Level Specifications (SLSs), while Traffic Engineering is responsible for fulfilling 
contracted SLSs by deriving the network configuration. Policy Management provides the two 
aforementioned blocks with a set of policies that guide their functional behaviour to reflect the 
high-level goals and objectives. 
Policy Management 
service management traffic engineering 
policies policies 
Service Management Traffic Engineering 
SLS-S traffic Dimensioning demand 
operational operational 
guidelines 
III 
guidelines 
resou rce 
SLS-I avail ability Dynamic RsrcMgmt 
tttttttt 
notifications Network Monitoring notifications 
Figure 3-1: PO"cy-driven QoS management framework 
Quality of Service management has always been one of the most popular application 
domains of 
policies since Internet Service Providers JSPs) can realize their objectives through 
flexible 
programmability with respect to offered services and treatment of customer traffic 
in their 
network. A small number of policies have been defined for some of the components of 
the QoS 
management framework described in Section 2.5.3 [85]. 
This chapter provides a comprehensive 
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set of QoS management policies and explains how their enforcement influences the behaviour of 
the managed modules and associated IP DiffServ managed objects. The policies are categorized 
into service management and traffic engineering policies and follow the two-level hierarchy of 
Figure 3-1. The latter depicts specific QoS management modules, initially proposed by the 
TEQUILA framework (see Section 2.5.3), targeted by the policies defined in this chapter. These 
are SLS Subscription (SLS-S) and SLS Invocation (SLS-1) on the service management side, and 
Network Dimensioning (ND) and Dynamic Resource Management (DRsM) on the traffic 
engineering side. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. 
Section 3.1 introduces the types of policies that can potentially drive the QoS management 
framework and classifies them based on their functional applicability and their temporal 
characteristics. A description of the format used for policy specification is also provided along 
with the management entities involved in the policy enforcement process. 
Section 3.2 describes in detail the functionality of the service management subsystem of the QoS 
framework, and in particular the SLS-S and SLS-I modules. Using the format provided by the 
Ponder language, the various policies that can be used to drive the two modules are specified, 
along with a description of their effect on the system's functional behaviour and the management 
objectives they can achieve. 
Following on, Section 3.3 describes the ND and DRsM modules, which constitute the main body 
of the traffic engineering subsystem. The policies presented here aim to provide the network with 
both static and dynamic configurations such that the treatment of traffic meets the QoS guarantees 
negotiated during the service subscription phase. 
To complete the policy influenced functionality of the QoS management framework, Section 3.4 
provides state chart representations for the managed modules, which form an essential part of the 
conflict analysis approach and are used to model the effect of policy enforcement. This section 
also describes the various managed objects in the framework and the operations they support 
which can be invoked through policies. Finally, Section 3.5 summarises the chapter. 
3.1 Policy Classification, Specification and Enforcement 
The functionality of the service management and traffic engineering sub-systems is realized by 
two modules on either side and follows a two-level hierarchy that reflects the off-line and run- 
time operational mode of the model. As such, individual modules can be categorised 
both 
logically based on their functionality, and hierarchically depending on to which layer of the 
hierarchy they belong. The SLS-l and DRsM modules, located at the lower level, perform 
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measurement-based dynamic functions, whereas the SLS-S and ND, residing at the upper layer, 
are time-based off-line modules. 
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Figure 3-2: Classification of QoS management policies 
A similar classification can be applied to the policies driving the behaviour of these modules as 
shown in Figure 3-2. At the first level, policies are classified based on the functional domain of 
their applicability. Service management policies apply to the SLS-S and SLS-1 modules and are 
mostly related to directives regarding static and dynamic admission control decisions. TE policies 
on the other hand apply to the ND and DRsM modules and control static and dynamic resource 
allocation functions. The second level of the classification differentiates policies based on their 
activation characteristics. Policies that apply to the upper layer of the hierarchy, i. e. to the SLS-S 
and ND modules, are more time-dependent and their execution depends mostly on the state of the 
module. Policies specific to SLS-I or DRsM can be either activated by the module state itself or 
by conditions and events emanating from the network. Off-line policies applying to the dynamic 
modules are, for example, policies that initialise essential system variables, whereas dynamic 
policies perform resource management functions at the edge or the core of the network and are 
triggered by network state notifications received from monitoring components. 
As described in Sections 2.1 and 2.5, various ways have been proposed to specify policies. 
Although the condition-action approach from IETF has been adopted by a number of people in 
their research work [5][86][90] and parts of the PCIM specification have been implemented in 
commercial products [91][921, it imposes limitations when designing policies for event-driven 
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systems such as TEQUILA. To have a complete policy representation for such environments it 
would be necessary to model events as condition objects. Furthermore, the model only supports a 
single type of rule and must undergo significant extension to support all the different policy types 
enforceable in a system. The PMAC specification on the other hand supports such requirements, 
but the fact that policy definitions have an XML representation makes them verbose and not 
easily interpreted by a user. The Ponder language overcomes the above issues and has been 
chosen for the specification of policies in this thesis. 
Out of the range of Ponder policy types, obligations are of particular interest to this work. These 
are even t- triggered- condition -action rules and can be used to specify management operations that 
must be performed when a particular event occurs given some supplementary conditions being 
true. They are specified in terms of a subject that should perform a particular action on a target 
when a specified condition is true as in the example of Listing 3-1. 
Listing 3-1: Ponder obligation policy example 
inst oblig /policies/qosmodule/PolID ý 
on event(params); 
subj s= qosmodulePMA; 
targ t= qosmodule/mo; 
do t. action(params); 
when constraints; 
I 
In the context of the QoS management framework, policy triggers can be internal system events 
generated by a management module indicating operational phases like the start of a new resource 
provisioning cycle, or network events reporting on the state of managed resources. The different 
operations supported by the modules are used to encode the action part of the obligation policy. 
These are exposed, through management interfaces, by managed objects (MOs) which act as the 
policy targets. The entity responsible for enforcing policies, and thus adopting the subject role, is 
the Policy Management Agent (PMA) [93] - in our application domain, every instance of a QoS 
management module is governed by a separate PMA. The last field in the specification example is 
an optional one and is mainly used to constrain the applicability of the policy with respect to time; 
it is particularly useful when an administrator needs to specify different network configurations 
for busy or non-busy hours of the day. 
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Figure 3-3: Policy enforcement 
Figure 3-3 depicts the process by which policies are enforced onto a QoS management module. 
Notifications are received in the PMA by an event handler and passed for processing to the policy 
enforcer. The latter inquires the local repository about policies that should be activated by the 
received event. For candidate policies, the relevant MOs are identified as the targets, from the set 
of MOs supported by a QoS management module, and policy actions are invoked through their 
management interfaces. The MOs respond by generating one or more low-level operations that 
realise the objectives of each of the policies being enforced. These drive the functional behaviour 
of the managed module and can yield new parameters for the configuration of managed resources. 
3.2 Service Management Policy Driven Functionality 
This section describes in detail the functionality of the SLS Subscription and SLS Invocation 
modules of the QoS management architecture which essentially perform static and dynamic 
admission control on network resources, respectively. Using the Ponder format we define the 
various policies that can be deployed by the SLS-S and SLS-I PMAs, describing their triggering 
events, constraints (where applicable), and the functionality that can be achieved through their 
enforcement. Although the MOs associated with individual policy actions are also included in the 
policy specification for reasons of clarity, their functional description can be found in Section 
3.4.1. 
3.2.1 SLS Subscription Policies 
The main objective of subscription logic is to control the number and type of service 
subscriptions, aiming to avoid overloading the network, whilst at the same time maximizing 
subscribed traffic. Service management policies can be used to guide the subscription process by 
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not only specifying the conditions under which a request is to be accepted, but also defining 
specific parameters that indirectly influence this decision, thus expressing business objectives. 
Such parameters are, for example, service multiplexing factors and service quality levels as 
described in the next section. 
Service Satisfaction 
The confidence with which a service is provided can not be derived in absolute terms. As such, 
subscriptions can be relatively differentiated (a) on the basis of the confidence with which they 
will enjoy a target minimum contractual traffic, and/or (b) in terms of how badly they will be 
affected in case of congestion. To the above end, the following definitions are used [94]: 
Almost Satisfied Service Rate (SRAS) - Denotes the traffic rate, which if offered to a 
SLS, the SLS is thought to be "almost satisfied"; expressed in BW units. 
Fully Satisfied Service Rate (SRFS) - Denotes the traffic rate, which if offered to a SLS, 
the SLS is thought to be "fully satisfied"; expressed in BW units. 
The above service rates are based on factors (multiplexing factors - MFs) that define SLS 
multiplexing. The latter takes into account traffic descriptors of the SI-Ss under aggregation, 
expressed in terms of parameters such as peak bit rate and QoS requirements. Multiplexing factors 
are defined per QoS class (QC), they range from 0 to 1, and are inversely proportional to QoS 
requirements. 
By defining two MFs through policies, one for each of the service rates, an administrator defines 
the risk that he/she is willing to take in satisfying the agreed SLS - an increasing MF achieves 
lower QoS guarantees. The left part of Listing 3-2 gives an example specification of a policy, 
P1.1, setting the almost (setAl mstsati sf ()) and fully (SetFU1 1 sati sf 0) satisfied factors in Ponder 
format. This policy type is triggered at the start of a new RPC and the action is enforced by the 
subscription module's PMA on the managed object (MO) supporting service satisfaction 
operations (se rvsati sf mo). 
Listing 3-2: Service satisfaction policies 
inst oblig /policies/slss/Pl-1 
on neWRPCO; 
subj s= SlSSPMA; 
targ t= slss/servsatisfmO; 
do t. setAlmstsatisf(QC, MF) 
t. setFUllsatisf(QC, MF); 
inst oblig /policies/slss/pl. 2 f 
on neWRPCO; 
subi S SISSPMA; 
targ t slss/servsatisfmo; 
do t. setQltLV1(QC, OQL); 
I 
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In addition to multiplexing factors, service objectives can further be expressed through an Overall 
Quality Level (OQL) parameter. This is associated with the risks in "adequately satisfying" 
subscriptions and is used as a measure of the degree of quality/satisfaction a provider would opt to 
provide to subscriptions. For a given SLS, the degree of satisfaction is analogous to the 
confidence level with which the SLS is to enjoy the agreed QoS at its SRAS- OQL is defined per 
QoS class as in policy P1.2 of Listing 3-2, and has a range from A to I as follows: 
0 OQL =0- In cases of congestion there is high confidence that active SLSs would enjoy 
their QoS at their SRAS- 
0 OQL =I- In cases of congestion there is high confidence that active SI-Ss would enjoy 
their QoS at their SRFS- 
0 OQL = -1 - In cases of congestion no guarantees can be provided for ensuring QoS. 
0 OQL increases (0,1) - In cases of congestion the higher the OQL the more likely is to 
ensure that SLS traffic rates higher than SRAS (i. e. near to SRFS)will get their QoS. 
0 OQL decreases (-1,0) - In cases of congestion the lower the OQL the less likely is to 
ensure that SI-Ss will get their QoS at their SRAS- 
3.2.1.2 Resource Availability Buffer Limit 
The subscription admission control logic decisions are based on the Resource Availability Matrix 
(RAM) calculated by the Traffic Engineering block. The RAM provides an availability estimate 
per Traffic Trunk (TT), which is expressed in the form of a Resource Availability Buffer (RAB) 
as shown in Figure 3-4. R',,, i,, represents the available bandwidth for this TT guaranteed by the 
network at any time. Rw, in represents the available bandwidth for this TT guaranteed by the 
network at congestion times. This bandwidth is not hard-reserved by the network and it can be 
utilised by other TTs but when congestion occurs the Traffic Engineering system will force all 
TTs to be constrained to their Rwnin bandwidth limit. Finally, Rm", represents the maximum 
available bandwidth for this TT but with no guarantees. 
0 RImin Rllvn= R.. 
iiiI 
Figure 3-4: Resource Availability Buffer 
The decision to accept a new SLS request, is based on a maximum limit in the buffer. This bound, 
subscription upper (SU), can be set by policies and its relative placement in the buffer is 
determined by the OQL of the associated QoS class. Two main areas can be defined, in the 
buffer, and interpreted in terms of confidence levels. The buffer up to R'min can be used with high 
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confidence levels because the network has been engineered so that this buffer can be at least 
available even at times of congestion. The buffer from R'min to Rmax is considered more risky 
because the network cannot provide any guarantees for the rates in this area; this is due to the fact 
that other TTs share the same physical resources with the TT under consideration. To this extent, 
three policies can be defined to set the value of SU (P1.3-P1.5) as shown in Listing 3-3, each 
expressing a different level of associated risk. The higher the value of SU the more subscriptions 
are accepted, thus increasing the profit, but the lower the guarantees offered to customers. 
Listing 3-3: Resource Availability Buffer policies 
inst oblig /policies/slss/pl. 3 
on raMRecvdo; 
subj S= SlSSPMA; 
targ t= slss/bufferMO; 
do t. setsuconsrv(TT); 
when t. getvalue(TT. Qc, OQL) > 0; 
I 
inst oblig /policies/slss/pl. S 
on ramRecvdo; 
subj S= SISSPMA; 
targ t= slss/buffermo; 
do t. setSURisky(TT); 
when t. getvalue(TT. QC, OQL) < 0; 
I 
inst oblig /policies/slss/Pl. 4 
on raMRecvdo; 
subj S= SlSSPMA; 
targ t= slss/bufferMO; 
do t. setsumodert(TT); 
when t. getvalue(TT. QC, OQL) 0; 
inst oblig /policies/slss/Pl. 6 f 
on neWRPCO; 
subj S= SlSSPMA; 
targ t= slss/buffermo; 
do t. defsustrg(consrv/ 
modert/risky, value); 
I 
Policies of this type are triggered upon receipt of a new RAM from the TE block and their actions 
are supported by the managed object responsible for buffer manipulations (buffermo). These 
policies set SU in the area between R',,, i,, and R.,, following a conservative, moderate or risky 
strategy depending on the OQL value of the QoS Class associated with a specific TT. The latter is 
expressed as a constraint in the policy where, for example, the limit associated with high-priority 
QoS classes (OQL close to 1) is set in a conservative fashion, close to Rw. i,,. The relative value of 
SU associated with each of the strategies is defined through policy P1.6 and is a function of OQL 
as follows: 
Conservative - SU = R"mi, + (R,,,, - Rw min) (]-OQL) for OQL >0 
Moderate - SU = R'min + 
(Rmax- R"min)12 for OQL =0 
Risky - SU=R W min+ (Rm, x - 
R'min) IOQLI for OQL <0 
46 
Chapter 3. Policiesfor DýftServ QoS Management 
3.2.1.3 Admission Control Decision 
When a new subscription request arrives, the anticipated traffic demand (TD) of the newly 
requested SLS is aggregated with the demand of already subscribed SI-Ss. Aggregating SRAs and 
SRFS of the new SLS yields new values for minimum and maximum traffic demand denoted by 
TD .. j,, and TD,,,,, respectively, which are parameters maintained by the subscription logic. The 
admission control decision is based on policies that define the conditions under which a SLS 
request is to be accepted, rejected or a counter-offer is to be made, following the guidelines of 
Table 3-1. 
Table 3-1: Conditions and actions for a subscription request decision 
Conditions Action when Action when conditions 
conditions true false 
OQL = 0, TD,,, i,, < SU accept reject / counter-offer 
OQL = 1, 
TDmax < SU accept reject / counter-offer 
OQL = -1, 
TDinin < SU accept reject / counter-offer 
I> OQL > 0, TDmi, < Rw. l., accept reject / counter-offer TDmax < SU 
0> OQL > -1, TDmi, <SU accept reject / counter-offer 
The various conditions for handling a SLS request are encoded as constraints in the policy as in 
the example of Listing 3-4, which corresponds to the first row of Table 3-1. This policy is 
triggered once the new anticipated traffic demand has been derived and its action is enforced 
through the admission control MO (acmo). Similar accept/reject policies can be defined for the rest 
of the constraints. 
Listing 3-4: Admission Control policy 
inst oblig /policies/slss/pi. 7 { 
on antDemcalcedO; 
subj S= SlSSPMA; 
targ t= slss/acmo; 
do t. accpt(SLS); 
when t. getvalue(SLS. TT. QC, OQL) == 0 && 
(t. getValue(SLS. TT, TDMin) < t. getvalue(SLS. TT, SU)); 
I 
3.2.2 SLS Invocation Policies 
The SLS-I module is responsible for the invocation management of already subscribed services. 
The task of regulating the traffic entering the network encompasses two aspects: 
(a) control the 
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number and the type of the active services, and, (b) control the volume and the type of the traffic 
injected by the active services. The main objectives of invocation management are the following: 
To maximise the use of network resources, and thus the number of admitted services and 
the QoS they enjoy. 
0 To prevent QoS deterioration caused by overwhelming the network. 
Service management policies can be used to guide the invocation process, which, in contrast to 
the static nature of the subscription module, is mainly based on run-time events. These are 
generated by a monitoring component, integrated within the SLS-I module, providing threshold 
crossing alarms on aggregate traffic (per TT) injected into the network by the local edge. The 
events act as triggers to policies that regulate the traffic entering the network and aim to achieve 
the above stated objectives. 
3.2.2.1 Module Initialisation 
At the start of every new RPC some parameters essential for the operation of the module are 
initialised. These are attributes of TTs originating from a specific ingress node and include the 
rates that are thought to almost/fully satisfy a service (SRAS, SRFS), minimum and maximum 
admission control parameters (AC,, i,,, ACnax), as well as monitoring thresholds that indicate 
target-critical and very-critical levels (TCL, VCL) of traffic flowing into the network. Service 
rates are aggregates of independent rates of services supported by a TT provided by SLS-S, they 
remain constant throughout the duration of a RPC, and serve as guidelines for the allocation of 
resources. Admission control parameters are based on the same RAM as the one used by SLS-S, 
their initial values range between R'min and Rmax, and they influence the probability of accepting 
new service invocations. Policy P2.1 below, enforced by the SLS-1 PMA, encodes the relevant 
actions that initialise service rates and admission control parameters. The latter are manipulated at 
run-time by policies described in the next section to reflect the current status of the network. 
Listing 3-5: Initialisation policies 
inst oblig /policies/slsI/P2.1 f 
on neWRPCO; 
subi S= SISIPMA; 
targ t= slsI/initmo; 
do t. setSRas(TT, value) 
t. setSRfS(TT, value) 
t. setACMin(TT, value) 
t. setACmax(TT, value); 
inst oblig /130, icies/slsi/p2.2 J 
on neWRPCO; 
subi S= SISIPMA; 
targ t= sIsI/monitormo; 
do t. setTCL(TT, value) - 
t. setVCL(TT, value); 
I 
I 
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Policy P2.2 sets TCL and VCL thresholds through the monitoring MO. These remain constant 
throughout a RPC and are used to proactively inform the SLS-I module when the levels of 
admitted traffic can potentially overwhelm the network. TCL and VCL values are relative to R'min 
and R,,,,, and can be derived with the following equation, where A is the percentage of the critical 
area: 
threshold = R",,, i,, +A* 
(Rmax- R'Vinin) 
The relative placement of the thresholds in the buffer defines the objectives of an administrator - 
the closer they are to R.,, the higher the risk of QoS deterioration as notifications will not be 
issued until the buffer is heavily utilised. The next section describes the various policies triggered 
at run-time by threshold notifications and their effect on the module's behaviour. 
3.2.2.2 Admission Control 
The run-time operation of the module is triggered by threshold crossing alarms. These initiate a 
set of policy actions that control the rates of incoming traffic and change invocation admission 
control parameters. The latter influence the treatment of new service invocations: the closer the 
aggregate value of current TT utilization and the requesting SLS traffic rate to ACmax than AC,,, i,,, 
the less the chances of the SLS being successfully invoked. 
Four event types can emerge from the specified thresholds; two for each of TCL and VCL when 
crossed upwards or downwards by the traffic entering the network (TRIN). Three of these events 
act as triggers (S1 SiAlamRai sed) to the policies of Listing 3-1 which enforce actions supported by 
the service adjustment managed object (serVAdj ustmo). 
Listing 3-6: Admission Control policies 
inst oblig /policies/slsI/P2.3 I 
on SISIAlarMRaised(tclup, TT); 
subi S= SlSIPMA; 
targ t= sIsI/serVAdjustmo; 
do t. decrSR(TT, value) - 
t. decrACMin(T-r, value); 
when duration(HH: MM-HH: MM); 
I 
inst oblig /polic ies/slsi/p2.4 { 
on SISIAlarMRaised(tClDown, TT); 
subi S= SISIPMA; 
targ t= sIsI/serVAdjustmo; 
do t. incrSR(TT, value) - 
t. incrACMin(TT, value); 
when duration(HH: MM-HH: MM); 
I 
inst oblig /policies/slsi/p2.5 f 
on SlSIAlarMRaised(vclup, TT); 
subj S= SlSIPMA; 
targ t= slsi/serVAdjustmo; 
do t. decrSR(TT, value) - 
t. decrACMin(TT, value) 
t. decrACmax(TT, value); 
I 
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Upon an upward TCL threshold crossing alarm policy P2.3 decreases the minimum admission 
control parameter - thus decreasing the probability of accepting new invocations - and the service 
rate offered to a particular TT. The amount by which these are decreased is expressed as a 
percentage of their current value. The effect of the policy enforcement is depicted in Figure 3-5 
(time t], N), where proactive measures are taken to avoid potential congestion built-up. 
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Figure 3-5: Run-time adjustment of service rate and admission control parameters 
The opposite actions are enforced when the TCL is crossed downwards by TRIN(Figure 3-5, time 
t3). Policy P2.3 increases ACi, and the service rate and can potentially restore the normal mode 
of operation where services enjoy their fully satisfied rates. Upward VCL threshold crossing 
alarms indicate more severe actions (policy P2.3) whereby service rates are further decreased and 
can be as low as SRAS (Figure 3-5, time t2). In addition to ACmi, ACmax is also decreased which in 
effect reduces the probability of accepting new invocations even more. In the event that VCL is 
crossed downwards no corrective policy actions are defined so as to allow the rate to eventually 
reduce to lower levels. It should be noted that these policies can also include a time constraint, as 
in the examples involving TCL events, which can be used to define alternative action parameters 
for different hours of the day, e. g. peak and off-peak hours, through multiple policies. 
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3.3 Traffic Engineering Policy Driven Functionality 
This section describes in detail the functionality of the Network Dimensioning (ND) and Dynamic 
Resource Management (DRsM) modules of the QoS management architecture. The overall 
objective of these modules is the static and dynamic management of resources in terms of BW 
allocation, route establishment, and resource optimisation with respect to the various QoS classes 
(QCs) supported in the network. As in the previous section, the specification of the relevant 
policies is provided in Ponder format along with descriptions of the functionality achieved 
through their enforcement. A collective description of the MOs involved can be found in Section 
3.4.2. 
3.3.1 Network Dimensioning Policies 
Network Dimensioning performs the provisioning activities of the management system. It is 
responsible for the long to medium term configuration of the network. Configuration involves the 
setup of Label Switched Paths (LSPs) as well as the parameters required for the operation of QCs 
on every link, e. g. bandwidth, priority, weight. The values provided by ND are not absolute but 
come in the form of a range, constituting directives for the function of the QCs, while for LSPs 
they come in the form of multiple paths in order to enable multi-path load balancing. The exact 
configuration values are determined by dynamic TE functions based on the actual state of the 
network at any point in time as described in Section 3.3.2. 
ND runs periodically, by first requesting the predictions (traffic matrix) for the expected traffic 
per QC in order to be able to compute the provisioning directives. The dimensioning period is 
typically in the time scale of a week while the forecasting period is in the time scale of hours. The 
latter is a period in which we have considerably different predictions as a result of the time 
schedule of the subscribed SLSs. For example, ND might run every Sunday evening and provide 
multiple configurations i. e. one for each period of the day (morning, evening, night). 
So, 
effectively the provisioning cycle is at the same time scale as that of the forecasting period. 
The objectives of ND are to optimally distribute the projected traffic over the network resources 
by minimizing the overall cost and at the same time not overloading parts of the network while 
others are under-loaded. In general, this problem can 
be formulated as a network flow 
optimisation problem [95]. The cost of each link can 
be defined as the sum of linear functions 
fh(Xl, h) per QC, where X1, h 
is the load on the link 1 from QC h. The total cost should be the sum offh 
for all QCs over all links; this is the objective 
function to be minimized. ND goes through three 
main stages in order to produce a network configuration. 
The basic functionality of every stage is 
summarised below, whereas a detailed description of the algorithm can 
be found in [96]. 
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0 Pre-processing stage 
Request traffic forecast per QC, i. e. Traffic Trunks (bandwidth, end-to-end delay, 
end-to-end loss probability requirements). 
0 Obtain statistics for the performance of each QC at each link. 
Determine the maximum allowable hop count K per TT according to the above 
statistics. 
0 Processing stage 
For each TT find a set of paths for which: 
0 The bandwidth requirements of the TT are met. 
The delay and loss requirements are met (by using the hop count constraint as an 
upper bound). 
0 The overall cost function is minimized. 
0 Post-processing stage 
Allocate any extra capacity or reduce any over-allocated bandwidth to the paths up 
to the maximum link bandwidth according to policy. 
0 Sum all the path requirements per link and configure the QCs. 
9 Configure the appropriate label switched paths calculated in the optimisation phase. 
ND is triggered by time rather than network state events from within the network. The policies 
applying to this module are resource provisioning policies that influence the way ND calculates 
the capacity allocation and the path creation and configuration of the network. These policies 
depend on the input from the Service Management block concerning the predicted volume of 
traffic and associated QoS classes, and their execution depends on the stage at which the module 
operates. The next sections describe the policies supported by the ND managed objects. 
BW Allocation and Explicit Route Setup 
The bandwidth allocation managed object (bamo) of this module allows for methods that explicitly 
define the way the BW should be allocated to different QoS classes. This is demonstrated by 
policy P3.1 (Listing 3-7), where an administrator can define the number of resources to be 
allocated per QC - giving a n-iinimum(NDMi n), a maximum(NDmax), or a range - with the 
BW 
value expressed as a percentage of the overall network capacity. Policies of this type are triggered 
once ND enters the processing stage. Policy P3.2 is supported by the LSP managed object (1 spmo) 
and is invoked during the pre-processing stage of dimensioning. It is useful for setting up explicit 
paths for traffic that belongs to a particular QC and passes though a set of nodes 
defined by Path 
with logically assigned bandwidth, BW. 
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Listing 3-7: Explicit BW allocation and LSP setup policies 
inst oblig /policies/nd/p3.1 I 
on dONDProcO; 
subj s= ndPMA; 
I 
targ t= nd/bamo; 
do t. setNDMin(QC, BW) - 
t. setNDMax(QC, BW); 
inst oblig /policies/nd/p3.2 f 
on dONDPreProco; 
subj s= ndPMA; 
targ t= nd/Ispmo; 
do t. SetUpLSP(QC, TT, [Path], BW); 
I 
3.3.1.2 Hop Count Derivation 
An important function of ND is to handle the QoS requirements of the expected traffic in terms of 
delay and packet loss. The implementation of ND functionality in [96] simplifies the optimisation 
problem by transforming the delay and loss requirements into constraints for the maximum hop 
count for each traffic trunk. This transformation is possible by keeping statistics for the delay and 
loss rate of the QCs per link. The accuracy of the statistics is determined by the period used to 
obtain them; smoothing methods, such as exponential weighted moving average, can be used. 
Listing 3-8: Hop count derivation policy 
inst oblig /policies/nd/P3.3 
on dONDPreProco; 
subj s= ndPMA; 
targ t= nd/hopsmo; 
do t. cal CHOPCOunt5trg(QC) 
Policy P3.3 of Listing 3-8 is triggered during the pre-processing stage and defines the way to 
derive the hop count constraint (calCHOPCOunto) for every QC. It allows for different strategies 
(5trg) in achieving this objective by using the minimum (min), maximum (max), or average (AVg) 
delay or loss along a route in order to derive the constraint. It is envisaged that by using the 
maximum an administrator is too conservative (appropriate for EF traffic), while by using an 
average the QoS requirements are possibly underestimated. 
3.3.1.3 Optimisation Algorithm 
The core component of ND is an optimisation algorithm and its objective 
is to find a set of paths 
for which the BW requirements of TTs are satisfied, the delay and 
loss requirements are met by 
using the hop count constraint as an upper bound, and the overall cost 
function is minimized. This 
is a non-linear optimisation problem which is solved by the gradient projection method 
[96]. 
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Listing 3-9: Optimisation algorithm policies 
inst obli 
on 
subj 
targ 
do 
g /policies/nd/P3.4 
dONDPreProco; 
s= ndPMA; 
t= nd/hopsmo; 
t. setmaxHopS(QC, HOPNUM); 
inst oblig /policies/nd/p3.5 
on doNDProco; 
subj s= ndPMA; 
targ t= nd/Ispmo; 
do t-setMaxAltPaths(Qc, TT, 
PathNum); 
Policies governing the behaviour of the optimisation algorithm are triggered during the processing 
stage of ND, as in the examples of Listing 3-9, and influence the way the algorithm calculates the 
output configuration. Policy P3.4, supported by the managed object dealing with hop constraints 
(hopsMO), sets an upper bound on the number of hops the calculated paths are permitted to have 
(setmaXHOpS()). This number may vary depending on the QoS class to which the traffic belongs. 
Policy P3.5, supported by the LSP managed object, defines the number of alternative paths the 
optimisation algorithm should allow (setmaXAitpathso) for every traffic trunk belonging to a 
specific QC, or even for a specific trunk, for the purpose of load balancing. 
3.3.1.4 Spare/Over-provisioned BW Treatment 
After the dimensioning algorithm executes, ND enters a post-processing stage where it assigns the 
residual physical capacity to the various traffic classes or reduces the allocated capacity because 
the link capacity is not enough to satisfy the predicted traffic requirements. 
Listing 3-10: Post-processing policies 
inst oblig /policies/nd/P3.6 
on dONDPreProco; 
subj s= ndPMA; 
targ t= nd/bamo; 
do t. allocspareBW5trgo 
I 
inst oblig /policies/nd/P3.7 
on dONDproco; 
subj s= ndPMA; 
targ t= nd/bamo; 
do t. redoverBW5trgo; 
The policies of Listing 3-10 can achieve the above objectives with different strategies (strg). 
Policy P3.6 defines the distribution of spare capacity (allocspareBWO) among the traffic classes, 
which can be done equally (equal) between the QCs, proportionally (prop) to the current 
allocation, or explicitly (expl), where the amount of BW is specified as a percentage. Following 
similar guidelines, policy P3.7 defines the strategy by which to reduce over-provisioned 
bandwidth (redoverBWO) in order to fit the physical link capacity. 
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3.3.2 Dynamic Resource Management Policies 
The resulting configuration of ND is based on historical data and customer subscriptions. As such, 
it is treated as a rough "nominal" value - actual offered traffic should fluctuate around forecasted 
values. For that reason, dynamic TE functions are deployed by the Dynamic Resource 
Management (DRsM) module, which has distributed functionality with an instance operating in 
every router. This module utilizes actual network state and load information in order to optimize 
network performance in terms of resource utilization while, at the same time, meeting QoS traffic 
constraints. In particular, DRsM opts for dynamic functions that manage network resources 
following the guidelines provided by ND and aims to guide the distribution of capacity between 
the QCs defined on a link. 
3.3.2.1 Module Initialisation 
At the start of every new RPC some parameters essential for the operation of the module are 
initialised. These hold resource allocation values which serve as functional constraints and are set 
by the actions of policy P4.1 below. The first two actions concern the minimum (NDMin) and 
maximum (NDmax) allocation directives received from the ND module and are used to set the 
boundaries between which the dynamic allocation of resources assigned to a QC should ideally 
reside. The third policy action (setRsrCA11OCO) is a general resource management directive that 
specifies the amount of link resources (as a percentage of link capacity) to be allocated among the 
various QCs during a DRsM operational cycle. Although the full link capacity should usually be 
available, an administrator may opt to allow for some BW dedicated to control traffic. It should be 
noted that the actions enforced by policy P4.1 are valid throughout the duration of a RPC. 
Listing 3-11: Initialisation policy 
inst oblig /policies/drsm/P4.1 I 
on neWRPCO; 
subj s= drSMPMA; 
targ t= drsm/initmo; 
do t. setAllocmin(Qc, NDMin) 
t. setAllocmax(Qc, NDmax) 
t. setRsrCA11OC(Link, BW); 
3.3.2.2 Utilisation Tracking and Resource Allocation 
In contrast to the static nature of the above policy actions, 
dynamic resource management policies 
[971 provide the flexibility to introduce 
logic on the fly, in the form of directives, for tracking the 
utilization of a QC and ensuring that the 
bandwidth allocated to that QC (alloCqc) is in accordance 
with the required BW. 
The latter is determined according to observed utilization (loadqc). Figure 
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3-6 depicts the functionality that can be achieved by the execution of DRsM policies. It shows 
that when the monitored utilisation exceeds the upper threshold, the allocated bandwidth, upper 
and lower thresholds are increased. Similarly, when the utilisation crosses the lower threshold, 
these values are decreased. Monitoring QC utilisation is achieved through a monitoring 
component, rather than polling instantaneous values, which is integrated within the DRsM 
module. The triggering of policy actions is based on upper and lower thresholds of the BW 
consumed by a QC. The monitoring component will raise a threshold crossing alarm when the 
utilization exceeds the upper threshold or drops below the lower threshold. 
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Figure 3-6: Bandwidth tracking of a single QC 
The calculation of new threshold and allocation values can be based on an algorithmic approach 
[98] that takes into account QC priorities as well as trend analysis of historical data. Alternatively, 
this could be achieved through explicit actions that only apply to the QC for which the alarm was 
raised. This means that each QC is treated independently through appropriate methods that 
modify thresholds and allocation upon threshold crossing alarms. Policies P4.2 and P4.3 
below, 
react to an upper threshold crossing alarm (upprTh) where the monitoring managed object 
(monitormo) increases both upper and lower thresholds (incrThso), and the BW allocation 
managed object (bamo) increases the allocation (i nc rAl 1 OC ()) for a given 
QC on a particular link. 
The opposite actions are enforced (P4.4 and P4.5) when a lower threshold crossing alarm 
(lowrTh) 
is issued. 
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Listing 3-12: Dynamic resource management policies 
inst oblig /policies/drsm/P4.2 { 
on drSMAlarMRaised(upprTh, 
Link, Qc) ; 
subj s= drsmPMA; 
targ t= drsm/monitormo; 
do t. incrThSStrg(Link, QC, BW); 
I 
inst oblig /policies/drsm/P4.4 I 
on drSMAlarMRaised(lowrTh, 
Link, Qc); 
subj s= drsmPMA; 
targ t= drsm/monitormo; 
do t-decrThSStrg(Link, QC, BW); 
when duration(HH: MM-HH: MM); 
I 
inst oblig /policies/drsm/P4.3 f 
on drSMAlarMRaised(upprTh, 
Link, Qc) ; 
subi s= drsmPMA; 
targ t= drsm/bamo; 
do t. incrAllOCStrg(Link, QC, BW); 
I 
inst oblig /policies/drsm/p4.5 { 
on drSMAlarMRaised(lowrTh, 
Link, Qc) ; 
subj s= drSMPMA; 
targ t= drsm/bamo; 
do t. decrAllocstrg(Link, QC, BW); 
when duration(HH: MM-HH: MM); 
I 
It should be noted that all policy actions of Listing 3-12 are appended with a strg keyword that 
signifies the different strategies with which an action can be achieved. For example, thresholds 
and allocation can be increased or decreased by an absolute value (Abs - e. g. kbps), a relative 
value (Rel - e. g. 5%), or by using a specific algorithm (Alg). A well known method would be to 
use an Exponentially Weighted Moving Average (EWMA) approach providing even more 
flexibility by setting Parameters such as the size of the extrapolation window and the number of 
historical data to be used in the extrapolation function. Furthermore, policies can also include a 
time constraint, as in the specification of P4.4 and P4.5, which can be used to differentiate 
between the handling of threshold crossing alarms during peak and off-peak hours. 
3.4 Managed Objects and System Behaviour Model 
Implementing a policy-based infrastructure for a real system as complex as the one enabled by the 
QoS management architecture described is a not an easy task. For the purposes of this thesis, 
which focuses on policy analysis rather than policy deployment mechanisms, state machines are 
used to represent system behaviour and model the effect of policy enforcement on the managed 
modules. This section describes the various MOs and the operations they support 
in relevance to 
the presented policies, and provides state machine representations for the modules of the QoS 
management framework. Policy enforcement is modelled through state transitions, which yield a 
new set of configuration parameters. The latter constitute properties of 
TTs and QCs for service 
management and traffic engineering operations, respectively. 
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3.4.1 Service Management 
To achieve its objectives, the SLS-S module employs three MOs exposing a set of methods that 
can be invoked through service subscription policies. These are as follows: 
Service Satisfaction MO (servsatisfmo) - Handles operations related to service 
satisfaction parameters. These include setting the SLS multiplexing factors that are used 
to derive the almost and fully satisfied service rates, and also defining the overall quality 
level of a service per QoS class. 
Buffer Allocation MO (buffermo) - Handles operations that define and execute the 
strategy with which the maximum limit for accepting new subscription requests is derived 
with respect to RAB parameters. 
Admission Control MO (acmo) - Provides operations that calculate the new anticipated 
traffic demand for an incoming subscription request and subsequently accept or reject that 
request based on policy constraints. 
The methods provided by the MOs above guide the evolution of the SLS-S module in its 
operation through a number of states represented by the state machine diagram of Figure 3-7. The 
transitions between states are managed through policy execution. 
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Figure 3-7: SLS-S module behaviour and action summary 
The upper part of the state machine represents the initialisation phase of the module which takes 
place at the start of every new RPC. During this time activated policies set the values 
for 
multiplexing factors (mi. 1), the service quality level (Mi. 2), and the maximum 
buffer limit (Mi. 3). 
The lower part represents the actual admission control process where policies guide the module to 
accept (Mi. 4) or reject (mi. s) a subscription request. 
It should be noted that a rejected request can 
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result in a counter-offer process which is out of the scope of this thesis. Here, it is assumed that if 
the counter-offer is accepted by the customer the module proceeds to the configuringSLS state, 
otherwise it returns to idle. 
Apart from state transitions, policy enforcement results in new configuration parameters. This is 
another function of the MOs, which have read/write access to an information store with the 
following structure: 
TTIQC(MFAS, MFFS, OQL) , Ra,, in, Rwmin, Rmax, TDmin, TDmax, SU, SLSEID, 
SRAS 
, SRFSI I 
The value of one or more of the above parameters, attributes of a TT, can be updated after a 
policy has been successfully enforced, but can also be passed to the PMA during policy 
evaluation. This is necessary when evaluating policies with constraints requiring TT related 
information. Such an example is the policy for setting the upper subscription limit whose 
evaluation involves instantiating the OQL parameter. 
The functionality of the SLS-I module is realised by operations that effectively aim to regulate the 
traffic entering the network and are supported by the following MOs: 
0 Initialisation MO (initmo) - Provides operations that initialise parameters essential for 
the operation of the module, including service rates and dynamic adn-ussion control 
parameters per TT. 
0 Monitoring MO (monitormo) - Provides operations that manage the functionality of the 
monitoring component. These include setting the TCL and VCL thresholds and 
generating alarms when the latter are crossed by traffic entering the network. 
* Service Adjustment MO (serVAdjustmo) - Handles operations that manipulate the 
service rates and admission control parameters of a TT. 
The behavioural representation of the SLS-I module is depicted in Figure 3-8 along with the 
various methods that result in state transitions once enforced through policies. 
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Figure 3-8: SLS-I module behaviour and action summary 
The on-line admission control process for incoming traffic is triggered by threshold crossing 
alarms emanating from the monitoring component depicted in the lower part of the figure. These 
are issued by the monitoring MO to the SLS-I PMA where they are processed by an event 
handler. Activated policies enforce methods (M2.4 and M2.5) that calculate new values for the 
service rate and admission control parameters of a TT. Newly generated configuration values are 
updated in the information store which also holds parameters established through static policies 
during initialisation: 
TTfQC, SR, SRAS, SRFS, ACrnin, ACrnax, TCL, VCL, Ra,, in, Rwrin, Rmax, SLSEID]l 
It should be noted that RAB parameters are also maintained in the information store as these can 
potentially be used to derive the relative placement of thresholds and admission control 
parameters within the buffer space of a TT. 
goldleo 
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3.4.2 Traffic Engineering 
The objectives of the ND module are achieved through resource provisioning operations 
supported by the following MOs: 
BW Allocation MO (bamo) - Handles operations related to the management of link 
capacity. These include minimum and maximum BW allocation for different QCs, and 
also functions for the distribution of spare link capacity and the reduction of over- 
provisioned BW. 
LSP MO (I spmo) - Provides operations that influence the load balancing aspects of the 
ND optimisation algorithm and for the setup of explicit paths through specific network 
nodes. 
Hops MO (hopsmo) - Provides operations that allow for different strategies when derIving 
the hop count constraint and also limit the number of hops that routes are permitted to 
have. 
The behavioural representation of the ND module is depicted in Figure 3-9 along with the various 
methods that result in state transitions once enforced through policies. 
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Figure 3-9: ND module behaviour and action summary 
The ND functionality is encapsulated within the three distinct stages of its operation which are 
represented by multiple states. Policies pertaining to each of the operational stages are 
triggered 
and subsequently enforced upon execution of a particular stage. 
During the processing stage, for 
example, policies enforcing methods M3.3-M3.6 define explicit 
BW allocation and constrain the 
output of the optimisation algorithm 
in terms of the maximum number of hops and alternative 
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paths. The post-processing stage is only activated if the resulting configuration is not an accurate 
one with respect to available network resources. Here, corrective actions are applied to 
strategically reduce over- provi si oned BW (M3.8) or distribute spare resources (M3.7) between 
QCs. Configuration parameter values established through policy enforcement are held in the ND 
information store that has the following structure: 
QCTNDminj NDmaxj HOpCountj MaXHOPS, TT[ID, MaxPaths, LSP[Path, BWIIJ 
It should be noted that the TT field holds multiple instances of TTs and LSPs, the attributes of 
which are explicitly defined through policies enforcing methods M3.2 and M3.5. 
DRsM policies invoke both static and dynamic operations that aim in performing effective 
resource allocation between the supported QCs, based on guidelines received from the ND 
module. These operations are offered by the following MOs: 
Initialisation MO (i ni tmo) - Provides operations that initialise specific parameters which 
act as constraints for the operation of the module. These include setting the minimum and 
maximum allocation of resources per QC and also defining the percentage of link 
capacity to be collectively made available for consumption. 
e BW Allocation MO (bamo) - Handles operations that manipulate the BW allocation on a 
per link basis, which effectively track the utilization of a QC. 
0 Monitoring MO (monitormo) - Provides operations that manage the functionality of the 
monitoring component. These include generating alarms when upper or lower thresholds 
are crossed and adjusting their values accordingly. 
Policy execution guides the evolution of the DRsM module in its operation through the states 
depicted in the behavioural representation of Figure 3-10. 
The process of tracking resource utilisation is triggered by threshold crossing alarms emanating 
from the monitoring component depicted in the lower part of the figure. These are Issued by the 
monitoring MO to the DRsM PMA, which, apart from enforcing policies that calculate new 
resource allocation values (M4.4 and M. 4.5), it also directs the monitoring 
MO to adjust the 
thresholds (M4.6 and M4.7) so that they are in accordance with the new allocation. 
In addition to parameters established through static policies 
during initialisation, the DRsM 
information store also holds updated threshold and allocation values calculated 
dynamically 
through the policies described above: 
QCfA110C, A11OCmin, A11OCmax, Thlowr, Thupprl 
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Figure 3-10: DRsM module behaviour and action summary 
3.5 Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter defined the various policies that can be used to drive the functionality of the 
TEQUILA QoS management framework by initially providing a generic classification based on 
the policy applicability and the temporal characteristics of their enforcement. Although a small 
number of policies have been defined for this application domain in [84], [85] and [86], these 
mostly targeted specific operations in the context of the ND and DRsM modules and were used as 
proof of concept on the feasibility and benefits of policy-based management. Here, we extend the 
policy definitions to cover all the associated QoS management modules in more detail thus 
providing a richer set of available functions. This allows to more realistically investigate the 
impact of a higher degree of programmability on the consistency and stability of the managed 
system. 
More specifically, we have shown the type of policies that can be used to drive the behaviour of 
service management modules and how these can influence the admission control process. SLS-S 
policies define essential service quality parameters and express conditional decisions for 
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performing static admission control on SLS subscriptions, aiming to provide service 
differentiation based on the QCs associated with the offered SLSs. SLS-I policies on the other 
hand, are mostly dynamic in nature aiming to regulate the traffic entering the network so that 
services can receive their subscribed rates and network congestion is prevented. They are used to 
set monitoring thresholds based on which dynamic functions can be invoked to alter service rates 
and admission control parameters. 
On the traffic engineering side, policies are used to influence the allocation of resources among 
the supported QCs. ND policies aim to provide static configuration of resources through different 
strategies for BW allocation and route assignment, which can potentially result in an optimised 
network with respect to demand and availability. As in the case of SLS-1, most policies for the 
DRsM module are triggered at run-time based on the network state. They are used to guide the 
distribution of capacity between the QCs defined on a link thus providing the means for adaptive 
resource management. 
In addition to the policy definitions, this chapter describes the various MOs available in the 
system and the operations they support, which are used in the policy specification to encode the 
targets and the actions respectively. The effect of policy enforcement onto the managed modules 
is modelled through state chart representations. These essentially describe the pre- and post- 
enforcement conditions which form part of the derivation process when identifying inconsistent 
situations in the system's operation. 
The defined policies are encoded using the widely adopted language of Ponder and they provide a 
comprehensive set of directives that serves as the basis for the conflict analysis methodology 
presented in subsequent chapters. Apart from analysis purposes [97][991, these policies have also 
been used in practical scenarios when addressing the policy refinement problem, and have been 
published in [100], [101], [102], and [103], in the context of the collaborative UK EPSRC 
PAQMAN [104] and European IST EMANICS [105] projects. 
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Chapter 4 
4 Static Policy Conflict Analysis 
One of the main reasons that prevent policy-based management from being widely adopted is that 
it is difficult to analyse policies in order to guarantee configuration stability, given that policies 
may have conflicts leading to unpredictable effects. The research issue of conflict analysis has 
been gaining momentum over the past decade and substantial effort has been invested in 
identifying conflicts and developing techniques for their effective detection and resolution. 
Initial work on conflict analysis tried to address the problem in a generic fashion where a number 
of approaches for the detection and resolution of conflicts pertaining to management policy 
[13][20][41][61][67] have been proposed. Although the outcome of this research was very useful 
for subsequent works, it was recognised that a generic approach could not satisfy the 
particularities of specific application domains. For this reason the evolution of research around 
this problem concentrated on providing solutions for distinct application domains, the main ones 
being security management of IP networks [27][106], call control in telecommunication networks 
[39][40], and management of mobile ad-hoc networks [107][108]. Besides the different types of 
inconsistencies identified in separate application domains, most of the above works distinguish 
between static and dynamic conflicts. This distinction is a key aspect as the time frame at which 
conflicts can be detected poses challenges in the way they are treated; static conflicts can be 
detected through off-line analysis at policy specification time whereas dynamic conflicts can only 
be detected when policies are enforced and depend on the current state of the managed system. 
While the policies described in the previous chapter can be used to guide the functional behaviour 
of the various QoS management modules, there is always the likelihood that several policies will 
be in conflict, either because of a specification error or because of application- specific constraints. 
This chapter focuses on the analysis of static conflicts by first identifying and classifying possible 
inconsistencies that may arise among the defined QoS management policies and then presenting 
techniques and mechanisms for their effective detection before being 
deployed in the system. The 
analysis approach is based on formal methods and 
derivation that caters for the various conflict 
types we have identified in policy-driven service management and 
traffic engineering. The logic 
formalism of Event Calculus was chosen for this purpose as 
it permits representation of events 
and persistent properties. 
The formalism is used for the representation of both policies and the 
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managed system, providing a uniform description that is amenable to analysis. Analysis relies on 
specifying detection rules to define the conditions for a conflict. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. 
Section 4.1 identifies the types of conflicts that can occur between the policies defined for the 
various QoS management modules. These conflicts are categorised based on their properties and 
are described in detail based on the conditions under which they arise. 
Section 4.2 presents the logic formalism of Event Calculus and describes how this can be used to 
represent the various components of the defined obligation policies and the QoS management 
system with a set of functions and predicates. 
Section 4.3 defines a set of rules that can be used to detect the identified conflicts. The rules are 
specified using the Event Calculus and encode the conditions under which the conflicts occur in 
the form of constraints. The conflict definitions for the various inconsistencies are part of the 
static analysis presented in the next two sections. 
Section 4.4 describes how system and policy, in their formal representations, can be used by the 
abductive reasoning technique to derive conflicts in the policy specification. This is demonstrated 
with a practical example of the derivation process followed by a description of the static conflict 
detection system architecture highlighting the main components. 
Section 4.5 provides a practical demonstration of the conflict detection process through a case 
study involving a set of ND policies. The output of a conflict detection tool developed is used to 
show the detected conflicts along with explanations as to their occurrence. Finally, Section 4.6 
surnmarises the chapter. 
4.1 Conflict Classification 
The fact that policies are downloaded to the QoS management modules, described in the previous 
chapter, on the fly while the system is operating may cause inconsistencies, since policies have 
not been tested to coexist with one another or with the rest of the system functionality without 
conflicts. This section provides a taxonomy of the various static conflict types that 
have been 
identified, as presented in Figure 4-1, and describes the conditions under which they arise. 
Although it would be possible to classify these conflicts using different characteristics we 
have 
chosen to distinguish the categories based on their 
level of abstraction, the subsystem in which 
they occur and their specificity to the application 
domain as we believe these most naturally 
reflect the scope in which they occur. 
First we distinguish between conflicts that are module- 
independent and those specific to the two management subsystems. 
Module-independent conflicts 
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may occur among any of the QoS management policies, whilst service management and traffic 
engineering conflicts are specific to the operations supported by the relevant modules. 
Figure 4-1: Classification of static policy conflicts 
Module-independent conflicts represent the simplest forms of inconsistency that may arise 
between policy specifications and examples include redundancy, and mutual exclusivity. 
Redundancy conflicts may arise because of duplicate policies or policies with inconsistent action 
parameters in relation to others and can be detected by syntactic analysis. Mutual exclusion 
conflicts occur between policies implementing alternative strategies that realize the same goal. 
Examples of the latter conflict type include SLS-S policies for setting the upper limit in the RAB 
in a conservative, moderate, or risky fashion, ND policies defining the treatment of spare/over- 
provisioned BW, and DRsM policies managing the allocation on link resources through different 
strategies. The various actions are said to be mutually exclusive since there should not be more 
than one directive specifying an operation on a particular managed resource. An example of such 
inconsistency would be between a DRsM policy incrementing the resource allocation using an 
absolute value (e. g. 500 kbps) and another one using a relative value. The conflict will materialize 
if the two policies are triggered by the same event, apply to the same link and QC, and have an 
overlap in the time constraints. 
The next two sub-sections describe the various conflicts relating to service management and 
traffic engineering policies and the conditions under which they can arise. 
4.1.1 Service Management Static Conflicts 
Conflicts specific to our application domain primarily occur because of inconsistent attribute 
values set by policies. It is essential that these are individually 
identified such that the exact 
reason for their occurrence can be defined and eventually resolved 
by a network administrator or 
in an automated manner. 
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Conflicts related to the SLS-S module can be detected at specific ation-time and arise between 
policies governing the process of static admission control. As described in Chapter 3, the upper 
limit in the RAB is a major factor for the decision of accepting/rejecting a new subscription 
request and can be defined with different strategies: risky, moderate, and conservative. A 
subscription admission strategy (subscrAdmStrg) conflict will arise if the resulting value of the 
conservative approach is greater than that of moderate, or if the latter is greater than the one 
generated by the risky approach. Multiplexing (multiplex) conflicts occur between service 
satisfaction policies that essentially define multiplexing factors used to derive the rates at which a 
service is considered almost and fully satisfied. This inconsistency will occur if the fully satisfied 
multiplexing factor is greater than the almost satisfied multiplexing factor for the same QoS class, 
as they are inversely proportional to the service rates produced. 
The relative priorities between traffic classes can cause inconsistencies to arise between policies 
defined on the various QCs in the context of any QoS management module. These are termed 
QoS class priority (qcPriority) conflicts and will materialize if the effect of a policy action 
violates the priority between QCs. Figure 4-1 shows two examples of such a conflict between 
SLS-S policies for setting service satisfaction and quality levels. A multiplex qcPriority conflict 
will occur if the multiplexing factor of a particular QC is higher than that of another QC with 
lower priority, whereas an overall quality level (oql) conflict will arise if the quality level of a QC 
with high priority is lower than that of QC with lower priority. 
At the start of every new RPC, policies for the SLS-I module initialise minimum and maximum 
admission control parameters (AC .. i, ACm,, x) as well as monitoring thresholds that indicate target- 
critical and very-critical levels (TCL, VCL) of traffic flowing into the network. The relative 
placement of both thresholds and admission control parameters in the RAB of each trunk allows 
the administrator to define the initial treatment of invoked services. Incorrect definition of these 
parameters will lead to an invocation admission strategy (invcAdmStrg) conflict, which will occur 
if AC,, " is greater than TCL, or if ACrnax is less than VCL. This 
is due to the fact that all 
parameters share the same buffer space and are indirectly related. Violation of the above rules can 
result in accepting (AC,,, i,, > TCL) or rejecting (ACmax < VCL) new 
invocation requests when the 
opposite actions should be taken, which can overwhelm the network or compromise the service 
quality unnecessarily. The reader should note that this conflict type can also occur at run time as 
AC parameters may be re-calculated on the fly based on threshold crossing alarms. 
This is 
discussed in the next chapter. 
The last two of the service management conflicts relate to the values of TCL and 
VCL thresholds. 
The first is termed a threshold incompatibility (thrshIncompat) conflict and can occur between 
policies setting these thresholds 
if the value of TCL, aiming to trigger proactive measures, is 
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greater than that of VCL. The second type is another instance of the qcPriority conflict and will 
materialise if the value of either threshold for a high priority QC is greater than the corresponding 
value of a lower priority QC. This is due to the fact that higher priority QCs require more 
conservative treatment so that early triggenng of dynamic AC functions can prevent delay 
sensitive traffic from suffering congestion. 
4.1.2 Traffic Engineering Static Conflicts 
Conflicts between policies guiding the functional behaviour of Network Dimensioning are all 
static in nature and occur due to contradicting action parameters of BW allocation and routing 
policies. With a combination of setNDMin and seMmax actions, the administrator can specify a 
range of network resources to be allocated to the various QCs (Figure 4-2a). When these two 
actions are encoded in two separate policies, there is a possibility that the BW values specified in 
the actions will not converge to provide the intended BW boundaries for a specific QC. Instead, 
the values are said to be diverging if BWI>BW2, in which case a diverging allocation 
(divergAlloc) conflict should be signalled (Figure 4-2b). 
BW1 BW2 %BW 
(b) 
BW2 BW1 %BW 
Figure 4-2: BW allocation (ndMin-ndMax) 
The above policies may also cause an over-allocation (minMaxBW overAlloc) conflict 
if the sum 
of the allocation corresponding to all the supported QCs exceeds the network capacity or a 
higher 
BW value if over- subscription is permitted. The same rule applies to explicit actions responsible 
for the distribution of spare resources or the treatment of over-provisioned BW during the post- 
processing stage of Network Dimensioning: a spareBW conflict will occur 
if the policy actions 
distribute more than the available spare capacity, and an excsBW conflict will materialise when 
the relevant policy actions do not reduce excess BW below the maximum network capacity. 
Incorrect specification of routing policies relating to the setup of explicit 
LSPs and the definition 
of the maximum number of hops and alternative paths can also 
lead the ND module to 
inconsistent states. The parameters set by the setmaXHOps and setmaXAItpaths policies, 
in order to 
meet the QoS characteristics of specific 
QCs, should not be violated by setUpLSP policies. A 
hopsExceed conflict occurs if the hop count of the path, through which an 
LSP is set, exceeds the 
maximum number of allowed 
hops, provided both policies apply to the same QC. A second 
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inconsistency termed altPathExceed conflict will arise if the instantiated number of LSPs is more 
than the maximum alternative paths permitted for a specific QC. Apart from the routing conflicts 
above, explicit LSP policy actions may also violate the constraints imposed by SetNDmax policies, 
in which case a BW and routing (bwRtViolation) conflict should be signalled. The conditions for 
this inconsistency will be satisfied if the collective BW required by a set of LSPs defined for a 
particular QC exceeds the maximum permissible. 
The last of the traffic engineering conflicts is based on the relative priorities between QCs and is 
another instance of the qcPriority inconsistency. This conflict occurs between policies specifying 
the strategy with which to derive the hop count constraint (caiCHOpcount), and will materialise if 
the strategy used for a high priority QC is less conservative in comparison to the one defined for a 
lower priority QC. 
4.2 Formal Representation 
Although a number of high-level policy languages and frameworks have been developed over the 
years, they all share a common deficiency in that they do not model the effect of policy 
enforcement on the behaviour of the managed system. As such, only simple checks can be carried 
out for the correctness of policies without taking into account the system state, which, in most 
cases, constrains the applicability of policies. Formal logical notations can allow for the 
representation of both system and policy and facilitate reasoning techniques to effectively analyse 
the policy specification. 
A small number of formal approaches for policy specification have been proposed in the literature 
including ASL (Authorisation specification Language) [22], PDL (Policy Description Language) 
[66], and Rei [1091. Although these approaches have contributed to the progress of policy analysis 
research, their main limitation is that they do not provide the means to reason about the state of 
the system and thus can not detect inconsistencies in the policies before they are deployed to the 
system. This section presents a formalism for representing policies and managed systems, based 
on Event Calculus, which supports the reasoning methods required for both static and dynamic 
policy conflict analysis. 
4.2.1 Event Calculus 
Event Calculus (EC) is a logic formalism for representing and reasoning about dynamic systems. 
Because it supports a time representation that is independent of any events that may occur, it 
provides a particularly useful way to specify a variety of event-driven systems including the 
presented QoS management framework. In the context of this work, EC serves as the underlying 
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formalism for describing policies and the managed system since it has well understood semantics, 
and supports all modes of logical reasoning. 
Since its initial presentation [69], a number of variations have been presented in the literature 
[I 10]. In this work we use the form presented in [II 11, consisting of (i) a set of time points that 
can be mapped to the non-negative integers; (ii) a set of properties that can vary over the lifetime 
of the system, called fluents; and (iii) a set of event types. In addition the language includes a 
number of base predicates, initiates(A, B, T), terminates(A, B, T), holdSAt(B, T), 
happens(A, T), which are used to define some auxiliary predicates as summarized in Figure 4-3. 
Base predicates 
initiates(A, B, T) 
terminates(A, B, T) 
happens(A, T) 
holdSAt(B, T) 
initiallyTrue(B) 
initiallyFalSe(B) 
Auxiliary predicates 
clipped(Tl, B, T2) 
declipped(Tl, B, T2) 
event A initiates fluent B for all time > T. 
event A terminates fluent B for all time > T. 
event A happens at time point T. 
fluent B holds at time point T. This predicate is useful 
for defining static rules (state constraints). 
fluent B is initially true. 
fluent B is initially false. 
fluent B is terminated between time point Ti and T2. 
fluent B is initiated between time point Ti and T2. 
Domain independent axioms 
holdSAt(B, Tl) <-- initiallyTrue(B) /\ -clipped(O, B, Tl). 
holdSAt(B, Tl) 
-holdSAt(B, Tl) 
-holdSAt(B, Tl) 
initiates(A, B, T) A happens(A, T) 
-clipped(T, B, Tl) AT< Tl. 
<- initiallyFalse(B) A -declipped(O, B, Tl). 
terminates(A, B, 
-declipped(T, B, 
A happens(A, T) 
TI) AT< Tl. 
Figure 4-3: Event Calculus predicates and axioms 
This is the classical form of Event Calculus where theories are written using 
Horn clauses. The 
frame problem is solved by circumscription, which allows the completion of 
the predicates 
initiates, terminates and happens, leaving open the predicates holdSAt, 
initiallyTrue and 
initiallyFalse. This approach allows the representation of partial 
domain knowledge (e. g. the 
initial state of the system). Formulae derived 
from Event Calculus are in effect derived from the 
circumscription of the EC representation. 
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The Event Calculus supports both deductive and abductive reasoning. Deduction uses the 
description of the system behaviour together with the history of events occurring in the system 
and the domain independent axioms to derive the fluents that will hold at a particular point in 
time. Although this reasoning technique can be used to determine conflicting conditions at a given 
point, partial specifications of the system state limit its applicability. Abduction addresses this 
issue and, given the descriptions of the behaviour of the system, it can be used to determine the 
sequence of events that need to occur such that a given set of fluents will hold at a specified point 
in time. While deduction is useful for dynamic conflict analysis as described in Chapter 5, 
abduction enables a priori static analysis of policies. 
4.2.2 System Representation 
A comprehensive Event Calculus specification of the managed system requires representations for 
the managed objects, the functional behaviour of the managed modules, and the management 
information maintained by each module. The main functions and predicates used to represent the 
managed system are provided on Table 4-1. The format follows standard logic programming 
conventions where unbound variable names and atoms start with uppercase and lowercase 
characters respectively. 
Table 4-1: Functions and predicates for representing the managed system 
Symbol Description 
Used to specify that Obj is a managed object in the mgdobj(obj) system. 
Used to denote that Obj is member of a particular ismember(Obj, module) 
module of the managed system. 
Used to denote the management operations specified in 
operation(obj, OpName, [Params]) a policy function and supported by a managed object, 
obj. 
Represents the state of a managed module when 
state(Module, value) defining its behaviour model. 
doACtion(operation(objTarg, Represents the event of the action specified 
in the 
operation term being performed on the target object, 
OpName, [Paramsl)) ObjTarg. 
Used to specify the various types of management 
mgdinfo(module, Resrc, [Parms]) information maintained by a module, 
in terms of 
resources, such as QCs and TTs- 
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The managed objects supported by each module of the QoS management framework need to be 
defined and organised based on membership relationships. This will enable a consistent 
organisational structure with which managed objects can be later used in the policy specification 
without ambiguities. This is achieved by the first two predicates of Table 4-1, where predicate 
mgdobj can be used to represent an instance of a managed object and predicate ismember can be 
used to define the membership relationship of a managed object with a specific module. To 
complete the formal description of a managed object, the various operations it supports are 
defined with the function operation. 
Listing 4-1 below demonstrates an example specification of the managed objects related to the 
SLS-S and DRsM modules. It should be noted that multiple instances of distributed QoS modules, 
as in the case of DRsM, expose the same set of managed objects with the same functional 
capabilities. Distinction between the various instances enables an administrator to enforce a 
different configuration at different physical points in the network. Lines 15 and 16 define the 
operations supported by the service satisfaction managed object of the SLS-S module. 
Listing 4-1: Formal representation of managed objects and organisation 
1 mgdobj(servSatisfmo). 
2 mgdobj (buff e rmo) 
3 mgdobj(acmo). 
4 mgdobj(initmo). 
5 mgdobj(bamo). 
6 mgdobj(monitormo). 
7 
8 ismember(servSatisfmo, slss). 
9 ismember(buffermo, sIsS). 
10 ismember(acmo, slsS). 
11 ismember(initmo, drsMROUtrl5). 
12 ismember(bamo, drSMROutrl5). 
13 ismember(monitormo, drsMROUtrl5). 
14 
15 operation(servsatisfmo, SetAlmstsatisf, [QC, MFI). 
16 operation(servsatisfmo, SetQltLV1, [QC, OQLI). 
The run-time behaviour of the managed modules can be modelled in terms of the changes in state 
caused by performing operations through managed objects. The state machines described 
in 
Chapter 3 represent the different states each of the modules can take as a result of policy 
enforcement. These can be specified with the function state which 
is used to represent the pre- 
and post- conditions for each operation. Performing an operation on the system will modify 
the 
state of the system in such a way that, once the operation 
is complete, there will be some new 
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fluents that hold, and some other fluents that will cease to hold. This is represented by the 
initiates(A, B, T) and terminates(A, B, T) predicates according to the schemabelow: 
(a) initiates(doACtion(operation(objTarg, OpName, Params)), PoStTrue, T) 
Precondition A mgdobj(objTarg) A ismember(objTarg, module). 
(b) terminates(dOACtion(operation(objTarg, OpName, Params)), PoStFalse, T) <-- 
Precondition A mgdobj(ObjTarg) A ismember(objTarg, module). 
The first rule above states that when the doACtion event occurs at time T, if the Precondition is 
true, then the fluent defined by POStTrue will hold after that time. Under the same conditions, the 
second rule states that the fluent defined by PoStFaise will hold after time T. In both rules, the 
Precondition will be represented by holdSAt predicates. The mgdobj and ismember predicates are 
used to verify that the target is a defined object and has a membership relationship with the QoS 
management module being modelled. Using these two rules, it is possible to model a transition in 
the state of the managed module. The PoStTrue fluent in the first rule expresses the new state after 
the transition and the Precondition takes the current state value, whereas the second rule 
invalidates the current state by setting it as the PoStFalse fluent with the same Precondition. 
Figure 4-4 represents part of the SLS-S module behaviour during the initialisation phase where 
multiplexing factors and the service quality level are set by policies. The first transition is initiated 
by the setAl mstsati sf 0 operation driving the module from the i di e to the Wactrsset state, and 
the second transition is initiated by the setQltLVI() operation driving the module from the 
Wactrsset to the OQLset state. The module returns to the idle state once the second operation has 
completed. 
setOltLvl( ) 
MFactrsSet )( OOLSet 
setAlmst 
I 
Satisfo goldleo 
idle 
Figure 4-4: Partial state chart representation of the SLS-S module behaviour 
Listing 4-2 transforms the first two transitions of the above state machine into Event Calculus 
representation. The doACti on function (lines 
1,6,11,16) specifies the operations being performed 
on the servsatisfMO managed object. 
The state(slss, MfFactrsset) term in line 2 is an example 
of a PoStTrue fluent and the state (s I ss, i di e) term in 
line 7 is a PostTrue fluent in the context of 
the first transition. The Precondition 
for this transition is the current state, state(siss, idle), 
which is a parameter of the hol dSAt predicate. 
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Listing 4-2: Formal representation of the SLS-S behaviour model 
1 initiates(dOACtion(operation(servSatiSfMO, setFUllSatisf, [QC, MFI)), 
2 state(slss, MfFactrsset), T) 
3 holdSAt(state(slss, idle), T) A 
4 mgdobj(servsatisfmo) A ismember(servsatisfmo, slss). 
5 
6 terminates (doACti on (operation (servSati sfmo, setFUllsatisf, EQC, MFI)), 
7 state(slss, idle), T) 
8 holdSAt(state(slss, idle), T) A 
9 mgdobj(servsatisfmo) A ismember(servsatisfmo, slss). 
10 
11 i ni ti ates (dOACti on (ope rati on (se rvsati sfmo, setQl tLV1 , EQC, OQLI 
12 state(slss, oqlset), T) 
13 holdSAt(state(slss, MfFactrsset), T) A 
14 mgdobj(servsatisfmo) ,\ ismember(servsatisfmo, slss). 
15 
16 terminates(doACtion(operation(servsatisfmo, SetQltLV1, [QC, OQLI)), 
17 state(slss, MfFactrsSet), T) 
18 holdSAt(state(slsS, MfFactrsset), T) A 
19 mgdobj(servsatiSfMO) A ismember(servsatisfmo, slss). 
When performing management operations, in addition to changing the state of a module, system 
resources need to be configured appropriately. Following the example above, the setFUlisatisf 
operation with parameters [ef, 11 will configure the fully satisfied multiplexing factor of EF 
traffic to the value of I on all traffic trunks. Management information is represented by the 
mgdinfo predicate of Table 4-1 and its parameters are instantiated with the structures associated 
with a particular module as described in Section 3.4 of the previous chapter. 
4.2.3 Policy Representation 
Although a number of policy types have been used in the literature for different purposes, this 
thesis is limited to obligation policies as these naturally apply to the QoS management 
framework 
under investigation. The formal representation of positive and negative authorisations as well as 
refrain policies, using Event Calculus, can be found in [ 112]. 
The elements of Ponder obligation policies are Subjects, Targets, 
Events, Actions and Constraints. 
To provide a complete formal representation of such policies, the 
information contained in each of 
these elements must be included in the formalism. Table 
4-2 describes the relevant functions used. 
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Table 4-2: Functions for representing obligation policies 
Symbol Description 
oblig(P01ID, Obisubj, 
Used to specify an obligation policy with 
identification P01ID, where the subject, Objsubj, 
operation(objTarg, OPName, [Params])) should perform the action OpName on the target 
object, objTarg. 
Represents events generated by the system which 
SySteMEvent(E) are used as the trigger in the definition of obligation 
policies. 
clocktick(HH, MM) Event that represents time in the format of hour 
minute. 
The Subject and Target elements of an obligation policy refer to the relevant managed objects; the 
Subject (objsubj) is the object representing the Policy Management Agent responsible for a 
specific module and is responsible for enforcing the policy operations specified in the Action 
clause, whereas the Target (objTarg) is the managed object on which the operations are 
perfon-ned. 
The triggering conditions for obligation policies are expressed with events that are based either on 
the operational system functionality or time, referred to as system and timer events respectively. 
System events for static QoS management components (SLS-S, ND) can arise because of a 
module entering a particular stage of its operation, whereas for dynamic modules (SLS-1, DRsM) 
they mainly depend on the current state of the underlying network and come in the form on 
threshold crossing alarms. Timer events can be used to trigger policies at some specific point in 
time, as in the case of a new resource provisioning cycle that typically takes place on a weekly 
basis. The two event types are represented by the systeMEvent(E) and clockTick(H, m) functions 
and they are parameters of the happens predicate. The examples below encode (a) the event of an 
upper threshold crossing alarm for DRsM and (b) the time turning 8 am. 
(a) happens (SYSteMEvent(drSMAl arMRai sed(upprTh, link2, ef)), T). 
happens(clocktick(08,00), T). 
Apart from events, constraints also control the applicability of a policy, which, in the context of 
our application domain, are either attributes of the managed resources or time periods. 
Examples 
of the former include constraints in SLS-S policies for determining the conservative strategy 
in 
setting the upper subscription limit in the resource availability buffer, and constraints 
that decide 
if a new subscription request should be accepted. As shown 
below, these constraints are 
represented by instances of the mgdinfo predicate together with comparison operators. 
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suconstraintsatisf <- 
mgdInfo(slss, tt2, 
accptconstraintsatisf <- 
mgdInfo(slss, tt3, 
mgdInfo(slsS, tt3, 
mgdInfo(slss, tt3, 
OQL==O A TDmin<SU. 
OQL, /\ OQL 
OQL, A 
TDMin, 
-]) 
A 
SU, 
-]) 
A 
Time constraints are useful when an administrator wishes to provide different network 
configurations during peak and off-peak hours as in the case of DRsM policies described in 
Chapter 3. To represent this type of constraint it is necessary to specify a rule that allows time 
values to be compared as shown below. The predicate duration defines a time period and holds 
between the occurrences of two c1 oc kt ick events. 
duration(HH1, MM1, HH2, MM2) <- 
holdSAt(clocktick(HH1, MM1)), Tl) A 
holdSAt(Clocktick(HH2, MM2)), T2) A 
Tl<T2 A (HH1<HH2 v (HH1==HH2 A Mml<MM2)). 
The remaining element of a policy is the Action, which specifies the management operations and 
is represented with the operation function previously defined. This is used as a parameter of the 
obI ig function of Table 4-2 together with an identifier and a subject to describe the type of the 
policy and the entity responsible to enforce it. 
Having defined the formal specification of the various components, it is now possible to combine 
them and provide the representation of an obligation policy. For each rule the terms objsubj, 
ObjTarg, OpName, E, and constraint, can be mapped directly to the subject, target, action, event and 
constraint clauses described above. Policy rule (a) below is expressed using the initiates 
predicate and states that if the constraint holds at the time the system event, systeMEvent(E), 
occurs, then the obligation for the subject to perform the operation on the target object holds. Rule 
(b) is an instance of a DRsM policy specifying the strategy and the value by which the BW 
allocation for EF traffic on a specific link should be increased during peak 
hours when a threshold 
crossing alan-n is raised. 
(a) initiates(SySteMEvent(E), oblig(PolID, objsubj, 
operation(objTarg, OPName, Params)), T) <-- constraint. 
(b) initiates(. systeMEvent(drSMAlarMRaised(upprTh, Iink2, ef)), 
oblig(incrBWPk, drsmPMA, operation(bamo, 
incrAlloCRel, Pink2, ef, 101)), T) <- 
duration(8,0,18,0). 
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4.3 Conflict Detection Rules 
According to the description of the conditions under which a conflict in the policy specification 
may arise, specific rules can be defined to detect such an event. These rules are expressed in the 
form of logic predicates that encapsulate the conditions to be met for a conflict to occur and are 
used as conflict fluents in Event Calculus notation. The latter can be considered as goal states that, 
when they are achieved, they signify the detection of a conflict. The advantage of using such a 
methodology is that, in addition to detecting possible conflicts, an explanation as to why a conflict 
occurred will always be provided. 
Conflicts identified in the literature come in different forms and levels of abstraction. The most 
common ones are modality conflicts which are domain independent and, according to [41], arise 
when two policies are specified using the same subjects, targets and actions but are of opposite 
modality, as in the case of positive and negative obligations (refrain policies). The conditions for 
this inconsistency can be encoded in the body of the rule specified below using EC notation 
(Listing 4-3). The rule specifies that a modality conflict (modl t) will occur at time TC, between the 
obligation policy Pol ID1 and the refrain policy Pol ID2, if their subjects (si, S2) are both obliged to, 
and refrained from performing an operation (opName) on their targets (T1, T2), and if they share the 
same subjects and targets. The conditions are determined by the isoveriap predicate and the 
conflicting parameters are used as arguments of the term conf 1i CtData. The latter are instantiated 
during a conflict detection query. 
Listing 4-3: Rule for detecting modality conflicts 
conflict(modlt, confliCtData(PolID1, POIID2, objsubj, objTarg, OpName), TC) 
holdSAt(oblig(PolID1, sl, operation(T1, Opl, Params)), TO ^ 
holdSAt(refrain(PolID2, S2, operation(T2, op2, Params)), TC) A 
isoverlap(Sl, S2, objsubj) A isoverlap(Tl, T2, objTarg) A 
isoverlap(opl, op2, opname). 
Whilst for modality conflicts the conditions under which the conflicts arise are generic and can be 
extracted from the policies themselves, for application- specific conflicts these conditions include 
system-specific data in addition to policy information for correctly capturing conflicting situations 
and need to be encoded in the body of the rules as additional constraints. The rest of this section 
presents and describes the various rules defined for the static detection of module independent 
conflicts and those specific to the two management subsystems. 
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4.3.1 Module Independent Conflict Rules 
Redundancy conflicts will arise between two policies if they are characterised by the same 
subjects, targets, actions and action parameters (duplicate policies). Furthermore, it is not 
necessary for all the action parameters to be exactly the same to indicate an anomaly. The 
matching of some key parameters in the actions will suffice to argue that the two policies are 
inconsistent with each other. Consider the actions of two ND policy instances where the first 
policy action specifies that at least 30% of the BW should be allocated to EF traffic and the 
second allocating a minimum of 40% for the same traffic type. In this case the QC is the key 
parameter matched, signifying that the two actions will lead to a redundancy conflict irrespective 
of the associated BW value. 
In order to capture redundancy conflicts one has to cater for all policy types driving the QoS 
management modules and their associated parameters. The rule of Listing 4-4 below is used to 
detect this particular conflict and is based on the number of policy action parameters. Besides 
matching subjects, target and actions, the rule performs checks that involve list manipulation and 
aims to match certain key parameters to signal the occurrence of a conflict. This is achieved with 
the following predicates: 1i stmembe rcount determines the length of the parameters list; f rstmembe r 
determines the first member of the list; and scndmember determines the second. These are used to 
compare key parameters and cater for policy actions with parameter number ranging from zero 
(e. g. ND allocspareBWEquai policies) to three (e. g. ND setmaXAItpaths policies). 
Listing 4-4: Rule for detecting redundancy conflicts 
conf 1i ct (redundancy, confliCtData(PolID1, P01ID2, objsubj, objTarg, OpName), TC) <- 
holdsAt(oblig(POIID1, sl, operation(T1, OP1, Paramsl», TC) 
holdsAt(oblig(POIID2, S2, operation(T2, op2, Params2», TC) 
isoverlap(S1, s2, objsubj) isoverlap(T1, T2, objTarg) 
isoverlap(opl, op2, OpName) 
POIID1 \== POIID2. 
listmembercount(Paramsl, Params2,0) v 
(listmemberCount(Paramsl, Params2,1) /\ 
frstmember(Paramsl, Pl) ^ frstmember(params2, P2) A pl P2) v 
(listmembercount(paramsl, Params2,2) /\ 
frstmember(Paramsl, P3) ^ frstmember(Params2, P4) /\ P3 P4) v 
(listmemberCount(Paramsl, Params2,3) \ 
frstmember(Paramsl, PS) ^ frstmember(Params2, P6) /\ PS == P6 A 
scndmember(Paramsl, P7) ^ scndmember(Params2, P8) /\ P7 == 
P8). 
As mentioned in Section 4.1, the functionality of the QoS management 
framework allows for a 
choice of methods related to a specific process, 
i. e. different strategies for realising a goal. 
Although this approach provides an administrator with the flexibility to follow 
different strategies 
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depending on the circumstances and managed resource, care must be taken so that no more than 
one strategy applies to a specific process and resource at the same time. Table 4-3 summarises the 
identified actions that are mutually exclusive (ME) between them and classifies them based on the 
process which they implement. 
Table 4-3: Sets of mutually exclusive actions 
Upper subscription Spare BW Over-provisioned Hop count 
limit (SLS-S) allocation (ND) BW reduction (ND) derivation (ND) 
setSUConsrv allocspareBWEqual redoverBWEqual calCHOpcountmin 
setsumodert allocspareMprop redoverMprop calCHOpcountmax 
setSURisky allocspareBWEXpl redoverBWEXpl calCHOpCountAVg 
Allocation Allocation Threshold Threshold 
Increment (DRsM) Decrement (DRsM) Increment (DRsM) Decrement (DRsM) 
i nc rAl 1 OCAbs decrA110CAbs incrThSAbs decrThSAbs 
i nc rAl I OCRei decrA110CRel incrThSRel decrThSRel 
i nc W1 OCA1 g decrAllOCAlg incrThSAIg decrThSAlg 
Extending the logic formalism, we introduce the meops predicate which organises ME policy 
actions into domains. Each domain is identified by a process that can be achieved with different 
strategies and a set of actions relevant to that process. The examples below encode the ME 
domains and actions for three processes of the ND module. 
meops(mutexspareBWAlloc, [allocSpareBWEqual, allocSpareBWProp, allocspareEXpl]). 
meops(mutexoverBWRed, [redoverBWEqual, redoverBWProp, redoverEXP11). 
meops(muteXHOpCountCalc, [calCHOpCountmin, calCHOpcountmax, calCHOpCountAVgl). 
The detection process for a ME conflict between two policy actions involves identifying their 
membership in a ME actions domain - if they belong to the same domain there is potential 
for the 
conflict to materialise. Listing 4-5 shows the general rule for detecting such conflicts, where the 
member predicate determines the membership of an action in a ME 
domain of actions. 
Listing 4-5: Rule for detecting mutual exclusion conflicts 
conflict(mutex, confliCtData(PolID1, P01ID2, objsubj, objTarg, 
muteXDomain, opl, op2), TC) <- 
holdSAt(oblig(PolID1, si, operation(T1, OP1, Paramsl)), TC) A 
holdSAt(oblig(PolID2, S2, operation(T2, op2, Params2)), TC) A 
meops(muteXDomain, MUteXOPS) A 
member(opl, mutexops) A member(op2, mutexops) A 
isoverlap(sl, S2, objsubj) A isoverlap(Tl, T2, objTarg) 
opl\==op2 A PolIDI\==POIID2. 
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4.3.2 Service Management Conflict Rules 
The detection of most inconsistencies that are specific to the two management subsystems 
requires not only information provided by the policy specification, as in the case of redundancies, 
but also QoS-specific information, such as properties of the managed resources and the supported 
QoS classes. These are encoded in the detection rules as further constraints that should not be 
violated. Such an example is provided by the rule for detecting QoS priority conflicts among 
policies for setting the quality level of traffic classes (Listing 4-6). Here, the constraint related to 
the relative priorities of QoS classes involved in setQltLV1 policy actions is encoded in the body 
of the rule. The conflict will be detected if the defined quality level of a QC with high priority is 
less than that of a QC with lower priority. Priorities are determined using the priority predicate 
which assigns values to terms Prti and Prt2. 
Listing 4-6: Rule for detecting OQL qcPriority conflicts 
conflict(oqlQCPrior, confliCtData(polID1, P01ID2, QC1, QC2, OQL1, OQL2), TC) <-- 
holdSAt(oblig(PolID1, subj, operation(Targ, setQltLVI, [QC1, OQL11)), TC) A 
holdSAt(oblig(POlID2, Subj, operation(Targ, SetQltLV1, [QC2, OQL21)), TC) A 
priority(Qcl, Prtl) ,\ priority(QC2, Prt2) A 
((Prtl>Prt2 A OQL1<OQL2) v 
(Prt2>Prtl /\ OQL2<OQL1)) A 
POIID1\==POlID2. 
It should be noted that in the above rule, subjects and targets are not explicitly checked for 
overlaps as in the rules for module-independent conflicts. They are instead assigned the same 
variable names (Subj, Targ) in the policy specification for simplicity. The same applies in 
subsequent definitions of conflict detection rules. 
As described in Section 4.1.1, multiplexing conflicts occur between policies setting the almost 
and fully satisfied service multiplexing factors. Listing 4-7 aims to match such policies and signal 
a conflict if the value of the almost satisfied factor, MF1, is less than that of the fully satisfied 
factor, MF2, for the same QC. The rules for detecting the rest of the identified inconsistencies, 
encoding application- specific constraints that characterise conflicting conditions, can 
be found in 
Appendix Al. 
Listing 4-7: Rule for detecting multiplexing conflicts 
conflict(mltplex, confliCtData(polID1, P01ID2, QC1, 
QC2, MFI, MF2), TC) <- 
holdSAt(oblig(POIID1, subj, operation(Targ, setAlmstSatisf, 
[QC1, MFII)), TC) 
holdSAt(oblig(PolID2, subj, operation(Targ, setFUllsatisf, 
EQC2, MF2])), TC) A 
Qcl==QC2 A MF1<MF2. 
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4.3.3 Traffic Engineering Conflict Rules 
Following the examples of the previous sub-section, here we describe the rules for detecting two 
of the identified conflicts between traffic engineering policies. The first rule concerns conflicts 
that arise due to inconsistent BW allocation when setting the upper and lower boundaries during 
the dimensioning process. In Listing 4-8, the conflict predicate will hold if it can match a 
setNDMin and a SetNDmax policy action applying to the same QoS class but the value of the 
minimum bound, BW1, is greater than that of the maximum bound, BW2. 
Listing 4-8: Rule for detecting diverging allocation conflicts 
conflict(divergAlloC, confliCtData(polID1, P01ID2, QC1, BW1, Bw2), TC) <- 
holdSAt(oblig(POlID1, subj, operation(Targ, setNDMin, [QC1, BW11)), TC) A 
holdSAt(oblig(POlID2, subj, operation(Targ, setNDmax, [QC2, Bw2l)), TC) A 
Qcl==QC2 A BW1>BW2. 
The second rule (Listing 4-9) will determine hOPSEXceed conflicts among policies setting up LSPs 
and those defining the maximum number of hops, HOpNUM, to meet the delay constraints of a 
particular QoS class. The predicate hopcount in the conditional part of the clause determines the 
hop-count, HC, of the route specified by Path in the setUpLSP policy. This conflict will be detected 
if Hc has a value greater than the permitted number of hops. The definitions of the rules for the 
other conflicts identified between traffic engineering policies can be found in Appendix A2. 
Listing 4-9: Rule for detecting hopsExceed conflicts 
conflict(hopSEXceed, confliCtData(PolID1, P01ID2, Path, HC, HOpNUM), TC) 
holdSAt(oblig(POlID1, subj, 
operation(hopsmo, setmaxHOPS, [QC1, HOpNUMI)), TC) A 
holdSAt(oblig(PolID2, subj, 
operation(lspmo, setUpLSP, [QC2, TT, Path, BWI)), TC) A 
hopcount(Path, HC) A HC>HopNum A Qcl==QC2. 
4.4 Analysis of Static QoS Management Conflicts 
The conflict analysis approach presented in this chapter is based on the 
formal representation of 
both system and policy has two main aspects: the definition of appropriate rules 
for determining 
potential conflicts in policy specifications, and the effective 
deployment of analysis processes in 
the context of the managed environment. In addition to the set of conflict 
detection rules defined 
in the previous section and system-specific information, an analysis process needs 
to support the 
appropriate reasoning capabilities to 
determine potential inconsistencies. This section describes 
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how abduction can be used to reason over a set of policies and presents the overall architecture for 
static conflict detection. 
4.4.1 Abductive Reasoning for Conflict Detection 
Based on the rules that define the conditions for a conflict, abductive reasoning can be used to 
determine inconsistencies in the policy specification. The logic predicates representing the various 
conflict types are used as goal states of abductive queries that, when achieved, signify the 
detection of a conflict. The advantage of using this type of reasoning is that, in addition to 
detecting possible inconsistencies, it provides an explanation as to why a conflict occurred, i. e. the 
sequence of events that must take place for the conflict to materialise. 
To demonstrate how abduction works, consider the example policies in Listing 4-10 which are 
candidates for a multiplexing conflict. The first policy sets the almost satisfied multiplexing factor 
of EF traffic to 0.3 and the second policy sets the fully satisfied factor to 0.4 for the same type of 
traffic. It should be noted that the integer numbers used in the policy actions represent the 
fractional part of multiplexing factors as their values range from 0 to 1. 
Listing 4-10: Policy instances 
initiateS(SYSteMEVerlt(neWRPC), oblig(pl, slsspmA, 
operation(servsatisfmo, SetAIMStSatiSf, Eef, 31», T) 
duration(8,0,18,0). 
initiates(SySteMEvent(neWRPC), oblig(p2, SlSSPMA, 
operation(servSatisfmo, setFUllsatisf, [ef, 41)), T) 
duration(8,0,18,0). 
The abductive query that checks for a conflict between the two policies above, will attempt to 
satisfy the goal conflict(mitplex, confliCtData(polIDI, P01ID2, QC1, QC2, MF1' MF2), Tc) as 
defined in Listing 4-7 of Section 4.3.2. This goal will be satisfied if the goals specified in the 
conditional part of the conflict rule can be achieved. These include the concurrent activation of 
the two policies above with matching subjects and targets, and inconsistent multiplexing 
factors 
applying to the same QC. Abductive reasoning first checks 
if these predicates are direct 
abducibles and if not, it recursively treats each predicate in the 
body of the rule as a goal of 
another abductive query. This process is illustrated in Figure 
4-5 where each branch of the 
evaluation tree represents a goal and leaf nodes represent 
facts or abducibles that satisfy the goals. 
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conflict(mltplex, confliCtData(pi, p2, ef, ef, 3,4), 1) I 
holdSAt(oblig(pl, SlSSPMA, operation (servSati sfMO, setAlmstSatisf, [ef, 31)), 1) Lio-happens(SySteMEvent(newRPC), 
1) 
initiates(systemEvent(neWRPC), oblig(pl, 
setAlmstSatisf, Eef, 31», 1) 
L* 
duration(8,0,18,0) 
happens(clocktick(8,0), 0) 
happens(clocktick(18,0), 2) 
slssPMA, operation(servSatisfMO, 
I 
holdSAt(oblig(p2, SISSPMA, operation(servsatisfmo, setFUllSatisf, [ef, 41)), 1) 
happens(SYSteMEVent(neWRPC), 1) 
initiates(systemEvent(neWRPC), oblig(p2, 
setFUllSatiSf, Eef, 4]», 1) 
L> 
duration(8,0,18,0) 
happens(clocktick(8,0), 0) 
happens(clocktick(18,0), 2) 
ef == ef 
3<4 
slsspmA, operation(servsatisfmo, 
Figure 4-5: Abductive reasoning evaluation tree 
4.4.2 System Architecture 
The architecture of the analysis system developed is outlined in Figure 4-6. Here, the static 
analysis process is an integral part of a Policy Management Tool (PMT) and is initiated by a 
network administrator. Our approach is based on the output of a refinement process [ 113][114], 
where high-level policy specifications or objectives introduced by a network administrator are 
decomposed into low-level implementable policies and mapped onto their respective EC 
representation. 
Policy 
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Interface 
Policy Cache Management 
Repository, Information Store 
awdliary Managed Resources 
into QoS Module 
Behaviour MO Domain Detection Logic 
QC Properties 
Cýa 
t 
Detection Rules ME Actions Domain 
Figure 4-6: Static conflict analysis system architecture 
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Before their enforcement, policies are analysed by the static analysis engine, which is the main 
component of the architecture encapsulating the necessary logic and reasoning abilities. This 
component also incorporates the detection rules defined in the previous section that cater for the 
identified conflict types. Apart from policies, the analysis engine takes as input the specification 
of the QoS management modules' behaviour as well as auxiliary information required by the 
process. The latter includes the structure of the managed resource representation, e. g. TT( ... ) 
QQ 
... ), domain information about the various MOs (the modules they are associated with and 
the operations they support), QC information regarding their relative priorities, and domain 
information about mutually exclusive policy actions. 
The output of the static analysis process is a set of conflicting polices along with an explanation of 
their occurrence. The resolution of these conflicts is a manual process that has to be carried out by 
the administrator as in the case of an oql qcPriority conflict where new quality levels need to be 
set for one of the QCs. Although some conflict resolution methods based on precedence rules 
have been proposed in the literature [ 18] [28] [30] [44], the nature of most static conflicts identified 
in this thesis does not allow for automation in their resolution. As such, in the event of a conflict, 
a policy can either be re-specified with the correct parameters or, in the case of redundancies, 
removed from the system. The details associated with each inconsistency however, can guide the 
administrator when correcting them. 
4.5 Static Conflict Analysis Case Study 
This section provides practical examples demonstrating the process of detecting conflicts among a 
set of policies, some of which are incompatible. In these examples, the conflict fluents defined in 
Section 4.3 are used as goal states of abductive queries aiming to determine any conflicts in the 
policy specification. If there are no solutions for a particular conflict fluent, it can 
be considered 
that the policy specification is free of that particular conflict type. 
The detection process is demonstrated with a tool developed using Prolog [ 
1151 in conjunction 
with the A-System abductive proof engine [ 116]. The tool takes as 
input the policy specifications 
and application- specific information, applies the appropriate 
detection logic and, in response to 
the user's queries, it returns any conflicts that may exist among the policies. 
The examples 
considered here aim to determine conflicts that can arise 
between policies managing the ND 
module. 
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4.5.1 Policy Set 
The policies used as input are the ones in Listing 4-11, which are in their EC representation and 
have been deliberately specified with such parameters that can lead to mutex, divergAlloc, 
hopsEvceed, and bvvRtViolation conflicts. 
In each policy rule, we have added some time constraints that control the applicability of the 
policy. For example, the first rule states that the ndPMA is obliged to perform the action 
cal CHOpcountmi n when the time is between 9am and 10am. In this respect, besides the conditions 
for the identified conflict types that have to be met, a conflict will be signalled if there is also an 
overlap in the time constraints. 
Listing 4-11: Policy instances 
initiates(systeMEvent(dONDPreProc), oblig(pl, ndpmA, 
operation(hopsmo, calcHopCountMin, [af]», T) 
duration(9,0,10,0). 
initiateS(SySteMEVent(doNDPreProc), oblig(p2, ndPMA, 
operation(hopsmo, calcHopcountAvg, Eafll», T) 
duration(9,30,10,30). 
initiates(systeMEvent(doNDProc), oblig(p3, ndPMA, 
operation(bamo, setNDMin, [ef, 501», T) 
duration(16,0,20,0). 
initiates(systeMEvent(doNDProc), oblig(p4, ndPMA, 
operation(bamo, setNDMaX, [ef, 40]», T) 
duration(18,0,22,0). 
initiates(systeMEvent(doNDPreproc), oblig(p5, ndPMA, 
operation(hopsmo, setmaXHOPS, [ef, 4]», T) 
duration(13,0,19,0). 
initiates(systeMEvent(doNDPreProc), oblig(p6, ndPMA, 
operation(Ispmo, SetUpLSP, [ef, r2r15, 
[r2, r4, r6, r8, r9, rll, r15j, 451», T) 
duration(9,30,18,30). 
initiates(systeMEvent(dONDProc), oblig(p7, ndPMA, 
operation(bamo, SetNDMin, [af, 601», T) 
duration(16,0,20,0). 
initiates(SySteMEVent(doNDProc), oblig(p8, ndPMA, 
operation(bamo, setNDMaX, [af, 501», T) 
duration(20,0,22,0). 
4.5.2 Static Analysis 
When performing queries concerning the different conflict types, the tool can indicate 
if there is a 
conflict of a particular type and also provide an explanation as to why that specific conflict 
occurred. Listing 4-12 shows the results of a single general query where the variables Type and 
confliCtData are instantiated with the identifiers pertaining to ND conflicts and their associated 
data respectively. 
The results suggest that there is a mutex conflict 
between policies pi and p2 because of mutually 
exclusive actions belonging to the 
domain rnuteXHOpcountCalc; a divergA110C conflict between p3 
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and p4 because of inconsistent BW values for EF traffic; a hOPSEXceed conflict between ps and p6 
because the hop-count of the specified path between routers r2 to r15 (6) exceeds the maximum 
number of hops allowed (4); and a bWRtVi ol ati on conflict between p4 and p6 because the BW 
allocated to the LSP is more than the permitted maximum for EF traffic. Additionally, the results 
describe the sequence of events that need to take place for the conflict to occur - system events 
mark the execution of particular stages of the dimensioning process controlling the activation of 
policies, and clocktick events constrain the applicability of policies between certain time periods. 
It should be noted that there is no conflict detected between p7 and p8. This is because the time 
constraints for these two policies do not overlap, and therefore there is not a situation in which a 
conflict may arise. 
Listing 4-12: Conflict detection trace 
solve(confliCt(Type, ConfliCtData, T)). 
solution found 
abduced atoms: 0-happens(clocktick(9,0), 0) 
1-happens(clocktick(9,30), 1) 
2-happens(SySteMEvent(doNDPreproc), 2) 
3-happens(clocktick(10,0), 3) 
4-happens(clocktick(lo, 30), 4) 
solved query: 
conflict(mutex, confliCtData(p2, pl, ndPMA, hopsmo, 
muteXHopcountcalc, calcHopCountAvg, calcHopCountmin), 3) 
solution found 
abduced atoms: 
0-happens(clocktick(16,0), 0) 
1-happens(clocktick(18,0), 1) 
2-happens(SySteMEvent(doNDProc), 2) 
3-happens(clocktick(20,0), 3) 
4-happens(clocktick(22,0), 4) 
solved query: 
conflict(divergAllOC, confliCtData(p3, p4, ef, 50,40), 3) 
solution found 
abduced atoms: 0-happens(clocktick(9,30), 0) 
1-happens(clocktick(13,0), 1) 
2-happens(systeMEvent(doNDPreProc), 2) 
3-happens(clocktick(13,30), 3) 
4-happens(clocktick(18,0), 4) 
solved query: 
conflict(hopSEXceed, confliCtData(p5, p6, [r2, r4, r6, r8, r9, rll, rl5], 
6,4), 3) 
solution found 
abduced atoms: 
0-happens(clocktick(9,30), 0) 
1-happens(clocktick(18,0), 1) 
2-happens(SySteMEvent(doNDProc), 2) 
3-happens(systeMEvent(dONDpreproc), 2) 
4-happens(clocktick(18,30), 3) 
5-happens(clocktick(22,0), 4) 
solved query: 
conflict(bwRtViolation, confliCtData(p4, p6, ef, 
40,45), 3) 
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4.6 Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter presented our approach towards the static analysis of conflicts by first identifying the 
various inconsistencies that may arise between policies driving the behaviour of the QoS 
management framework and which can be detected prior to policy enforcement. These were 
classified into module-independent and module-specific conflicts based on their level of 
abstraction and their specificity to the application domain. Although recent work in [32] also 
tackles the problem of conflict analysis in the context of QoS management, the conflicts identified 
in this chapter have not been previously reported in the literature. 
The conflict analysis approach is heavily based on the logic formalism of Event Calculus, which 
is suited for the representation of event driven systems as in the case of our application domain 
and the obligation policies that govern its behaviour. Using formal notations we have shown how 
Event Calculus can be used to represent the various components of the managed system such as 
the MOs, the operations supported, the state, and the managed information maintained by the QoS 
management framework. With respect to policies, the formalism was used to represent obligations 
and their associated events, actions and constraints. 
Apart from the system and policies, the formalism is also used to describe conflicting situations. 
Based on the description of the conditions under which the identified conflict types occur, specific 
rules have been defined to determine inconsistencies in the policy specification. These are Event 
Calculus predicates that encode information from policies and the managed system itself 
signifying the detection of a conflict when they are achieved. Unlike any other conflict detection 
methodology in the literature, including formal approaches [22][109], we have shown how Event 
Calculus can be used to not only detect conflicts but also provide explanations as to their 
occurrence. This was achieved by modelling the effect of policy enforcement through state 
machine transitions and including the description of the managed system state in the analysis 
procedure. 
The analysis approach presented in this chapter was demonstrated through a case study 
involving 
the detection of a range of conflicts among ND policies. The examples show 
how abductive 
reasoning can derive the sequence of events that need to occur 
for the conflicts to materialise, thus 
generating an explanation. This is particularly important when guiding a network administrator 
to 
handle a conflict requiring manual resolution, which is the case 
for most of the identified conflicts 
in this chapter. Finally, most of the work presented 
in this chapter has been published in [99]. 
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Chapter 5 
5 Dynamic Policy Analysis and Conflict 
Resolution 
Although research has tackled the problem of policy analysis in the context of several application 
domains, it has mainly focused on conflicts that can be determined statically at compile-time. The 
detection process involved simple policy analysis and resolution mostly based on the specification 
of policy precedence rules that may not suit many policy-driven systems. Although static analysis 
is very useful for detecting and resolving some conflicts before policies are deployed, it does not 
cater for the variety of conflicts that can emerge at run-time. Such conflicts occur in dynamic 
systems as a result of the current state of the resources. In network resource management, for 
example, policies which increment or decrement allocation of resources may conflict with policies 
related to setting upper and lower bounds for those resources. Conflicts of this type cannot be 
detected prior to policy enforcement because they depend on the current state of the managed 
system. 
The time-frame at which conflicts can be detected influences the analysis methodology and 
requirements for dealing with them. Static conflicts are typically detected through analysis 
initiated manually by the system administrator; conflicts represent inconsistencies between 
policies and are typically resolved by amending the policies. In contrast, run-time conflicts must 
be detected by a process that monitors policy enforcement and detects inconsistent situations in 
the system's execution. Resolution must be achieved automatically, for example through 
enforcing resolution rules. Lack of automation in the handling of run-time conflicts may have 
catastrophic consequences on the correct system operation, especially when managing QoS for 
delay sensitive applications. 
While the conflicts identified in the previous chapter can be detected statically, policies managing 
the QoS management modules can also be involved in dynamic inconsistencies. 
These conflicts 
occur between policies governing the behaviour of the on-line 
SLS-1 and DRsM modules, and can 
only be detected dynamically as their manifestation depends on the current state of 
the underlying 
managed resources. This chapter is based on the work presented 
in [97] and addresses the largely 
unresolved issue of dynamic conflict analysis. 
We first identify and classify possible 
inconsistencies that may emerge at run-time along with the description of the conditions under 
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which they arise, and then define the rules that can be used to detect their occurrence. The 
methodology presented in this chapter caters for the requirements posed by dynamic conflicts, 
where detection processes can be invoked automatically during the system's operation and 
resolution can be achieved without human intervention. As with static conflicts, our approach to 
dynamic analysis is based on the use of the Event Calculus formalism for the representation of 
both policies and the managed system, which is extended to model policy enforcement. The latter 
is linked with the behavioural representation of on-line modules so as to provide information 
about the run-time state of managed resources, which is essential for the detection of dynamic 
conflicts. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. 
Section 5.1 identifies the types of conflicts that can occur between the policies defined for on-line 
QoS management modules. These conflicts are categorised based on their properties and are 
described in detail based on the conditions under which they arise. 
Section 5.2 defines a set of rules that can be used to detect the identified run-time conflicts. The 
rules are specified using the Event Calculus and encode the conditions under which the conflicts 
occur in the form of constraints. 
Section 5.3 presents our approach towards conflict resolution and defines special rules, which, 
when enforced, can resolve the identified conflict types. This section also describes the additional 
functionality that is required by the managed system to support resolution logic. 
Section 5.4 describes how the formal representation of the system, policy and detection rules can 
be used by deductive reasoning to determine policy conflicts at run-time. Additionally, this 
section describes the different components of the dynamic analysis system architecture including 
a model for policy enforcement. 
Section 5.5 provides a practical demonstration of the dynamic analysis process through a case 
study involving a set of DRsM Policies. The output of a conflict analysis tool 
developed is used to 
demonstrate the automated detection and resolution of conflicts arising during the system's 
execution. Finally, Section 5.6 summarises the chapter. 
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5.1 Conflict Classification 
A number of potential conflicts that can only be determined at run-time have been identified and 
classified as shown in Figure 5-1. Like most static conflicts, these are all specific to the two QoS 
management subsystems, but they can be further subdivided into conflicts relating to policies for 
individual modules, and to policies applying to different modules. These are termed intra- and 
inter-inodide conflicts respectively, the latter denoted with green colour in the classification 
below. 
Apart from policies managing specific modules, in a hierarchical system like the presented QoS 
management framework, policies targeting upper layer modules may also influence the 
functionality of lower layer modules as a result of their relationship. One such relationship is, for 
example, between the ND and DRsM modules that constitute the main body of the Traffic 
Engineering subsystem. ND-specific policies allow the administrator to constrain the amount of 
network resources which can be allocated for each QC by providing upper and lower bounds. 
These policies are communicated to the relevant DRsM modules during the refinement process, 
acting as constraints throughout the dynamic allocation of resources. Violation of these 
constraints can occur at run-time in case a newly calculated allocation falls outside the nominal 
values, giving rise to inter-modide conflicts. The next two sub-sections describe the identified 
dynamic conflicts along with the conditions under which they can arise. 
Figure 5-1: Classification of dynamic policy conflicts 
5.1.1 Service Management Dynamic Conflicts 
The first two inconsistencies related to service management policies are 
inter-module conflicts 
and occur as a result of the hierarchical relationship 
between the SLS-S and SLS-1 modules. To 
regulate the traffic entering the network, 
SLS-1 works on guidelines provided by SLS-S. These 
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come in the fon-n of policies defining the service rates which are thought to almost/fully satisfy a 
service on a per TT basis. They are enforced during the initialisation of SLS-1 acting as 
constraints for the duration of a RPC and although harmonising the operation of the two modules, 
they may cause run-time conflicts. A maximum service rate violation (srMaxViolation) conflict 
will occur if the resulting configuration value of a service invocation policy increasing the service 
rate of a particular TT exceeds the upper boundary, i. e. the fully satisfied rate, provided by the 
subscription policy. Similarly, a minimum service rate violation (srMin Violation) conflict will 
occur if an invocation policy decreases the service rate below the minimum permitted value, i. e. 
the almost satisfied rate. 
In addition to activating service rate policies, TCL and VCL threshold crossing alarms also trigger 
SLS-I policies that manipulate admission control parameters (ACIi,,, ACmax) aiming to provide 
proactive and reactive control over invoked services. The relative position of both thresholds and 
AC parameters in the RAB of each trunk allows the administrator to adjust the strategy by which 
services are admitted to the network and potentially avoid the built-up of congestion while 
maximising resource utilisation. As mentioned in the previous chapter, inconsistencies between 
thresholds and AC parameters may result to an intra-module invocation admission strategy 
conflict (invcAdmStrg) that can be detected statically. The same conflict can also arise during the 
operation of the SLS-I module as AC parameters are re-calculated on the fly. The conflict will 
materialise if a newly calculated value for ACr,, i,, exceeds the TCL threshold, or in case the value 
of ACmax falls below VCL for a particular trunk. 
5.1.2 Traffic Engineering Dynamic Conflicts 
Run-time inconsistencies related to policies driving the functional behaviour of traffic engineering 
modules may arise as a result of enforcing DRsM policies that calculate new BW allocation and 
threshold values. Two such inconsistencies occur due to ND directives which are communicated 
and executed by DRsM during its initialisation stage. These policies define upper and lower 
bounds per QC acting as constraints for the allocation of resources between which DRsM should 
operate. The enforcement of dynamic actions altering the allocation may violate the constraints 
leading to inter-module conflicts. This means that a maximum ND violation (ndMaxviolation) 
conflict will arise if the resulting configuration value of a policy increasing the resource allocation 
of a particular QC exceeds the upper boundary. Similarly, a minimum ND violation 
(ndMaxViolation) conflict will occur if a DRsM policy decreases the allocation below the 
minimum permitted value. 
Another high-level directive that is refined down to the DRsM level is a general resource 
management policy, which explicitly specifies the amount of link resources to be allocated among 
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the various QCs during a DRsM operational cycle. This implies that a DRsM policy action aiming 
to increase or decrease the allocation for a specific QC can violate the above rule as the resulting 
allocation may exceed or be less than the specified value. We term these inconsistencies as over- 
allocation (overAlloc) and under- allocation (underAlloc) conflicts respectively. 
The last DRsM-related conflict is an intra-module conflict and involves policies responsible for 
the computation of new thresholds and allocation of resources. The inconsistency arises if the 
allocated BW is below its respective upper utilization tracking threshold, in which case a 
threshold incompatibility (thrshIncompat) conflict should be signaled. 
The next section provides the definitions of the necessary rules for detecting the identified 
conflicts encapsulating the policies involved and the conditions under which the conflicts will 
materialise. 
5.2 Conflict Detection Rules 
As with static conflicts, the detection of run-time inconsistencies is also based on the definition of 
conflict predicates using the Event Calculus formalism, which, in this case, require additional 
information regarding the run-time state of on-line modules. In this context, the conditions under 
which a conflict will arise are represented by constraints that depend on the conflict type. The 
rules for detecting such conflicts are based on the fact that two policies violate these constraints. 
In order to meet the requirements of the dynamic analysis approach presented in subsequent 
sections and facilitate an automated process, detection rules need to follow a specific structure. 
More specifically, the conditions encapsulated in the body need to be ordered as follows: 
Conflict- causing policy - the policy whose action can potentially violate a constraint 
imposed by another policy when enforced. 
0 Constraining policy - the policy defining a constraint that should not 
be violated. 
0 Set of conditions - these include policy parameters and run-time state 
information that 
need to be satisfied for the conflict to materialise. 
This structure is reflected in the conflict predicates defined in the next two sub-sections. 
5.2.1 Service Management Conflict Rules 
Based on the description of conditions under which service management conflicts occur, 
here we 
present the rules for detecting two of the identified dynamic conflicts. 
The first rule concerns the 
violation of the constraint imposed by the SLS-S module regarding the maximum service rate 
to 
be allocated to a TT for the duration of a RPC. 
The conflict predicate in Listing 5-1 aims to 
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match a SLS-I policy that increases the service rate and a SLS-S refined directive defining the 
fully satisfied rate (SRf S). The predicate will hold if the maximum permitted value is exceeded by 
the increased service rate (SR) for a particular trunk. The latter is acquired using the reqSR 
predicate, which reads the required rate from a management information base. 
Listing 5-1: Rule for detecting maximum service rate violation conflicts 
conflict(srMaxviolation, confliCtData(polID1, POlID2, TT1, SRfs, SR), TC) (-- 
holdSAt(oblig(POlID1, subj, operation(serVAdjustmo, incrSR, [TT1, Val])), TC) 
holdSAt(oblig(POIID2, subj, operation(initmo, setSRfS, [TT2, SRfS])), TC) A 
reqSR(TT1, SR) A SR>SRfS A TT1==TT2. 
The second rule concerns i nVCAdmst rg conflicts between policies that increase the minimum AC 
parameter and those setting the TCL threshold. Listing 5-2 aims to match such policies and signal 
a conflict if the newly calculated value Of ACMi n is higher than that Of TCL for a particular TT. This 
conflict type can also occur if, during a re-configuration, the maximum AC parameter falls below 
the value of VCL. The definition of this rule together with the one catching srMinViolation 
conflicts can be found in Appendix A3. 
Listing 5-2: Rule for detecting invocation admission strategy conflicts 
conflict(invcAdmStrgl, confliCtData(PolID1, P01ID2, TT1, ACMin, TCL), TC) <- 
holdSAt(oblig(PolID1, subj, operation(serVAdjustmo, incrACMin, [TT1, Val])), TC) 
holdSAt(oblig(PolID2, subj, operation(monitormo, setTCL, [T-r2, TCLI)), TC) A 
reqACMin(TT1, ACMin) A ACMin>TCL A TT1==TT2. 
5.2.2 Traffic Engineering Conflict Rules 
Following the detection rules in the context of dynamic service management conflicts, here we 
describe the rules for detecting two of the identified conflicts between traffic engineering policies. 
The first rule (Listing 5-3) determines ndmaxviolati on conflicts and aims to match a DRsM policy 
for increasing the BW allocation of a QC and a directive originating from ND that sets the upper 
allocation bound (NDmax) for that QC. The conditional part of the rule specifies that such a conflict 
will be detected if the required allocation (BW), acquired by the reqBW predicate, 
is higher than the 
permitted maximum value. 
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Listing 5-3: Rule for detecting ND maximum violation conflicts 
conflict(ndmaxviolation, confliCtData(PolID1, P01ID2, QC1, Link, BW, NDmax), TC) <- 
holdSAt(oblig(PolID1, Subj, operation(bamo, incrAllOC, [Link, QC1, Val])), TC) A 
holdSAt(oblig(polID2, subj, operation(initmo, setAllocmax, [Qc2, NDmaxl)), TC) A 
reqBW(Link, Qci, BW) /\ BW>NDmax A QC1==QC2. 
The second rule (Listing 5-4) determines overAllOC conflicts and aims to match a DRsM policy 
for increasing the BW allocation of a QC and the general resource management directive that 
defines the amount of link resources (A110C) to be allocated among the various QCs. The 
conditions for this conflict will be satisfied if the collective allocation of all supported QCs (BW) 
exceeds the value of the variable All oc. The definitions of the rules for detecting ndMaxViolation, 
underAlloc and thi-shIncompat conflicts can be found in Appendix A4. As in the examples 
provided here, the conditional parts of these rules include the policies involved and the run-time 
state of resources that have to be met for a conflict to occur. 
Listing 5-4: Rule for detecting over-allocation conflicts 
conflict(overAlloc, confliCtData(PolID1, P01ID2, Link, QC, BW, A110C), TC) <-- 
holdSAt(oblig(POlID1, subj, operation(bamo, incrAlloC, ELink, Qc, val])), TC) A 
holdSAt(oblig(POlID2, subj, operation(initmo, setRsrCA110C, ELink, AlloCl)), TC) 
totalReqBW(Link, BW) A BW>AllOC. 
5.3 Conflict Resolution 
As described in the previous chapter, the resolution of static conflicts requires human intervention 
since the nature of the identified conflicts does not allow for the deployment of automated 
resolution techniques. Despite the fact that this process is performed manually, it takes place 
before policies are deployed in the system and does not impose any run-time overheads on the 
functionality of on-line modules. Dynamic conflicts however, require system components to 
both 
detect and resolve conflicts in real-time, without degrading the performance of the system. 
This 
section describes our approach towards the resolution of dynamic conflicts and shows 
how the 
system specification can be extended to support such functionality. 
5.3.1 Conflict Resolution Rules 
Having identified the different inconsistencies that may arise at run-time, a network administrator 
can pre-specify rules that aim to provide a resolution strategy 
for each of these conflicts. Unlike 
other resolution methodologies 
[18][44][28], the approach presented here does not involve 
identifying which of the conflicting policies will prevail, 
but provides separate resolution rules 
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that handle potential inconsistencies. These rules are effectively obligation policies introduced by 
the administrator in Ponder format and their triggering events are conflict occurrences rather than 
network events. As with policies driving the behaviour of the QoS management framework, 
resolutions are mapped to their Event Calculus representation and enforced when a conflict is 
signalled. 
The resolution policies for most inconsistencies aim to configure the parameter involved in the 
conflict to have a value equal to the violated constraint, i. e. assign the maximum or minimum 
permissible value depending on the type of conflict. In the following example relating to the 
srmaxvioiation conflict, the resolution policy sets the service rate to the maximum permissible 
value defined by the relevant SLS-S directive. The resolving value, SRfS, for a particular TT can 
be acquired from the parameters of the SLS-S policy on the fly - as this quantifies the relevant 
variable in the data associated with the conflict predicate - and instantiate the relevant parameter 
in the resolution policy action. The latter can be re-used for multiple occurrences of the same 
inconsistency alleviating the need for human intervention. A similar policy can be defined to 
handle s rmi nvi ol ati on conflicts using the minimum permissible service rate in the resolution. 
initiates(SySteMEvent(confliCtDetected(srmaxviolation, 
confliCtData(PolID1, P01ID2, TT, SRfS, SR))), 
oblig(resPoll, SISIPMA, operation(serVAdjustmo, setSR, [TT, SRfS])), T). 
Since the resolution rules are part of the formal description, an analysis engine can determine 
which resolution policy applies for a particular conflict predicate based on the information 
provided for that conflict. The work in [59] and [107] describes an alternative approach for the 
handling of dynamic inconsistencies and follows the validation principle of [60]. The authors 
propose the use of constraints to prevent a policy from firing if a new configuration parameter is 
not consistent with an associated system variable. Although this approach can prevent a run-time 
conflict, it may also prevent the system from making a potentially essential re-configuration to 
meet an SLS requirement. Consider, for example, the fully satisfied service rate (S Rf S) of a trunk 
to be 10OMbps, and a policy that increases the rate allocated to that trunk by 20% when executed: 
if the policy triggering condition is met when the current allocation is at 
90Mbps, the constraint 
will prevent the policy from firing and as a result the rate allocation will remain unchanged. 
Our 
approach overcomes this problem and allows for the correct configuration of resources, which, 
in 
this case, is the maximum permissible value Of SRf S. 
The policy actions responsible for the resolution of the rest of the 
identified conflicts can be found 
on Table 5-1. These can be used to encode the action part of resolution policies which 
take as 
events the corresponding conflict type along with the 
descriptive data values as shown on the left 
column of the table. It is worth noticing that 
in the case of a ND-DRsM ndmaxviolati on conflict, 
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apart from setting the allocation to the maximum permissible value (NDmax) defined by the ND 
directive, additional resolution policies set the upper monitoring threshold to NDmax so that it is 
consistent with the BW allocation and an alarm is raised notifying the ND module about the 
event. The latter may decide to initiate a new resource provisioning cycle depending on the 
frequency of these events. Similar actions are taken to handle an ndminviolation conflict but in 
this case the lower monitoring threshold is set to zero as to avoid further decrease in BW 
allocation. 
Table 5-1: Resolution policy actions for the identified conflict types 
Conflict Resolution Policy Actions 
srmaxviolation(-, TT, SRfS, SR) setSR(TT, SRfS) 
srminviolation(-, TT, SRfS, SR) SetSR(TT, SRas) 
inVCAdmStrgl(-, TT, ACMin, TCL) setACMin(TT, TCL) 
inVCAdmStrg2(-, TT, ACmax, VCL) setACmax(TT, VCL) 
setAllOC(Link, QC, NDmax) A 
ndmaxviolation(-, -, QC, Link, 
BW, NDmax) setThuppr(Link, QC, NDmax) A 
raiseNDAlarm(ndmax, Link, Qc) 
SetAIIOC(Link, QC, NDMin) A 
ndminviolation(-, -, QC, Link, 
BW, NDMin) setThLowr(Link, QC, 0) A 
raiseNDAlarm(ndMin, Link, Qc) 
redoverBWEqual(Link) v 
overAllOC(-, Link, BW, A110 C) redoverBwprop(Link) v 
redoverBWEXPI(Link, QC, BW) 
allocSpareBWEqual(Link) v 
underAllOC(-, Link, BW, A11 0C) allocspareBWProp(Link) v 
allocspareBWEXpl(Link, QC, BW) 
thrshIncompat(-, 
-, 
QC, Link, BW, Thuppr) setThuppr(Link, QC, BW) 
The resolution of DRsM overAlloc and underA110C conflicts does not follow the procedure of 
configuring the value of the violated constraint. These conflicts can be handled with different 
strategies, as depicted on Table 5-1, where the resolutions are inspired by the policies used in the 
post-processing stage of the ND module: the distribution of spare capacity, or the reduction of 
over-provisioned BW can be done equally (Equal) between the QCs, proportionally 
(prop) to the 
current allocation, or explicitly (EXpl), where the amount Of BW is specified as a percentage. 
5.3.2 Support for Resolution Functionality 
The fact that a new set of policies, not part of the existing system policy specification, is required 
to handle conflicting situations at run-time, implies that the 
functionality supported by on-line 
QoS management modules needs to be extended to 
facilitate resolution logic. Here, we provide 
the state machine representations 
for the DRsM and SLS-I modules that illustrate the new 
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operations supported and state transitions as a result of enforcing conflict resolution policies. The 
state machines do not replace the existing functionality of the modules, but they instead build on 
top of that. Furthermore, the new operations are supported by the existing MOs since they have 
similar characteristics with the ones previously defined; for example the DRsM MO supporting 
operations to increase/decrease the BW allocation, now also supports the operation for setting the 
allocation to a specific value. 
Figure 5-2 below, depicts the behaviour of the SLS-I module as a result of incorporating 
resolution logic. In the event of a conflict, executing any of the three pre-defined resolution 
policies drives the module into a distinct state in which a conflict is resolved: SRset state for 
minimum and maximum service rate violation conflicts, Acmaxset and ACMinset states for 
inVCAdmstrg conflicts. The operations for setting the service rate and admission control 
parameters are all supported by the service adjustinent MO. Once a conflict has been resolved, the 
module returns to its idle state. 
SRSet 
conflict I 
handling 
setSROJ qw--) I goldleo 
setACmaxo 
idle 
setACmino 
01 goldleo N.., ACmaxSet 
ými 
nSet :!! 
ý 
gý 
ýIdleo 
Figure 5-2: SLS-I module resolution logic 
The resolution behaviour of the DRsM module is represented by two state machines since the 
monitoring component is treated independently - Figure 5-3. Here, overAlloc and underA110C 
conflicts are resolved by enforcing the relevant policies and transitioning to overA110CDcrsd or 
sparecapAllcd states respectively. The resolution of ndmaxviolation and ndminviolation conflicts 
however, requires the enforcement of multiple policies. Apart from setting the allocation and 
visiting the A110CSet state, the module alters threshold values in the monitoring component and 
raises a ND alarm. Finally, a thrshincompat conflict is resolved after transitioning to the upprThset 
state. The BW allocation MO is responsible for the enforcement of 
BW manipulation operations, 
whereas the monitoring MO supports operations that set the value of thresholds and raise 
ND 
alarms. 
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Figure 5-3: DRsM module resolution logic 
As with the state machines presented in Chapter 3, the states that on-line modules can take as a 
result of resolution policy enforcement can be represented in Event Calculus with initiates and 
te rmi nates predicates. 
5.4 Analysis of Dynamic QoS Management Conflicts 
Having defined the rules for the detection of run-time conflicts and the policies for their 
resolution, this section describes how these can be used to effectively deploy dynamic analysis 
processes. Since the detection of dynamic conflicts requires information relating to the current 
state of the underlying managed resources, we show how such a process can be embedded within 
policy agents managing on-line modules, and how it can be automatically initiated alleviating the 
need for human intervention. Additionally, we show how deductive reasoning can be used to 
detern-tine run-time inconsistencies, the result of which is used to trigger the identified resolution 
policies pertaining to a conflict. 
5.4.1 Deductive Reasoning for Conflict Detection 
Although the detection of run-time inconsistencies is also based on predicates that define 
conflicting conditions, as in the case of static analysis, the two approaches differ in the fact that 
deductive reasoning is used instead of abduction. This is because complete system specification is 
available to reason over, which is provided by run-time events and the current state of the 
managed modules. As such, the defined conflict predicates can be used as goal states of deductive 
queries to determine the occurrence of dynamic inconsistencies. 
To demonstrate how deduction can be used to derive a conflict, we use the example of Section 
5.3.1 regarding a maximum service rate violation. The rules involved 
in this inconsistency are 
presented in Listing 5-5, where the first is a conflict-causing policy that 
increases the rate of trunk 
tt2 by 20% upon a downward TCL crossing alarm, and the second 
is a constraining policy setting 
the value of the fully satisfied service rate, for the same trunk, at 
10OMbps. 
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Listing 5-5: Policy instances 
initiates(systeMEvent(slSIAlarMRaised(tClDown, tt2)), 
oblig(pl, SlSIPMA, operation(serVAdjustmo, incrSR, Ett2,20])), T). 
initiates(systeMEvent(neWRPC), 
oblig(p2, SlSIPMA, operation(initmo, setSRfS, Ett2,1001)), T). 
Assuming that the current service rate for tt2 is at 90Mbps, the alarm triggering the first policy is 
raised at T=2, and the second policy has been enforced at the start of a new RPC at T=1, Figure 5-4 
shows the evaluation tree of a deductive query aiming to determine a srMaxViolation conflict. 
The goal conflict(srmaxviolation, confliCtData(PolMl, P01ID2, T-r, SRfS, SR), TC) will be 
satisfied if the goals specified in the conditional part of the conflict rule can be achieved. 
Deductive reasoning recursively determines the validity of the two policies at T=2, and satisfies 
the remaining conditions for the conflict as the resulting policy enforcement requires a service 
rate of 108Mbps, which violates the constraint. During this process, the variables of the 
conf 1i CtData term are unified thus providing all the information pertinent to the conflict. 
conflict(srmaxviolation, confliCtData(pl, p2, ttl, 100,108), 2) 
holdSAt(oblig(pl, SlSIPMA, operation(serVAdjustmO, incrSR, [tt2,201)), 2) 
4- 
happens (systernEvent(sl SIA1 armRai sed(tCl Down, tt2)), 2) 
i ni tiates(systemEvent(sl SIAlarrnRai sed(tCl Down, tt2)), oblig(pl, SlSIPMA, 
operation(servAdjustmo, incrSR, [tt2,20])), 2) 
holdSAt(oblig(p2, SlSIPMA, operation(initmo, 
Lio-happens(systeMEvent(newRPC), 
1) 
initiates(systemEvent(newRPC), oblig(p2, 
setSRfS, [tt2,1001)), 1) 
setSRfS, [tt2,1001)), 2) 
SlSIPMA, operation(initMO, 
reqSR(tt2,108) 
108 > 100 
tt2 == tt2 
Figure 5-4: Deductive reasoning evaluation tree 
5.4.2 Policy Enforcement Model 
It is evident that run-time inconsistencies arise as a result of a change 
in the state of a managed 
module, which in turn is caused by the execution of a new policy. 
As such, it is necessary to 
define the rules that model policy enforcement. Figure 5-5 below 
illustrates this process, which is 
similar to that of Ponder, but does not involve authorisation at the 
target end. 
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Figure 5-5: policy enforcement model 
As shown, a network event from the monitoring component of a QoS management module is 
received by the Event Handler in the subject's policy agent, which is forwarded to the Policy 
Enforcer. The latter enquires the policy repository to determine if that event serves as the trigger 
for any of the obligation policies. In such a case, a request to perform an operation is dispatched 
to the target. Here, the operation is evaluated by the relevant managed object which performs the 
requested action. This causes a state transition in the behavioural representation of the managed 
module and the derivation of new resource configuration values corresponding to a specific policy 
action. 
Listing 5-6: Formal representation of obligation policy enforcement model 
requestACtion(operation(objTarg, OpName, Params), Tl) 
initiates(Event, oblig(PolID, objsubj, 
operation(objTarg, OpName, Params)), Tl) 
happens(Event, T2) A (Tl>T2). 
happens (dOACtion (operation (ObjTarg, OpName, Params)), TI) <- 
requestACtion(operation(objTarg, OpName, Params) , T2) 
operation(objTarg, OpName, Params) A (Tl>T2). 
The representation of the policy enforcement model in Event Calculus is provided in Listing 
5-6. The first rule models the behaviour of the subject's policy enforcer, where the requeStACtion 
predicate holds after an event has triggered an obligation policy. 
This predicate is used in the 
conditional part of the second rule, which models the behaviour of a managed object 
in the target 
environment. The enforcement will complete by asserting the doACti on( ... ) 
fluent as an event after 
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the request, if the operation is supported by the relevant MO. This model is part of the architecture 
presented in the next sub-section. 
5.4.3 System Architecture 
As described in the precious chapter, detection engines for static inconsistencies form an integral 
part of a PMT, analysing policies before they are downloaded to the QoS management modules. 
The manifestation of dynamic inconsistencies however, depends on the current state of the 
network and the resulting configuration output of on-line modules. For this reason, the process for 
handing dynamic conflicts needs to be embedded within policy management agents which have 
access to the run-time information required. 
The architecture of the dynamic analysis system developed is outlined in Figure 5-6, which 
involves an instance of a PMA and an associated on-line module. The latter is represented by an 
Event Calculus model which allows the enforcement of policy actions through state transitions 
and configuration changes, and can also generate events about emerging network conditions. 
Figure 5-6: Dynamic conflict analysis system architecture 
Policies stored in the PMT repository are translated to their Event 
Calculus representations and 
downloaded to a cache local to the PMA. These include resolution policies which 
have previously 
been checked for static module- independent conflicts. This 
is done to remove potential duplicates 
and resolution actions that are mutually exclusive between them, as 
in the case of allocating spare 
BW in the DRsM module. Policy execution is triggered by the Event 
Handler which processes 
events from the dynamic network environment and 
forwards them to the Policy Enforcer. 
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Successful policy enforcement results to a new resource configuration and state transitions in the 
behavioural model of the on-line module. 
To facilitate a seamless conflict handling environment and avoid driving the managed system into 
inconsistent sates, the deployment of a dynamic analysis process requires automation. This is 
achieved by processing the detection rules a priori and extracting information about policy actions 
that can potentially cause a conflict when enforced. These are encoded in the first field in the 
conditional part of detection predicates, as explained in Section 5.2, and are used to derive the 
states, from the beahavioural representation of a module, that are associated with the enforcement 
of such actions. The resulting states are used by the Event Handler, which notifies the analysis 
engine upon intercepting a system event matching one of the identified states, thus initiating the 
detection process. For example, the policy action causing an ndmaxviolati on conflict is associated 
with the all ocIncrsd state in the DRsM module. If the enforcement of a new policy drives the 
module into this state, the detection logic will perform a query to determine the occurrence of an 
ndmaxvi ol ati on conflict. As described in Section 5.4.1, the query is based on deductive reasoning, 
which makes use of the network events maintained by the Event Handler to evaluate the 
conditions of a conflict. 
If a conflict materialises during the detection process, an event is generated containing the details 
associated with that conflict and the resolution logic is invoked. Using the DRsM example above, 
the conflict event has the following fonnat: 
SySteMEvent(confliCtDetected(ndmaxviolation, 
confliCtData(polID1, P01ID2, QC, BW, NDmax))) 
The resolution engine enters a resolving state which performs a search in the cache repository for 
a possible resolution pertaining to the detected conflict. If an appropriate resolution policy is 
identified the Event Handler is notified, which in turn triggers the enforcement of that resolution. 
The output of dynamic analysis is passed to an interface in the PMT, which can be used to 
monitor or keep a log of the overall process. 
5.5 Dynamic Conflict Analysis Case Study 
In this section we present an example scenario that demonstrates the use of 
dynamic logic to 
detect and resolve conflicts emerging during the operation of the 
DRsM module. The results 
presented form the output of the analysis process 
deployed in the architecture described in the 
previous section which is based on Prolog [115] and 
its deductive reasoning capabilities. We 
assume that two traffic types are defined 
for the underlying network, namely EF and AFI, for 
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which the associated values regarding allocation, thresholds and ND constraints on link] are 
presented in Table 5-2. All values are expressed as a percentage of the total link capacity. 
Table 5-2: QC associated values 
Link QC Alloc NDmin NDmax upprTh IowrTh 
HAI EF 60 40 65 55 45 
link I AFI 40 20 F 50 35 25 
5.5.1 Policy Set 
Listing 5-7 defines a set of policies enforced on DRsM in their EC representation. Policies pi and 
p2 specify how the allocation and thresholds are to be increased in case of an upper threshold 
crossing alarm; policies P3-p6 represent the constraints imposed by ND that are enforced during 
the initialisation of the module; p7 signifies the full allocation of link capacity; and policies p8-P11 
provide resolution strategies for ndmaxviolation, overAlloc and thrshIncompat conflicts 
respectively. 
Listing 5-7: Policy instances 
initiates(SySteMEvent(drSMAlarMRaised(upprTh, linkl, ef)), 
oblig(pl, drSMPMA, operation(bamo, incrAllOCRel, [linkl, ef, 20])), T). 
initiates(systeMEvent(drSMAlarMRaised(upprTh, linkl, ef)), 
oblig(p2, drsmPMA, operation(monitormo, incrThSRel, [linkl, ef, 20])), T). 
initiates(systeMEvent(neWRPC), 
oblig(p3, drsmPMA, operation(initmo, setAllocmax, [ef, 651)), T). 
initiates(systeMEvent(neWRPC), 
oblig(p4, drsmPMA, operation(initmo, setAllocmin, [ef, 40])), T). 
initiates(systeMEvent(neWRPC), 
oblig(p5, drsmPMA, operation(initmo, setAllocmax, Eafl, 50])), T). 
initiates(SYSteMEvent(neWRPC), 
oblig(p6, drsmPMA, operation(initmo, setAllocMin, [afl, 20])), T). 
initiates(systeMEvent(neWRPC), 
oblig(p7, drsmPMA, operation(initmo, setRsrCA110C, [linkl, 1001)), T). 
i ni ti ates(systeMEvent(conf Ii CtDetected(ndmaxviolati on, 
confliCtData(PolIDI, P01ID2, QC, BW, NDmax))), 
oblig(p8, drsmPMA, operation(bamo, setA110C, [Link, QC, NDmax])), T). 
i ni ti ate s(systemEvent(conf Ii CtDetected(ndmaxviolati on, 
confliCtData(PolID1, POIID2, QC, BW, NDmax))), 
oblig(p9, drsmPMA, 
operation(monitormo, SetThuppr, [Link, QC, NDmaxl)), T). 
initiates(systeMEvent(confliCtDetected(overAllOC, 
confliCtData(PolID1, P01ID2, Link, ef, BW A110C))), 
oblig(plO, drsMPMA, operation(bamo, redoverBWProý, 
[Link])), T). 
initiates(systeMEvent(confliCtDetected(thrshIncompat, 
confliCtData(PolID1, P01ID2, QC, Link, BW, Thup))), W])), T). 
oblig(pil, drsMPMA, operation(monitorMO, setThuppr, 
[Link, QC, B 
104 
Cha ,, 11, -11 lill 11 namicPoll, ilr,, ýiiiysis and Conflict Resolution 
5.5.2 Dynamic Analysis 
By using one of the conflict fluents as a goal state of a deductive query, it is possible to detect 
conflicts during system execution. The queries use the predicates defined for the conflicts we aim 
to detect in this scenario and are triggered automatically based on the state of the DRsM module, 
as explained in the previous section. If a particular state triggers the detection of more than one 
conflict, the sequence with which queries are executed depends on the ordering of the conflict 
rules. In addition, a single conflict can be handled at a time, which means that a new conflict 
query will be executed only when the resolution of a previous conflict has completed. 
The results of queries indicate if there is a conflict of a particular type; the detection of a conflict 
causes the system to generate an event containing the conflict information which is passed to the 
resolution engine. The latter identifies the appropriate policy to handle the conflict which is 
subsequently enforced. The timeline in Listing 5-8 shows the sequence of events 
(systeMEvent( 
... )), actions (doACtion( ... )), and fluents (oblig( ... ), conflict( ... )) that describe the 
different stages that our system goes through, upon an upper threshold crossing alarm for EF 
traffic, before producing the appropriate configuration for 1in k1. 
The generated alarm, at T=1, triggers policies pi and p2, which increase the allocation and 
thresholds for EF traffic by 20%, thus producing new configuration values and driving the DRsM 
and monitoring components to states that reflect the enforced policies. At this point, dynamic 
detection logic is invoked since the state allocincrsd can potentially lead to any of the three 
conflicts we provide resolutions for. As the ordering of the detection rules used in this example 
follows the sequence ndmaxviolation, overAlloc and thrshIncompat, at T=5 a query is performed 
that first checks for an ndmaxvi ol ati on conflict. This conflict is detected at T=6 between policies pi 
and p3 since the required increased BW (72%) exceeds the maximum permissible value of 65% 
defined by the ND directive. This result acts as a trigger for the relevant resolution policies (p8 
and p9), which set the allocation and upper threshold for EF traffic to 65%. 
After successful resolution, and at T=10, a second query is performed for the detection of an 
ove rAl I OC conflict. The goal of the query is achieved as the sum of the required 
BW values for EF 
and AFI traffic exceed the maximum link capacity (105%). As such, a conflict 
is signalled 
between policies pi and p7, which is subsequently resolved 
by enforcing policy plo. The latter 
reduces the over-allocated BW proportionally among the two 
QCs providing a new allocation of 
62% and 38% for EF and AM respectively. 
The last query, which is performed at T=15, concerns a thrshincompat conflict. 
This inconsistency 
materialises as the increased upper threshold value of 
65% exceeds the current allocation for EF 
traffic. Policy pil resolves the conflict by setting this threshold 
to 62%. Finally, all newly 
calculated values are used to configure the 
link at T=20. 
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Listing 5-8: Dynamic conflict analysis trace 
T- Event / Action / Fluent 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 SySteMEvent(drSMAlarMRaised(upprTh, linki, ef)) 
2 obl ig (pl, d rsmPMA, ope rati on (bamo, i nc rAl I OCRel , [I i nkl, ef , 20] oblig(p2, drSMPMA, operation(monitorMO, incrThSRel , [linkl, ef, 20])) 
3 doACtion(operation(bamo, incrAlloCRel 
, 
[linkl ef, 20])) doACtion(operation(monitormo, incrThSRel 
, 
[liýkl, ef, 20])) 
4 reqBW(linkl, ef, 72) 
reqThuppr(linkl, ef, 66) 
systeMEvent(state(drsm, allocIncrsd)) 
systeMEvent(state(drsmmon, thsIncrsd)) 
5 conflict(ndmaxviolation, confliCtData(polIDI, PolID2, QC, Link, BW, NDmax)) 
6 systeMEvent (con f1i CtDetected (ndmaxvi ol ati on, confliCtData(pl, p3, ef, 72,6S))) 
7 oblig(p8, drSMPMA, operation(bamo, setAI10C, [linkl, ef, 65])) 
oblig(p9, drSMPMA, operation(monitormo, SetThuppr, [linkl, ef, 65])) 
8 dOACtion(operation(bamo, setA110C, [linkl, ef, 65])) 
doACtion(operation(monitormo, setThuppr, [linkl, ef, 651)) 
9 reqBW(linkl, ef, 65) 
reqThuppr(linkl, ef, 6S) 
systeMEvent(state(drsm, allocset)) 
systeMEvent(state(drsmmon, upprThset)) 
10 conflict(overAllOC, confliCtData(PolID1, POIID2, Link, QC, BW, AIIOC)) 
11 systeMEvent(confliCtDetected(overAllOC, 
confliCtData(pl, p7, linkl, ef, 105,100))) 
12 oblig(plO, drsmPMA, operation(bamo, redoverBWprop, Elinkl])) 
13 dOACtion(operation(bamo, redoverBWprop, [linkl])) 
14 reqBW(linki, ef, 62) 
reqBW(linki, afl, 38) 
systeMEvent(state(drsm, overAllOCDecrsd)) 
15 conflict(thrshincompat, confliCtData(PolID1, P01ID2, QC, Link, BW, Thup)) 
16 systeMEvent(confliCtDetected(thrshIncompat, 
confliCtData(pl, p2, ef, linkl, 62,65))) 
17 oblig(pll, drsmPMA, operation (moni tormo, setThuppr, [linkl, ef, 62])) 
18 doACtion(operation(monitormo, setThuppr, [linkl, ef, 62])) 
19 reqThuppr(linkl, ef, 62) 
systeMEvent(state(drsmmon, upprThset)) 
20 systeMEvent(state(drsm, configuringLink)) 
v 
5.6 Summary and Conclusions 
Dynamic conflict analysis is known to be the least addressed and one of the most challenging 
problems in the area of policy-based management. This chapter presented our contributions 
towards this problem by first identifying the various inconsistencies that may arise 
between 
policies driving the behaviour of on-line QoS management modules and which can only 
be 
detected at run-time. These were classified into conflicts relating 
to policies for individual 
modules (intra-module), and to policies applying to 
different modules (inter-module) as a result of 
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their hierarchical relationship, identifying for each conflict type the conditions under which they 
arise. 
The dependency of such conflicts on the run-time state of the managed system guided the design 
of our approach to deploy analysis engines within policy agents so that state information from the 
managed resources can be readily available. Although the detection of dynamic inconsistencies 
shares the same principles with static analysis regarding the definition of conflict predicates, the 
reasoning technique used is that of deduction rather than abduction. This is because run-time 
events and the run-time state of resources provide a complete system specification over which to 
reason. The main novelty of the detection methodology proposed here is that such a process can 
be initiated automatically during system operation, which is achieved by monitoring for events 
regarding system states that can potentially lead to a conflict. 
The requirements for a fully automated analysis process, so as to prevent the degradation of the 
system's run-time performance, are partly fulfilled by the proposed detection method. Our 
resolution approach completes this objective by providing specific rules that handle the identified 
conflicts types. These are in the form of pre-defined resolution policies that are triggered and 
enforced upon successful detection of a conflict, thus alleviating the need for human intervention. 
Furthermore, they are generic enough with only few required for each conflict type to cater for 
multiple occurrences of the same inconsistency. 
Most approaches in the literature propose the use of precedence rules when resolving a conflict, 
the most representative being the works in [18] and [44]. Although resolution based on the 
assignment of priorities to conflicting policies may be useful in some occasions, we believe that 
this may not be a flexible solution to the problem, especially when application- specific 
environments are concerned, as demonstrated in our examples where new policies need to be 
enforced. The approach based on the use of constraints within a policy to prevent it from firing if 
the resulting configuration is conflicting [107], is also not a viable solution as explained in 
Section 5.3.1; although it can prevent a run-time conflict, it may also prevent the system from 
making a potentially essential re-configuration. A methodology similar to the one described in 
this chapter was proposed in [40] where specific processes handle call control policy conflicts and 
are based on the notion of resolution policies. The detection of conflicts 
however is not supported 
by a separate process, but the various conditions are encoded within resolution policies 
instead. 
Resolution specifications can thus become complex and their evaluation quite expensive. 
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Chapter 6 
Tool Support and Experimental Evaluation 
The proposed analysis techniques have been developed and integrated into a policy conflict 
analyser. This tool implements static and dynamic analysis engines based on Prolog, supports 
Ponder policy specifications and has mapping capabilities to formal representation, integrates 
emulated execution environments of on-line QoS modules, and provides a conflict analysis user 
interface. 
Policy Management and Analysis Client 
Policy 
Mgmt 
Behaviour r 
Figure 6-1: Architecture of the policy analysis tool 
Figure 6-1 shows the architecture of the policy analysis tool developed, which has three main 
components: the static analyser, the dynamic analyser, and the user interface client application. 
The first component implements the detection logic for QoS management static policy conflicts 
making use of Prolog in conjunction with the A-System abductive proof engine. The dynamic 
analyser implements the detection and resolution logic for conflicts that can arise during system 
execution. This is based on Prolog's deductive reasoning capabilities and the implementation of 
an environment that emulates the behaviour of on-line modules. Lastly, the analysis client 
application provides a graphical interface through which the Prolog engines can be invoked and 
the analysis output to be acquired. 
The remaining three components of the architecture provide the means to store policies in Ponder 
format, maintain system management information, and represent the behaviour of QoS 
management modules in Event Calculus notation. 
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The first three sections detail the implementation aspects of the tool, whereas the latter part of this 
chapter presents and discusses a number of experimental results that evaluate the performance of 
the static analyser over a range of conflict types, and validate the functional behaviour of the 
dynamic analysis process. 
6.1 Policy Management and Analysis Client 
The logic formalism and conflict analysis techniques presented in this thesis can be difficult to use 
and understand. The client developed provides an interface through which a user can interact with 
the Prolog engines in a relatively simple manner, shielding him/her from the complexity of logic 
specifications and reasoning methods. The client, developed in Java, provides object 
representations for both policies and conflicts, and implements a graphical interface that allows 
the user to: (a) display managed system resources, (b) create/retrieve/view QoS management 
policies in Ponder format, and, (c) perform static and dynamic policy conflict analysis. This 
section describes the various components and features of the client. 
6.1.1 Design 
The Java classes that implement the client tool and their relationships are depicted in Figure 6-2. 
PoficyConflictAnalyser is the main class implementing the graphical interface through which the 
user can interact with the tool. It defines two modes of operation - static and dynamic - and 
provides methods to enter/view policies, display the managed resources specified in the 
information store, and perform static and dynamic conflict analysis. The latter is achieved by 
invoking the Prolog analysis engines and passing queries and events through Prolog's JPL 
interface [117] with Java. Analysis results are added to a list of conflicts maintained by this class 
through methods addstati cconf 1i CtSTOLi sto and addDynconfl i CtTOLi Sto. 
The Policy class provides the representation of a policy as a Java object. It has an ID attribute 
which is used to distinguish between policy instances, and provides methods to get and set the 
components of a policy. The latter are implemented by the PolicyEvent, 
PolicyAction, and 
PolicyConstraint classes which represent events, actions and constraints respectively. The Pol i cy 
class has a single Pol i CyEvent and Pol i CyACti On object and a vector of Pol 
i cyconstrai nt objects. 
This class also provides methods to represent the components of a policy object 
in text form, both 
in Ponder format (tostringo) and in Event Calculus notation (toprologstringo). The Policy 
class is used by the PolicyconfliCtAnalyser 
for creating and displaying policies and also for 
converting policy specifications to their 
Event Calculus representation. 
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initStaticAnalysiso 
loadStat ic Polices() 
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createNewPolicyo 
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1 
1 
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addParamo addParamo setAnd0ro addPolicieso 
getNameo getNam eo addParamo parsePolicieso 
getParamso getParamso getParamso remowPolicieso 
toStringo toStringo toStringo 
Figure 6-2: Class diagram for the policy management and analysis client 
The PolicyParser class provides the functionality to read Ponder policy specifications and store 
them in a dynamic vector as Pol i cy objects. The methods of this class cater for a three step 
parsing process where the contents of the policy file are read line by line and used to populate the 
vector. This process is described in more detail in Section 6.1.3. The Policyparser is used by the 
Pol i cyconf Ii CtAnal yse r class when loading new policies to the system. 
The Conflict class models a policy conflict as a Java object and holds information about the 
conflict type, the policies involved as well as conflicting parameters. It provides a tostringo 
method which returns a structured string representation of a conflict's details. It is used by the 
PolicyconfliCtAnalyser class to present to the user any conflicts identified during the detection 
process. 
6.1.2 Client Tool Overview 
Having described the various classes that implement the policy management and analysis client, 
this sub-section presents the graphical interface of the tool developed and provides an overview of 
its functionality. 
As shown in the screenshot of Figure 6-3 the tool has three main panels corresponding 
to static 
analysis, dynamic analysis and presentation of results. 
The first allows the user to load Ponder 
policies from a text file (containing multiple policies) and 
initiate detection queries for static 
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conflicts choosing among different inconsistencies to check for. The dynamic panel allows the 
user to load policies that drive the operation of on-line modules and to interact with the run-time 
execution environment by entering network events which can trigger the detection and resolution 
of potential conflicts. Apart from the text area for viewing policies loaded into the system, the 
dynamic panel also displays information about the operation of on-line modules. This allows the 
user to monitor the dynamic execution of policies, the automated invocation of the detection 
process and the enforcement of conflict resolutions. 
Poky Into-atomModel 
Static Analysis 
ýýPM? Va Stabc Detecbon Load PoAý Frm fk 
Conflict Detection 
Conflict types: At Dmm Dxýý- 
II ----- - --------- 
Policies Policy Details 
Id 1000 
Id 1001 on newRPC( 
id 1002 subject slsSPmA Id 1 003 
id W04 target strvSatistmo 
id IMS do s@tQftLvl(*f, 0.9) 
id 1006 when duration(08,. 00-18: 00) 
id 1007, 
Analysis Results 
Conflicts Detected Coaffict Details 
messagos 
The follOWlr)q SLSs have been ristantsted: 
SLS-Slsl, Plararrs=> TT-ttl, QC. ekO. 2,0.1, Oý9), SRaS. 23, SRfb-25 
SLS=sls2, Pararns=> TT=ttl, QC=ef(O. 2.0.1,0.9), SRas=23,11,; Rfs=25 
SLS-sls3, Pararns-> TT=tt2, QC=afl(O. 3,0.2,0, S), SRaS-17, SPfs. 20 
SLS-SýS4, Params=>TT=tt2, QC. afl(O. 3,0.2,0.5), SRas. 17, SRfs=20 
Conflicting Policy 
Polides 
Policy Details 
Conflicting Policy 
The following TTs have been instantated: 
7T-I, tl, Pararns=> QC-ef(O. 2.0.1,0.9), Ramin. 100, Ryimin=150, Rma, (=200, TDmin=46, TDmax-50, SU-ISS, SLS=(slsl(23,2S), s152(23,25)) 
7T=tt2. Pararns=> QC=afl(G. 3,0ý2,0.5), Ramin=100, Rwmin=150, Rmax=200, TL)min=34, TDmgx=40, SU=175, SLS=(SIS3(17,20), sls4(17,20)) 
Figure 6-3: Policy management and analysis tool interface 
Lastly, the analysis results panel is shared by both processes and displays the output of conflict 
analysis by mapping the Event Calculus format to a user friendly representation. This includes a 
list of conflicts, explanations for their occurrence and the policy pair involved. The lower part of 
the panel displays messages about the operations performed including performance times when 
detecting static conflicts. 
Apart from interacting with the Prolog conflict analysis engines, the tool (menu bar) allows the 
user to create new policies, perform basic Prolog queries, and to access the management 
information store and selectively display available entries. The message area on the screenshot of 
Figure 6-3, displays information about the four SLSs and the associated TTs currently specified in 
the information store. 
DynaMIC Analysis 
INUake PROLOG fýr Nnark Model ErTpJation I Load Polta- hom file 
Event Generator 
NextEvent: ea 
Dynamic System Execution 
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6.1.3 Policy Input and Parsing 
As mentioned above, policies can be introduced into the tool by either loading them directly from 
plain text files or by creating new ones using the graphical interface provided. The latter process 
is demonstrated in Figure 6-4 where a policy setting the overall quality level of the EF QoS class 
to 0.9 is created. This involves three steps that correspond to the relevant tabs of the dialog box: 
(a) specify the policy ID, triggering event, subject and target, (b) specify the policy action and 
associated parameters, and, (c) specify any constraints applying to that policy - in this case a time 
constraint. Once created, the policy is loaded into the system and can subsequently be stored in a 
new text file or added to an existing one. 
Policies 
Wit 
Policy Details 
id 1000 
on newRPCO 
subject sIsSPNIA 
target servSatisfNIO 
do setQItLvl(ef, 0.9) 
,., #hen duration(S-. 00-18: 00) 
Figure 6-4: New policy creation using the graphical interface 
When introducing new policy specifications in the tool, by either loading a text file or creating 
new ones as described above, they undergo a three step parsing process which converts them to 
Java objects. This process is depicted in Figure 6-5 and described below: 
Step I 
A newly created policy or a text file is initially parsed and stored 
line-by-line in a vector 
(linevector). Each line in the vector is then read and split into tokens, which are 
identified as words surrounded by white spaces. The action part of the policy example 
above would be split into "do" and "setQ1tLVI(ef, 0.9)" tokens. 
These are stored in 
another vector (tokenvector). 
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0 Step 2 
The tokenvector is read to determine entries that match the "id" keyword. These entries 
signify the beginning of a new policy the indices of which are stored in an array 
(policyAXArray). Thus, the tokens that hold each policy's specification are contained in 
the tokenvector's entries that fall inside the range signified by two consecutive 
pol i cyIdXAr ray entnes. 
Step 3 
Based on policyidXArray, all tokenVector entries describing a policy are read 
sequentially and keywords signifying policy fields (e. g. "i C or "do") are identified. These 
are used together with the immediate next entry in the -tokenvector to populate a new 
policy object's fields. In the example, the successive entries of "id" and "looo" are used 
to create a new policy object (policyobjecti) and set its identifier field to 1000. When all 
fields are populated the new policy is stored in a policyvector. This last step is repeated 
until the tokenvector has been exhausted. 
Step 1 
input policies 
id 1000 
on newRPCO 
subject SlSSPMA 
target servsatisfmo 
do setQltLvl(ef, 0.9) 
when duration(08: 00-18: 00) 
id 1001 
Step 2 
lineVector 
1 "id 1000" 
2 "on newRPCO" 
3: "subject SlSSPMA" 
4: "target servSatisfMO 
S: "do setQltLVI(ef, 0.9) 
6: "when duration(08: 00-18: 00)"I 
7: "id 1001" 
Step 3 
tokenVector 
1: "id" 
2 "1000" 
3 "on" 
4 "newRPCO" 
5 "subJect" 
6 "Sl SSPMA" 
7: "target" 
8: "servsatisfMO" 
9: "do" 
10: "setQltLvl(ef, 0.9)" 
ii: "when" 
12: "duration(08: 00-18: 00)". ) 
13: "id" 
14: "1001" 
tokenVector 
1 "id" 
2 "1000" 
3 "on" 
4 "neWRPC 
5: "subject" 
6: "S I SSPMA" 
7: "target" 
8: "servsatisfmo" 
9: "do" 
10: "setQltLV1(ef, 0.9)" 
11: "when" 
12: "duration(08: 00-18: 00)" 
13: "i d" 
14: "1001" 
policyldxArray 
2: 13 4 
Figure 6-5: The policy parsing process 
policyVector 
1: policyobjectl 
2: policyobject2 
In addition to parsing policy specifications and creating 
Java objects, logic policy representations 
in Event Calculus notation are also generated. These are communicated to the 
Prolog engine 
through the JPL interface where they are loaded to the 
local predicate database and are 
subsequently analysed for conflicts or used to 
drive the behaviour of on-line modules. 
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6.1.4 Interfacing with Prolog 
The client tool allows the user to interact with the Prolog environment in terms of initialising the 
analysis engines, loading policies, searching for conflicts, and introducing dynamic network 
events. This communication is achieved through the JPL interface and more specifically with its 
Query class, which is used to query the Prolog database or to invoke built-in predicates. 
Instances of the Query class used in the implementation build queries from the given arguments 
denoting the goal which is to be called. Arguments can be plain Prolog source text as in (a) below 
or compound terms following a predefined predicate (b). The latter case is used when committing 
policies to the predicate database. 
(a) q new Query(''holdSAt(Fluent, T)"); 
(b) q new Query("assert", compoundpoliCyTerm); 
The Query class implements the Java Enumeration interface, through which successive solutions 
can be obtained. The al 1 Sol uti ons () method is used for this purpose returning all query solutions 
as an array of hash tables, each containing key-value pairs and representing a single solution. 
Taking the query in (a) as an example, and assuming that fluents f1 nti and f1 nt2 hold at time T=1 
and T=2 respectively, the solutions array would have the following two hash tables: 
solutions[O] = [Fluent=>flntl, T=>ll 
solutions[l] = [Fluent=>flnt2, T=>2] 
The value of specific variables in any of the solutions can be retrieved with a get method, but 
because these are stored as objects of the Java base class object, they have to be cast back to their 
original type. F1 uent values, for instance, should be cast to stri ng type and T values to integers. 
6.2 Static Conflict Analyser 
The static analyser implements the logic for the detection of the various conflict types 
identified 
in Section 4.1 and takes as input Ponder policies that have been previously converted 
into their 
Event Calculus representation. The reasoning engine iterates through the policies aiming to satisfy 
the conditions specified in conflict rules, and outputs a set of conflicting policy pairs, along with 
an explanation of their occurrence. 
6.2.1 Prolog Implementation 
The main Prolog source files implementing the 
functionality of the static analysis system are 
depicted in Figure 6-6. When the engine is initialised through 
the graphical interface described in 
Section 6.1.2, the staticAnalyser file is loaded to the 
Prolog execution environment. This file 
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subsequently consults the rest of the source files in the diagram and also adds a set of clauses in 
the Prolog database which correspond to the various conflict detection queries that can be 
executed. These enable the analysis engine to either search for a specific conflict or for the entire 
set of identified conflict types based on the user's selection from the tool. The example clause 
below is used for detecting OQL qcPriority conflicts. In the case of multiple inconsistencies, the 
conditional part of the clause contains a conjunction of rules, one for each of the identified 
conflict types. 
solve(conflict(oqlQCPrior, ConfliCtData, T)): - 
conflict(oqlQcPrior, confliCtData(PolID1, P01ID2, QC1, QC2, OQU, OQL2), T). 
mgmtlnfoLoader II ecPreds 
init commaný 
--------- 
ý 
staticAnalyser 
from client too I 
helperFunctions conflictRules staticModIBehvr 
Figure 6-6: Static analysis engine implementation files 
The functionality provided by the rest of the Prolog source files is described below: 
0 mgmtInfoLoader loads the predicates representing system management information in 
terms of (a) managed objects, including their association with QoS modules and 
supported operations, (b) QoS class properties, e. g. relative priorities among QCs, (c) 
domains of mutually exclusive policy actions, and, (d) managed resources e. g. 
instantiated SLSs and TTs. 
0 ecPreds specifies the Event Calculus base predicates and axioms used by the detection 
engine as listed and described in Section 4.2.1, including the rule which is used to 
evaluate the holdSAtpredicate. 
0 In addition to the duration predicate used when evaluating policies, the 
file 
helperFunctions specifies a set of functions that are used during the evaluation of 
conflict rules. Examples include the isoverlap, member, 
listmembercount, sumof, and 
hopCount functions. 
conflictRules contains the logic predicates that encapsulate 
the conditions for the 
occurrence of the various static inconsistencies 
identified in Section 4.3. 
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staficModIBehvr contains the Event Calculus representation of the static modules' 
behaviour by making use of initiates and terminates predicates, which model state 
transitions. 
6.2.2 Conflict Detection Example 
Using a drop-down menu in the static analysis panel of the tool, the user can select whether to 
submit a general query for any possible inconsistency or to perform detection for a specific 
conflict type among loaded policies. This feature was added to the tool for demonstration and 
performance evaluation purposes. 
Static Analysis ------------------- ----------- --- - ----- -- 11 .... -ý -1 ....... - ................. - ----------------- ----------- ----- Dynamic Analysis 
F-blib-ake-PROL-OG kr-! Policies i PROLOG for ýýK; 6diný 
Conflict Detection Event Generator 
Conflicttypts: OQLcwed ! i! - 
NextEvent ýk 
Policies Policy Details Dynamic System Execution Policy Details 
Id IX0 141001 
on newRPCO 
id IOC-^ subject SISSPMA id 1003 target S*rvSatisf'40 
do soQltLvi(ef, 0.7) 
when duration(00: 00-08: 00) 
Analysis Results 
Conflicts Detected Conflict Details Conflicting Policy Conflicting Policy 
Conflict type: Static AC Conflict -> OQL QC Priority Coriffict ST=2: Id 1002 Id 1001 OQLCWe'a[IOcO. IvO: J 
OQLCWrmct[Im0.1001] For 2 QCs (QCI, QC2) on nQwRpC() on newFtK( 
with prlorlty(QCI) > prlorlty(QC2) subject sIsSPDIA subject slsSPMA 
CQLI I OQL2 target servSatisfMO target servSatisfMO 
QC2: aft, OQL2: 0.8, QCI: of, OQL1: 0.7 do setQltLvl(afl, 0-8) do setQ[tLvl(ef, 0.7) 
Tim* overlap: 00: 00-02,00 when duration(00: 00-02: 00) when duration (00: 0 0-0 6: 00) 
Conflict Scenario: 
T-0: ciocktick(O, 0), T= 1: systernEvent(newRPCo) 
Messages 
Loading pokoes from ', It: F: '%software'ýconflictlnifýsis%PolicVConflicVýnalyser\policyPep'ýlal[_Statjc\oql, txt 
Total policies read frcm, file: 4 
Oetecting OQL qcPrionty conflicts 
Analysis time: 0.012 secs 
Total GQL qcPnonty conflicts found: 3 
Figure 6-7: Detecting OQL qcPriority conflicts 
The screenshot of Figure 6-7 shows the results of statically detecting the occurrence of OQL 
qcPriority conflicts among four SLS-S policies that set the quality level of EF and AFI traffic 
classes for different times of the day. The bottom part of the results panel outputs general 
information about the process, including the analysis time and the number of conflicts detected. 
The upper part of the panel lists the detected conflicts, the pair of conflicting policies, and the 
details associated with each conflict. The example above shows the 
involved policies and the 
details of the first (out of three) conflict. The solution suggests that 
in the event of a new RPC, the 
conflict will occur between policies with IDs 
1002 and 1001, because of a time overlap during 
which, the OQL values set are inconsistent 
in relation to the priorities of the two QCs involved. 
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6.3 Dynamic Conflict Analyser 
For demonstrating the dynamic analysis approach presented in this thesis, a run-time execution 
environment that emulates the behaviour of on-line modules through state machines has been 
implemented. This is an Event Calculus based model of the system which allows the enforcement 
of policy actions. Dynamic reasoning engines interface with the run-time environment through an 
event handler, which provides a two-way notification service, allowing for an efficient and 
automated run-time analysis process, including detection invocation, and conflict resolution. 
6.3.1 Prolog Implementation 
The Prolog source files implementing the functionality of the dynamic analysis system as well as 
their relationships are depicted in Figure 6-8 below. 
mgmtlnfoLoader ý-ý rý ecPreds 
init command 
----------------------- initialiser conflictRules from client too[ 
dynModlBehvr 
polEnforcer 
moOperations 
monitoring event 
----- eventHandler dynamicAnalyser ---------------- from client tool 
Figure 6-8: Dynamic analysis engine implementation riles 
When the system is initialised through the graphical interface, the initialiser 
file is loaded to the 
Prolog execution environment. This file subsequently consults the rest of the source 
files in the 
diagram (only four connecting arrows shown here for simplicity) and also adds a set of 
facts in the 
Prolog database which correspond to the various states of an on-line module that can potentially 
lead to a conflict. 
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Deriving these states is essential for automating the invocation of the conflict detection process. 
This is achieved in three steps: 
Stet) I 
The first two lines of each of the conflict detection rules are iteratively parsed and two 
lists (one for each line) are created as follows: 
Line] = [conflict, ConflictType, ConflictData, ... ] 
Line2 = [holdsAt, oblig, PolID], Subj, operation, MO, OpName, ... ] 
9 Step 2 
For each detection rule, the second member of Line], as well as the sixth and seventh 
members of Line2, are used to instantiate the arguments of the following function, which 
is subsequently asserted as a fact: 
potconflop(confliCtType, OpName, mo) 
Multiple instances of this function represent the policy actions that can potentially cause a 
conflict when enforced. These actions are associated with a conflict type and a managed 
object. 
0 Step 3 
Based on the derived actions, the run-time state machines are enquired to determine the 
states dynamic modules can take as a result of enforcing those actions using the rule 
below: 
potconflstate(confliCtType, module, state): - 
potconflop(confliCtType, OpName, MO), 
initiates(dOACtion(operation(mo, OpName, J), state(module, state), 
By querying the Prolog database using this rule, the arguments conf Ii CtType, Modul e, and 
state are unified and a set of potential confl ict-c au sing states are asserted as facts. The 
example below represents the state associated with the minimum service rate violation 
conflict: 
potconflstate(srminviolation, slsj, srDecrsd) 
Once the analysis system has been initialised, the rest of the 
Prolog source files allow for policy 
enforcement and subsequently conflict analysis. Their 
basic functionality is described below: 
As in the case of the static analyser, the mgmtInfoLoader loads the predicates 
representing system management information 
(e. g. managed objects and resources), and 
ecPreds specifies the Event Calculus base predicates and axioms used 
by the system. 
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dynModIBehvr contains the Event Calculus representation of the dynamic modules' 
behaviour by making use of initiates and terminates predicates, which model state 
transitions. 
0 conflictRules contains the logic predicates that encapsulate the conditions for the 
occurrence of the various dynamic inconsistencies identified in Section 5.2. 
eventHandler specifies a set of rules that define how system events are handled. Apart 
from state transition and conflict analysis events, the rules can handle user generated 
events from the client tool. These represent emerging network conditions and lead to the 
enforcement of policies. 
0 polEnforcer specifies the rule for requesting an action; it evaluates whether a new event 
triggers the enforcement of a policy operation. 
0 moOperations implements the functionality of the managed objects. The rules specified 
in this file evaluate requests from the policy enforcer and execute supported operations by 
deriving new resource configuration values and updating the state of a managed module, 
as a result of a transition. 
0 dynan-ticAnalyser implements the dynamic conflict detection and resolution logic. It 
contains a set of rules for solving the various inconsistencies specified by the 
conflictRules file. 
6.3.2 Handling Events 
As briefly described above, the implementation of the Event Handler manages the various system 
events that can arise at run-time. These can be of three types: 
(a) Network monitoring events generated by the user from the client tool indicating, for 
example, threshold crossing alarms - SlSIAiamRaised(tclup, TT). 
(b) State transition events which are generated when executing policies - 
state(module, state). 
(c) Conflict analysis events which are issued by the dynamic analysis engine after successful 
detection of a conflict -ConfliCtDetected(confliCtType, confliCtData). 
The rules in Listing 6-1 define how the above events are 
handled. The first rule is the one called 
from the client tool for type (a) events, but also 
from a managed object and the dynamic analyser 
for events of type (b) and (c) respectively. 
This rule asserts the received event in Prolog's 
database and subsequently calls the function to 
handle it (handleEvent) by forward chaining. If the 
received event is a state transition one, the second rule 
is used to determine a potential association 
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with a conflict and the analysis logic is invoked (solve) to perform detection for that conflict. The 
last rule, which invokes the policy enforcer, is used for handling events of type (a) and (c). 
Listing 6-1: Rules for handling system events 
neXtEvent(Event, T): - 
assert(happens(systeMEvent(Event), T)), 
handleEvent(Event, T). 
handleEvent(state(module, state), Tl): - 
potconflstate(ConfliCtType, module, state), 
T2 iS T1+1, 
solve(conflict(confliCtType, ConfliCtData, T2)). 
handleEvent(Event, Tl): - 
T2 iS Tl+l, 
reqUeStACtion (operation (ObjTarg, OpName, Params), T2). 
6.3.3 Enforcing Policies 
The rule called by the Event Handler in the case of network monitoring or conflict analysis events 
is presented in Listing 6-2. The conditional part of rule first checks if the new event triggers a 
policy. The parameters of the ope ration term are unified upon a positive match, a request for an 
action is asserted in Prolog's database, and the associated managed object (objTarg) is 
subsequently invoked to perform the action (dOAC ti on). 
Listing 6-2: Rule for requesting an action 
requeStACtion(operation(objTarg, OpName, Params), Tl): - 
happens(systeMEvent(Event), T2), 
initiates(Event, oblig(PolID, objsubj, 
operation(objTarg, OpName, Params)), Tl), 
Tl>T2, 
assert(requeStACtion(operation(objTarg, OpName, Params), Tl)), 
T3 iS Tl+l, 
happens (doACtion (operation(objTarg, OpName, Params)), T3). 
The rules in Listing 6-3 complete the enforcement process by implementing the execution of a 
policy. When called by the enforcer, the first rule checks if the operation of the requested action is 
supported by the managed object. If so, the doACti on predicate 
is asserted as an event and the next 
two rules are used to update the state of the module and the value of the resource associated with 
the enforced policy. The updtResrc rule is specific to a policy action; multiple rules of this type 
implement the functionality of the various QoS management policy actions. The example here 
concerns the operation of 
decreasing the service rate of a traffic trunk, in the SLS-I module, by a 
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percentage (value). The resulting rate (NeWSR) is asserted in Prolog's database and is later used by 
the conflict analysis engine. 
The new state of a module, as a result of policy enforcement, is derived by the updtstate rule. 
Using the previously asserted dOACti on event, the rule searches the behavioural model of a module 
to determine if a state transition is caused by this event. Upon a positive match, the new state is 
passed to the Event Handler. 
Listing 6-3: Rules for executing a policy 
happens (dOACtion (operati on(objTarg, OPName, Params)), Tl)*- 
requeStACtion(operation(objTarg, OpName, Params), T2), 
operation(objTarg, OpName, Params), 
Tl>T2, 
assert (happens (dOACti on (ope ration (ObjTarg, OpName, Params)), Tl)), 
T3 iS Tl+l, 
updtResrc(module, OpName, Params, NewVal, T3), 
updtstate(module, OpName, state, T3). 
updtstate(module, OpName, State, Tl): - 
happens (dOACtion (operation(objTarg, OpName, Params)), Tl), 
initiates(doACtion(operation(objTarg, OpName, Params)), 
state(module, state), Tl), 
neXtEvent(state(module, State), T1). 
updtResrc(slsI, decrSR, [TT, Value], NeWSR, Tl): - 
mgdinfo(slsI, TT, [-, SR, 
SRP iS SR*Value/100, 
NeWSR iS SR-SRP, 
assert(reqSR(TT, NeWSR)). 
6.3.4 Performing Conflict Analysis 
Conflict detection logic is realised by a set of rules that perform analysis on a per conflict basis, 
i. e. one solve rule per conflict type. Based on the conflict with which a state transition event may 
be associated, the Event Handler invokes the detection process by using the solve predicate in the 
conditional part of the handleEvent rule. The confliCtType parameter, unified to a specific 
conflict, is subsequently used to search for a rule implemented 
by the Conflict Analyser that 
solves that conflict. The first rule of Listing 6-4, 
for example, solves srminviolation conflicts. 
This is achieved by calling the srminviolation conflict predicate 
from the specified detection 
rules and using deductive reasoning to satisfy 
its goal. If the conflict is successfully detected, a 
confliCtDetected event 
is asserted in Prolog's database and is used by the resolution logic 
(findRes rule) to determine if a policy has 
been specified for resolving that conflict. Upon a 
positive match, the conflict event 
is passed to the Event Handler, which triggers the enforcement 
of the resolving po icY. 
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Listing 6-4: Rules for conflict analysis 
solve(conflict(srminviolation, ConfliCtData, Tl)): - 
conflict(srMinViolation, confliCtData(polID1, P01ID2, TT, SRfS, SR), 
as sert(happens (SYS teMEvent(conf 1i CtDetected (srmi nviol ati on, 
confliCtData)), Tl)), 
findReS(srminviolation, ConfliCtData, Tl), 
T2 iS Tl+l, 
neXtEvent(confliCtDetected(srminViolation, ConfliCtData), T2). 
findRes(confliCtType, ConfliCtData, T): - 
happens (systeMEvent(conf Ii CtDetected(Conf 1i CtType, confliCtData)), T), 
in ti ates (systeMEvent (conf 1i CtDetected (Con fIi CtType, confliCtData)), oblig, T). 
A practical demonstration of the dynamic analysis implementation is provided in the next section. 
The example involves the enforcement of a SLS-I policy for decreasing the service rate of a traffic 
trunk, and shows how the tool developed detects and resolves as rmi nvi ol ati on conflict. 
6.4 Analysis Tool Evaluation 
This section presents the results of a number of experiments conducted to evaluate the 
performance and scalability of the static analysis engines developed, and to validate the 
functionality of the dynamic analysis process. All experiments were performed on a Centrino Duo 
2GHz processor with 2GB of RAM, and the subject of the conflict analysis were service 
management policies. 
6.4.1 Static Conflict Detection Performance Analysis 
The main aim of the performance evaluation experiments concerning static conflict analysis is to 
determine the relative times taken to detect inconsistencies among varying numbers of policy 
specifications. Performance is primarily influenced by the evaluation of a conflict predicate in 
terms of: (a) the cost in evaluating its conditions, and (b) the number of times 
it is evaluated. The 
experiments described below indicate that the number of conflicts only 
has a minor effect on 
performance, whereas the number of policies, policy types, and 
QoS-specific information are the 
main factors affecting the evaluation of a conflict predicate. 
6.4.1.1 Experiment 1 
This experiment aims at detecting an 
increasing number of conflicts among a fixed number of 
policies. We investigate three conflict 
types each of which applies to a separate set of 1000 
policies: redundancy and qcPrioriry conflicts among 
SLS-S policies for setting the quality level of 
EF traffic, and multiplexing conflicts 
between SLS-S policies for setting the service satisfaction 
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factors of AFI traffic. The conflict number was varied by introducing more inconsistencies in 
policy action parameters and policy validity time overlaps. As suggested by the results of Figure 
6-9, the number of conflicts does not have a significant impact on the performance with an 
average of I I% increase in analysis times over a range from 0 to 1000 conflicts detected. 
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Figure 6-9: Detection performance with varying number of conflicts 
Since there is no formal method in deriving the number policies required for managing a network, 
the experiments that follow assume that up to 3000 could be in use. This is a reasonable number 
of policies for large networks taking into account the number of managed devices, the supported 
QoS classes and the various constraints that can be used (e. g. hours of the day). These policies are 
not created all at once when the network is initially deployed but are gradually introduced either 
on an individual basis or collectively through a refinement process. 
6.4.1.2 Experiment 2 
To investigate the impact of policy types in the analysis, a mo dule- independent conflict is 
required which can detect the same inconsistency among different policy types and can ultimately 
provide a uniform basis upon which to compare performance. As such, the second experiment 
concerns redundancy conflicts detected over different numbers of policies. 
In the first case only 
one policy type is used - for setting the quality 
level of a single QoS class. The number of 
conflicts, although not having a substantial impact on the performance, 
is kept constant as the 
number of policies is varied. The number of times the conflict predicate is evaluated 
is defined by 
the number of policies since the detection process 
iteratively compares each policy with the rest in 
the set. This can be quantified by equation 
(1) below, where L is the number of policy types, and 
N, is the number of policies of a particular type. 
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xN, 
Figure 6-10 demonstrates the performance of the detection process where the execution time 
grows quadratically with respect to the number of policies, namely O(N2). As suggested by (1), 
for 2500 policies of a single type the detection predicate is evaluated I 999X 103 times, which takes 
39 seconds. Introducing more policy types, e. g. for setting service satisfaction factors and the 
upper limit in the RAB, the performance is significantly improved as the number of comparisons 
decreases, with all the conditions in the detection predicate only being fully evaluated when 
matching policy actions are found. For 2500 policies of two and three types, there is a 
performance improvement of 49% and 66% respectively. These results are validated against the 
theoretical gain provided by (1), which is 50% and 67%. 
60 
1 policy type 
50 2 policy types ------------------------------------- 
A3 policy types 
U) 40 -- ------------------------------------------------- 
4) - E 
- 30 -- -------------------------------------------------- 0) 
41) - 21. 
M 
C 20 ---------------------------------------------- ------ 
10 ------------------------------ ------ ---- --------- 
0 
0 100 200 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 
Policy number 
Figure 6-10: Redundancy conflicts - Detection performance against number 
of policies with varying policy types 
6.4.1.3 Experiment 3 
Another factor that influences analysis performance is application- specific information. This is 
particularly important when dealing with QoS management conflicts whose occurrence depends 
on such information, as for example the number of QoS classes supported and their impact on 
determining qcPriority conflicts among SLS-S policies setting the service quality level. Equation 
(2) below can be used to calculate the number of times the relevant predicate is evaluated when 
detecting such conflicts, where M is the number of QCs involved, 
L is a counter equal to M-1, and 
N, and N,, are the number of policies setting the quality 
level of particular QCS- For an example 
scenario involving three QCs, EF, 
AFI, and BE, policies setting the OQL of EF traffic are 
compared against the ones 
for AFI and BE, and those for AFI traffic against the ones for BE. It 
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can be shown that (N, xN2)+(N, xN3)+(N2xN3) comparisons are performed, where NI, N, ), and N3 
represent the number of policies associated with each QC. 
M 
INNin (2) 
Although of the same complexity of O(N2) as the previous experiment, the detection process for 
this conflict type is more expensive as indicated by Figure 6-11, especially with an increasing 
number of QCs- The experimental results indicate an increase of 35% in detection time between 
two and three QCs, and 53% between two and four, which are comparable to theoretical values of 
33% and 50% obtained by (2) respectively. 
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Figure 6-11: Detection performance against number of policies with varying QCs 
6.4.1.4 Experiment 4 
The last experiment compares the performance of various detection predicates. To provide a 
meaningful comparison this experiment involves a set of policies of the same type which is prone 
to more than one inconsistency. We consider redundancylqcPriority conflicts among service 
quality policies for two QCs, and redundancylmultiplexing conflicts between almost and full 
satisfaction factor policies also for two QCs. In the first case the performance of the qcPriority 
predicate is substantially worse than that of redundancy 
by an average of 52% over a range of 
3000 policies (Figure 6-12), despite the fact that it 
is evaluated half as many times based on 
equations (1) and (2). This demonstrates the simplicity 
in detecting redundancies involving the 
matching of policy actions, and the cost associated with 
determining relative priorities between 
potentially conflicting QCs- 
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Figure 6-12: Detection performance against number of policies for different conflict types 
The performance in detecting multiplexing conflicts is the most efficient with nearly 100% gain 
when compared to a redundancy analysis on the same set of policies. Equation (3) below can be 
used to calculate the number of multiplexing predicate evaluations, where L is the number of QCs, 
and NAs and NFs are the number of policies for almost and full satisfaction factors of a specific 
QC. 
L 
LNA, N,, 
1=1 
(3) 
For 2500 policies - NAs = NFs = 625 for each of the two QCs - equation (3) results in 781250 
predicate evaluations, which is achieved in 9.7 seconds, whereas double the number of 
comparisons are required to determine redundancy conflicts in 19.6 seconds. 
The last experimental result in Figure 6-12 concerns the sequential execution of all three conflict 
rules, where half of the policy set consists of service quality policies and the other half is equally 
split between policies for almost and full satisfaction factors; 2 QCs are involved. The combined 
performance is better than two of the individual predicate evaluations, which is attributed to the 
policy set and the decreased number of predicate evaluations. The number of policies associated 
with the expensive qcPriorily conflict, for example, has halved resulting to a 
75% decrease in 
evaluations of the relevant predicate. 
126 
Chypter 6. Tool Support and Experimental Evaluation 
6.4.2 Dynamic Analysis and Emulated System Behaviour 
The analysis tool developed interacts with the emulated dynamic behaviour of on-line modules by 
enforcing policies to anticipate emerging conditions regarding the network status and eventually 
handle potential inconsistencies at run-time. In contrast to static detection, dynamic analysis aims 
at discovering a single inconsistency at a time and enforcing the appropriate resolution policy. For 
this reason, searching the entire policy space for a conflict may not be required, thus improving 
the detection performance in comparison to static analysis. The evaluation of this approach is 
mainly in terms of correct functional behaviour in the event of a conflict. 
To demonstrate the functionality of the dynamic analysis engine, we consider a scenario involving 
the SLS-I module, which is loaded with 100 policies (reasonable number for a single router), and 
concentrate on managing the service rate of a specific TT. The current allocation for this TT is 
120Mbps with the almost and fully satisfied service rates set by SLS-S policies at 10OMbps and 
150Mbps respectively. Conflict specifications loaded in the system concern srMinviolation and 
srMaxViolation inconsistencies. The screenshot on Figure 6-13 shows the response of the 
analysis engine when an upper threshold crossing alann is received. 
Event Generator 
Next Event: sIsIAj3rmPaiseYtcPjp, ttI, - Go 
Dynamic System Execution 
T ID: E., ent = initialize -> sIsI state = idle 
Determined potential conflict causing states: srDecrsd, srlncrsd 
T 1: E. -ent = systemE, -ent(slslAlarmPaised(tclUp, ttl)) 
T 2: request. ction(ser, ýAdjustMO, decrSk, (ttl, 25)) 
T 3: E,, ent = doAction(servAdjustMO, decr--, P,, (ttl, 2S)) 
T 4: Required SP, , alue = 90, Nevv sisi state = srDecrsd 
Eý. -ent = systemEvent(state(slsl, srDecrsd)) 
-T=5: * DETECTION ENGINE ACTIVATED 
*, * 
* Detecting for sirMinViolation conflict... 
si-MinViolation conflict detected, caused by policy ID 1000 
Res... lution policy for srMinViolation conflict found... --- 
T=6: E,, ent = systemEý, ýent(conflictDete,: ted(srMinViolatic, n, 
decrSP- ttl)) 
T=7: requestAction(servAdjustMO, setSP, (ttl, 100)) 
T=8: Event = JoActi. on(ser, ýAdjustMO, setSP. (ttl, 1013)) 
-T=9: Pesol. ing SP ; alue = 100, Neýv slsl state = 
srSet -> idle 
Conflict Details 
Conflict type: Dynamic AC Conflict 
Lower Service Rate Violation (srMinViolation): 
policy attempted to set SR below SRas 
Conflicting policies'lDs: 1000,1001 
TT involved: ttl, with SRas=100 and SRfs=150 
Attempted policy action, SR: 90 
Resolution policy ID: 1100, SR: 100 
Conflict detected at: T=4 
Conflict resolved at: T=9 
Figure 6-13: Analysis example of a dynamic conflict - 
detection and resolution 
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The analysis process is initialised at T=O, at which point it sets the state of the SLS-I module to 
idle and detennines potential conflict-cau sing states from the loaded conflict specifications. In the 
example above, two such states are determined, which relate to service rate violations (srDecrsd 
and srIncrsd). At T=1 a user generated threshold crossing alarm is entered in the system, which 
triggers a policy for decreasing the service rate by 25%. The request for this action is issued by 
the policy enforcer at T=2, which is subsequently executed at T=4 by calculating the new rate 
(90Mbps) and deriving the new state of the module (srDecrsd). The latter activates the analysis 
engine for a potential srMinViolation at T=5, which detects the occurrence of the conflict and also 
identifies a resolution policy for this inconsistency. At T=6 the conflict detection event is issued, 
which leads to the execution of the resolution policy. This configures the service at the minimum 
acceptable (almost satisfied) rate and derives the new state of the module (srSet) at T=9- The 
cycle is completed with the SLS-1 module returning to idle state consuming not more than lOms- 
The delay introduced can be argued as being acceptable, even for the strict requirements of EF 
traffic, as long as conflicts do not occur extremely frequently. The lower part of Figure 6-13 
shows the specifics of the detected conflict including an explanation of the inconsistency, the 
policies involved, and the resolution enforced. 
6.5 Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter presented the design, implementation and evaluation of the conflict analysis tool that 
realises the approach for static and dynamic policy analysis. After presenting the overall 
architecture, a detailed description of the three main components of the tool was provided. 
The client application, which provides a graphical interface for the user to create, retrieve and 
view policies, display management information such as TTs and SLSs, but also to perform 
conflict analysis among a set of policies loaded in the system, was initially described. Details 
about the various classes implementing the functionality of the client were provided and the 
processes of policy input and policy parsing were illustrated with examples. The 
interface through 
which the client interacts with the underlying Prolog engines was also presented. 
The implementation of the static conflict analyser was then described, which focused on the 
functionality provided by the various Prolog source files and their collective use 
in detecting static 
inconsistencies. A practical example of detecting OQL qcPriority conflicts using the client 
application was given, demonstrating the ease 
by which the user can perform queries and the type 
of output he/she is presented with. 
In a similar manner, the Prolog 
implementation of the dynamic conflict analyser was described 
giving emphasis on the manner with which 
the analysis engine can be automatically invoked 
during system execution in order to 
detect the occurrence of a conflict and subsequently resolve it. 
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More specifically, we presented the main rules that are responsible for handling emerging system 
events, enforcing policies, and performing conflict detection and resolution. 
The last part of the chapter described a set of experiments that have been carried out in order to 
evaluate the tool developed. These allowed to identify the main reasons that influence the 
performance of the static analysis engines, and also to validate the functional behaviour of the 
dynamic analysis process. While the number of conflicts in a policy set has only a minor effect on 
the detection performance, the number of policies in the set, their type, and applic ation- specific 
information, such as the number of QoS classes supported, constitute the main performance 
factors. These control the number of conflict predicate evaluations and consequently the analysis 
times. Furthermore, the various conflict types investigated in the experiments exhibit different 
execution times for the same number of policies. This is attributed to the different requirements of 
individual detection predicates when evaluating their conditions. 
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Chapter 7 
7 Conclusions and Future Work 
Despite its potential benefits in managing complex systems, policy-based management has so far 
not been widely adopted. This is mainly due to the shortage of tools and techniques for analysing 
policies in order to guarantee configuration stability given that policies may have conflicts leading 
to unpredictable effects. 
This thesis presented an approach towards policy conflict analysis based on the formalisation and 
reasoning provided by Event Calculus and its application in the domain of QoS management for 
DiffServ networks. The subject of the analysis techniques presented is a set of management 
policies that can be used to influence/control the behaviour of key modules in the process of QoS 
provisioning. The various inconsistencies that can arise between these policies have been 
identified and classified based on their characteristics, which are used to describe the reasons and 
the conditions under which a conflict will arise. 
Conflicts that can occur between policies applied to a single management module, or between 
policies specified for different modules as a result of their hierarchical relationship have been 
defined. The main characteristic distinguishing between conflicts however, is the time-frame at 
which they can be detected. This has driven the design and specification of two 
different methods 
to address the issues associated with the analysis of conflicts that can 
be detected statically, at 
policy specification-time, and those that can only 
be determined dynamically, during system 
execution, based on feedback regarding the current state of the managed system. 
These techniques 
have been implemented and integrated in a conflict analysis tool aiming to provide a network 
administrator with a usable interface through which 
to interact with the management system and 
perform both static and dynamic consistency checks. 
The sections that follow provide an overview of 
the contributions, point out potential future 
directions of this work and conclude this thesis with some remarks. 
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7.1 Contributions Overview 
This section re-visits the main contributions of this work, as described in the introductory part of 
this thesis, which are discussed further. 
It is always beneficial to demonstrate the applicability of a new approach within a valid domain. 
In this respect, Chapter 3 presented a comprehensive set of QoS provisioning policies that can be 
used to guide the behaviour of IP DiffServ networks. Although QoS policies have been previously 
studied in the literature, they were focusing on basic management operations serving as proof of 
concept for the use of PBM in this domain. The policies defined in this thesis allow for a richer 
set of programmable operations, they are specified using the format provided by the Ponder 
language, and their effect on the managed system's functional behaviour has been described. 
Furthermore, the majority of these policies are generic enough to apply to other QoS and resource 
management frameworks, where functions for admission control and bandwidth management are 
essential. 
Conflicts specific to the application domain of QoS management primarily occur because of 
inconsistent attribute values set by policies. It is essential that these are individually identified 
such that the exact reason for their occurrence can be defined and eventually resolved by a 
network administrator or in an automated manner. Based on the QoS management policies 
defined, Chapters 4 and 5 provided a comprehensive review of potential conflicts that may arise 
between them, and classified those conflicts based on their properties. Furthermore, the rules 
defining the conditions that will result in conflicts have been specified and were therefore used, 
together with system-specific information, in analysis processes to determine the presence of 
inconsistencies. Since most of the defined policies are generic to a certain extent, re-use of the 
conflict detection rules in other QoS frameworks could be possible. 
The principal challenges in detecting policy conflicts are being able to account 
for the constraints 
that limit the applicability of a given policy to specific states of the managed system and the 
effects of enforcing policies on the states of the managed system. 
To achieve this, it is necessary 
to use formal reasoning techniques and formal models of the 
QoS management system behaviour, 
policy enforcement mechanisms and the policy rules themselves. 
Since the QoS management 
system and the policy enforcement mechanisms concerned are event-based 
reactive systems, 
Event Calculus has been used as the underlying formal representation. 
In addition to having built- 
in representations for events and persistence of properties, 
Event Calculus is a suitable formalism 
because it supports both deductive and abductive reasoning. 
The latter has been used when 
analysing for static inconsistencies, as 
described in Chapter 4, and provides the means to not only 
identify a conflict but also generate an explanation as 
to how that conflict occurred. This is 
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particularly important when guiding a network administrator to handle inconsistencies requiring 
manual resolution, as in the case of the static conflicts identified. 
Despite the fact that the resolution of static conflicts is performed manually, this process takes 
place before policies are deployed in the system and does not impose any run-time overheads on 
the functionality of on-line modules. Dynamic conflicts however, require system components to 
both detect and resolve conflicts in real-time, without degrading the performance of the system. 
This has been the main motivation behind the dynamic analysis approach presented in Chapter 5, 
which provides an automated run-time analysis process. This can be automatically invoked based 
on run-time network events, can provide a resolution if a conflict materialises, and also instruct 
the appropriate entity for the enforcement of that resolution. The latter is in the form of pre- 
defined policies that are generic enough with only few required for each conflict type to cater for 
multiple occurrences of the same inconsistency. 
The approach has been implemented in an integrated tool supporting both static and dynamic 
conflict analysis. As described in Chapter 6, the developed client application hides the complexity 
of the underlying logic formalism and reasoning techniques, allowing the user to perform analysis 
queries in a simplified manner and presenting the results in an easily understood form. Finally, the 
tool has been used to perform extensive experiments through which it was possible to identify the 
main reasons that influence the performance of the static analysis engines; the correct operation of 
the dynamic analysis process was also validated with a case study involving a service 
management conflict. 
7.2 Future Research Directions 
This section presents ways in which the work in this thesis can be extended. Potential future 
directions are summarised below: 
0 Enhancements to the tool: Although not very research oriented, some enhancements to 
the tool would further simplify its use. The conflict rules and the system 
behaviour 
representations are currently specified manually by a user who 
is familiar with the 
underlying logic formalism. An interface could be 
developed to input conflict rules in a 
higher level format closer to the user's understanding, which are subsequently translated 
to Event Calculus representations. A similar translation approach could 
be developed for 
system behaviour specifications which can 
be derived from UML state diagrams. 
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9 Integration with policy refinement: The analysis approach is currently perfonned on a 
set of policies that can be derived from high-level goals through a refinement process. 
Static conflict detection could be an integral part of policy refinement since both are off- 
line processes and achieve complementary objectives. A solution where potential conflict 
states are avoided at every step of the refinement process is envisaged. 
0 Inter-domain QoS policy analysis: The conflicts identified in this thesis concem 
policies that manage QoS within a single administrative domain. A challenging future 
direction is in the domain of collaborative QoS management, where neighbouring 
network providers set-up service-level agreements aiming to create an end-to-end chain 
for the delivery of QoS sensitive applications. The negotiation process is envisaged to be 
one where each provider tries to force its own policies in terms of requirements and 
objectives resulting in conflicting situations. A collaborative negotiating process would 
act as a mediator where an optimal solution, satisfying both entities, would be achieved 
through conflict analysis. Initial work has been done by investigating game theoretic 
approaches for the negotiation and policy harmonisation processes. 
0 Performance evaluation: Further experimentation with the dynamic analysis engines 
involving a bigger number of policies could be perfon-ned. Separate performance 
evaluations for the detection and resolution phases could be carried out, and the main 
factors influencing the performance of both could be identified. Furthermore, network 
traces could be used as input to the analysis process so that the frequency of run-time 
inconsistencies under realistic conditions, as well as possible conflict patterns, can be 
determined. 
Dynamic conflict analysis: The dynamic analysis approach could be extended by 
considering the requirements of more volatile application environments where policies are 
continuously changing to achieve adaptation based on emerging conditions. 
Initial work 
in ubiquitous networked environments has been carried out, which 
focused on conflicts 
arising between policies originating from 
different managing entities [108]. A mechanism 
to detect such conflicts has been developed, which employs an automated resolution 
process once a resolution strategy for each conflict 
type is agreed. The strategy depends 
on the contractual agreement between management 
entities and/or the business model of 
the managed network. 
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7.3 Epilogue 
It is evident that there is limited value in developing policy-based management systems that do 
not provide support for conflict detection and resolution. The importance of conflict analysis is 
accentuated by the recent view of policies as the enabling technology in autonomic networking 
where the diversity of programmable management functions can be considerably high. Future 
adoption of autonomic networking principles will require support for conflict analysis so that 
stability in the control loop can be ensured. 
Research has shown that with conflict analysis approaches not taking into account the system 
state, which, in most cases, constrains the applicability of policies, only simple checks can be 
carried out for the correctness of policies. As described in this thesis, formal logic notations can 
address this issue and also facilitate reasoning techniques to effectively analyse for conflicts. The 
ideas presented contribute to the effort for a wider uptake of policy-based management as a 
technology that can potentially simplify the management of complex systems. 
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ndix 
Appendix Al - Service Management Static 
Conflict Rules 
conflict(subscrAdmstrg, confliCtData(polID1, P01ID2, 
Strgl, strg2, vall, val2), TC) <-- 
holdSAt(oblig(POlID1, subj, operation(Targ, defsustrg, [Strgl, valll)), TC) 
holdSAt(oblig(POIID2, Subj, operation(Targ, defsUStrg, [strg2, val2])), TC) 
moreConsrvtv(strgl, Strg2) A vall>val2 A 
polID1\==POlID2. 
conflict(mltplexqcPrior, confliCtData(polID1, POIID2, QC1, QC2, MF1, MF2), TC) <-- 
holdSAt(oblig(POlID1, subj, operation(Targ, setAlmstSatisf, [QC1, MF11)), TC) A 
holdSAt(oblig(POlID2, subj, operation(Targ, setAlmstSatisf, [QC2, MF2])), TC) A 
priority(Qcl, Prtl) A priority(QC2, Prt2) A 
((Prtl>Prt2 A MF1>MF2) v 
(Prt2>prtl A MF2>MFI)) A 
pOlID1\==POlID2. 
conflict(inVCAdmStrg, confliCtData(PolID1, P01ID2, TT1, vall, Va12), TC) <-- 
holdSAt(oblig(POIID1, Subj, operation(initmo, setACmin, [TT1, vall])), TC) A 
holdSAt(oblig(POlID2, subj, operation(monitormo, setTCL, ETT2, Val2])), TC) 
TT1==TT2 A vall>val2. 
conflict(thrshIncompat, confliCtData(PolID1, P01ID2, TT1, vall, val2), TC) 
holdSAt(oblig(PolID1, subj, operation(Targ, SetTCL, ETT1, valll)), TC) A 
holdSAt(oblig(POIID2, subj, operation(Targ, setVCL, [TT2, val2])), TC) A 
TT1==TT2 A vall>val2. 
conflict(thrshQcprior, confliCtData(PolID1, P01ID2, TT1, TT2, Vall, Val2), TC) 
holdSAt(oblig(PolID1, subj, operation(Targ, setTCL, ETT1, valll)), TC) A 
holdSAt(oblig(PolID2, subj, operation(Targ, setTCL, [TT2, val2])), TC) A 
mgdInfo(slsS, TT1, EQC1, -1) A 
mgdinfo(slss, TT2, EQC2, -]) A 
priority(QC1, Prti) A priority(QC2, Prt2) 
((Prtl>prt2 A vall>val2) v 
(Prt2>Prtl A val2>vall)) A 
polID1\==POIID2. 
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Appendix A2 - Traffic Engineering Static 
Conflict Rules 
conflict(altPathExceed, confliCtData(polIDI, P01ID2, T-r, ic, PathNum), TC) holdSAt(oblig(PolID1, subi, 
operation(Targ, setmaAltPaths, [QC1, TT, PathNum])), TC) holdSAt(oblig(PolID2, Subj, 
operation(Targ, setUPLSP, EQC2, TT, Path, BWI)), TC) A 
instcount(operation(Targ, setUPLSP, EQC2, TT, IC) A 
IC>PathNUM A Qcl==QC2. 
conflict(bwRtViolation, confliCtData(polID1, P01ID2, QC1, Bwl, BW2), TC) <-- 
holdSAt(oblig(POlID1, subj, operation(bamo, setNDmax, EQC1, Bwll)), TC) 
holdSAt(oblig(POlID2, Subj, 
operation(Ispmo, setUPLSP, EQc2, TT, Path, Bw2])), TC) A 
Bw2>BW1 A Qcl==QC2. 
conflict(ndqCprior, confliCtData(PolID1, POIID2, Qcl, Prtl, QC2, Prt2), TC) 
holdSAt(oblig(PolID1, subj, operation(Targ, opi, [QC11)), TC) A 
holdSAt(oblig(PolID2, subj, operation(Targ, op2, [QC2])), TC) A 
meops(muteXHOpCountCalc, mutexops) A 
member(opl, mutexops) A member(op2, mutexops) A 
priority(Qcl, Prti) A priority(QC2, Prt2) A 
((Prtl>Prt2 A moreconsrvtv(op2, opl)) v 
(Prt2>Prtl A moreConsrvtv(Opl, op2))) A 
polID1\==POlID2. 
conflict(spareBW, confliCtData(polID1, P01ID2, POIID3, BW1, Bw2, Bw3, BW), TC) <-- 
holdSAt(oblig(PolID1, subi, operation(Targ, allocspareBWEXpl, [ef, BW11)), TC) A 
holdSAt(oblig(POIID2, subj, operation(Targ, allocspareBWEXpl, [af, Bw2j)), TC) A 
holdSAt(oblig(POlID3, subj, operation(Targ, allocspareBWEXpl, [be, Bw3l)), TC) A 
SUMOf(BW1, Bw2, BW3, BW) A BW>100. 
conflict(excSBW, confliCtData(PolID1, POIID2, 
holdSAt(oblig(PolIDI, subi, operation(Targ, 
holdSAt(oblig(POIID2, subj, operation(Targ, 
holdSAt(oblig(PolID3, subj, operation(Targ, 
SUMOf(BW1, Bw2, BW3, BW) A BW<100. 
P01ID3, BW1, Bw2, M, BW), TC) <-- 
redoverBWEXpl, Eef, BW11)), TC) A 
redoverBWEXpl, Eaf, Bw2l)), TC) A 
redoverBWEXpl, [be, Bw3])), TC) A 
conflict(minmaXBW, confliCtData(PolID1, P01ID2, 
holdSAt(oblig(PolID1, subj, operation(Targ, 
holdSAt(oblig(PolID2, subi, operation(Targ, 
holdSAt(oblig(PolID3, subi, operation(Targ, 
SUMOf(BW1, Bw2, Bw3, BW) A BW>100. 
P01ID3, BW1, Bw2, M, BW), TC) 
setNDmax, [ef, BW11)), TC) A 
SetNDmax, [af, BW21)), TC) A 
setNDmax, [be, BW31)), TC) A 
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Appendix A3 - Service Management Dynamic 
Conflict Rules 
conflict(srminviolation, confliCtData(polID1, POIID2, TT1, SRas, SR), TC) I 
holdSAt(oblig(POIID1, subj, operation(serVAdjustmo, decrSR, [M, vall)), TC) 
holdSAt(oblig(PolID2, subj, operation(initmo, setSRas, [M, SRasl)), TC) A 
reqSR(TT1, SR) A SR<SRas A TT1==TT2. 
conflict(inVCAdmstrg2, confliCtData(PolID1, P01ID2, T-ri, ACmax, VCL), TC) <- 
hold SAt(oblig(POI I D1, Subj, operation (serVAdjustmo, decrACmax, ETT1, Val I)), TC) 
holdSAt(oblig(POIID2, subj, operation (moni torMO, setVCL, [TT2, VCLI)), TC) A 
reqACmax(TT1, ACmax) A ACmax<VCL A TTI==TT2. 
Appendix A4 - Traffic Engineering Dynamic 
Conflict Rules 
conflict(ndminViolation, confliCtData(PolID1, P01ID2, QC1, Link, BW, NDmin), TC) <- 
holdSAt(oblig(PolID1, subj, operation(bamo, decrAlloC, [Link, Qcl, vall)), TC) A 
holdSAt(oblig(POIID2, Subj, operation(initmo, setAllocMin, [QC2, NDMin])), TC) A 
reqBW(Link, QC1, BW) A BW<NDmin A QC1==QC2. 
conflict(underAllOC, confliCtData(PolID1, P01ID2, Link, QC, BW, A1100, TC) <-- 
holdSAt(oblig(POIID1, subj, operation(bamo, decrAllOC, [Link, QC, Val])), TC) A 
holdSAt(oblig(PolID2, subj, operation(initmo, setRsrCAlloc, 
ELi nk, Al I OCI TC) 
totalReqBW(Link, BW) A BW<AlIOC. 
conflict(thrshIncompat, confliCtData(polID1, P01ID2, QC1, Link, BW, Thup), TC) 
<- 
(holdSAt(oblig(PolID1, subj, operation(bamo, incrA110C, [Link, QC1, Vall])), TC) A 
holdSAt(oblig(PolID2, subj, 
operation(monitorMO, incrThs, [Link, Qc2, Val2l)), TC)) v 
(holdSAt(oblig(POIID1, subj, operation(bamo, decrAlloc, 
ELink, QC1, Vall])), TC) A 
holdSAt(oblig(PolID2, subj, 
operation(monitorMO, decrThs, 
[Link, QC2, val2])), TC)) A 
reqBW(Link, QC1, BW) A reqThUppr(Link, 
QC2, ThUP) A 
ThUp>BW /\ Qcl==QC2. 
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